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Evocations
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Epic Working Class Poem
Originally Posted 1 July 2015

Home is the place where, when you have to go there,
They have to take you in.
Robert Frost, “The Death of the Hired Man.”
I
Earth,
with the money extracted
and sent down South,
is just this blistered mass,
prime matter heaped beside railway tracks,
far from discriminating eyes.
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But does that prevent
me, with broader tastes,
from suggesting (and not in jest),
that it is not waste,
but sculpture made by hands
that had no intention,
as they drilled and blasted,
crushed and roasted,
separated and poured,
colluded with the random geometry
of cooling and tumbling,
to produce something
that I am compelled to admire
here,
on this road,
that is quite literally,
the end of the line?
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II
Grown
in the North.
Beards and bear piss blueberries,
rhubarb and Blezzard Valley potatoes;
these thin acidic soils
will not suffice,
I fear,
to attract network attention.

Unless,
in my long absence,
by grace of global warming blessing,
the sins of frost-bite winds
have been redeemed
with produce more exotic,
for your weekend farmer’s market,
just one more token of a type
now found everywhere,
and locally!
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III
City,
perpetually off-balance,
wobbling atop granite pullulations
that seem alive,
although they aren’t.
Stubbornly, they refuse to hide
their still blackened surface from tourists,
otherwise impressed.

They used to say:
“It looks just like the moon!”
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[“Really, lady, have you been to the fuckin’ moon?”].
Buzz Aldrin has and he,
il miglio fabbro,
saw and said it best:
“Desolation. Magnificent desolation.”

Not everything beautiful, you see,
needs to be green and pretty,
and no one should be ashamed,
of how they had to make their living.

IV
Work
you never had to live
is easy to romanticise.
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The too-young dead might disagree,
if they could speak.
But only the living can tell stories
of heroic union battles
not to be repeated anytime soon.

Somewhere,
a dusty archive proves
this place once had some fight.
But today all you hear
from the old timer in Rudy’s,
coming in for a coffee,
and almost the best burger in the city,
is defeat:
“Hey Petey, where the hell is everyone?
I just drove past Little Stobie
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and there was hardly a goddamn person on the line.”

V
Cold,
there is something clarifying about it
that you have to breathe to understand,
something that maybe unhinges a man,
and makes him think
that his monstrous trapper’s hat,
face of fox and tail of wolf
[I shit you not]
would intimidate the twelve year olds,
and ensure victory
for his son’s side.
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But no one traps a loon,
whose perfect melancholy
is never sung,
until he’s sure that work is over,
and the sky’s quiescent purple
has settled us on the dock,
to pour the rye and ginger,
and drink
a toast to each of us,
to the cliches we once were,
and loved.

VI
It is summer now.
And the night is warm.
And no one needs to rush.
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Sudbury-Windsor, May-July, 2015
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Fer Windsor (Re-gift Version)
Originally Posted December 24th, 2015
A re-gift (for my friends, colleagues, family, Josie, and fellow Windsorians) of my piece “Fer
Windsor.” It was first shown in the exhibition, “Stories of the City 2015,” Organized by the
(in)Terminus collective at the School of Creative Arts (SOCA), University of Windsor. Thanks to
Michael Darroch and Lee Rodney for organizing the exhibition and Sasha Opeiko of SOCA for her lay
out work.
.
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READINGS: JOHN BROWN: NEW
PAINTINGS
Originally Posted, November 27th, 2014
John Brown
New Paintings
Olga Korper Gallery
17 Morrow Ave.,
Toronto
(until December 19th, 2015)
Untitled
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“The transitoriness of things is essential to their physical being, and not at all sad in itself; it becomes
sad by virtue of a sentimental illusion, which makes us imagine that they want to endure, and that their
end is always untimely; but in a healthy nature it is not so.” (George Santayana, “A Long Way Round to
Nirvana,” p. 59). Look, the column is separating and soon it will collapse. No structure is so perfectly
crystalline and internally stable that it can withstand time. Painting is not sentimental because it does not
look back to what was, but makes a claim for eternity. The painting that you are looking at is always

now. However, it too, being material, cannot last and must go under. The column is separating and will
bring the whole edifice down. But not yet.
Untitled

“At this stage you must admit that whatever is seen to be sentient is nevertheless composed of atoms that
are insentient. The phenomena open to our observation do not contradict this conclusion or conflict with
it. Rather, they lead us by the hand and compel us to believe that the animate is born, as I maintain, of
the insentient.”(Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe,” p. 59). There, right at the centre, do you see
it? Is that not a face emerging from the swirl of brush strokes, distinguishing itself from the block of
material in the background? Out of the universal swirl comes order. The paint is affixed to the surface,
it does not move, and yet it expresses dynamism and development, emergent coherence, structure,
meaning, life.
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Windsor

“Only art restores the dimension of the senses to an encounter … Art, in all its forms, is a great
reflection on the event as such. A great painting is the capture by its own means of something that
cannot be reduced to what it displays.” (Alain Badiou, In Praise of Love, p. 78). One wants to know,
one demands, “what is that a picture of?” But no painting is a picture of anything, it is a picture, a
creation; knowing it, “understanding” it, is not tantamount to reducing it to its origins “in the real
world.” It is not a mystery to be decoded but a world to be entered into on its own term (terms which
always change) The painting is its own real world, re-invented every time it stops one in one’s tracks
and forces one to look at it. There is nothing hidden; the painting is the surface and the meaning is
there, if anywhere.
Wrong Place Wrong Time
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Aesthetic form is not opposed to content … in the work of art, form becomes content and vice
versa.” (Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, p. 41). The problem with all formalisms is that

they are one-sided; products of prodigious cleverness or even genius, they nevertheless lack the
reciprocity between form and content that truly arresting art possesses. There is no versa (content
becoming form) but only vice (form becoming content). In formalism there is experiment and
transgression of boundaries, and thus creativity and new openings, but the connection to ultimate
problems is lost. Attention is attracted, but not held for long. The arresting work is the unity of form and
content established by the sui generis rule by which each work is composed. The enduring work of art
takes us somewhere else, down to the ground, to the real problems.
Green Figure

“It is not the artist’s job to restore a supposed “reality” that the search for knowledge, techniques, and
wealth never stops destroying … The spirit of the times is definitely not geared to what is pleasing, and
the task of art remains that of the immanent sublime, that of alluding to an unpresentable which has
nothing edifying about it.” (Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Representation, Presentation, Unpresentable,” p.
128). Hence, what you see on first glance must be resisted– a dark figure emerging from a chrysalis,
scowling, menacing. However, seeing the unpresentable is also not a matter of treating the painted
image as a symbol, a reference to something else. Always, it is a matter of seeing the thing itself, the
painted surface as a complete whole which pictures that which photography or the literal eye cannot
record– the act, the art, of picturing.
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Grimm 96

“”What distinguishes, among other things, man from the beasts is this capacity for abstraction. All our
forms of communication are are abstractions from the whole context of reality. Moreover, one is able to
chose on one’s own part the degree of abstraction one wants to be involved in.” (Robert Motherwell,
“On The Humanism of Abstraction.” p. 250). That capacity distinguishes us, yes, but also, and moreso,
the singularity of our faces. All painting involves abstraction, but it is not all, thereby, “abstract.” Then
again, not is all painting that is not abstract is “representational.” It is picturing, an act, not a
classification. The painting abstracts from the details of the face what is essential to the picturing of a
human face– how little, indeed, is needed. Look- here is what a face is, concentrate on it.
Imaginary Portrait of Roy Orbison Singing Crying
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“[The artist] must give the void its colours.” (Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 84). And its
humour. Neither the dignity of the human person, nor the dignity of the human body, not the dignity of
human creations elevate us above the pleasure of giving funny names to things. To not be able to laugh
at others and oneself in turn is inhuman. If one had to choose, it would be better to be the laughing
animal than the rational animal. The void must be coloured and it must echo with our laughter. From
void to void our lives move in tragicomedy. We are able to bare the terror of the idea of emptiness
because there is music and laughter.
Yellow Head

“When our first encounter with some object surprises us and we find it novel, or very different from
what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it ought to be, this causes us to wonder and to be
astonished at it. Since all this may happen before we know whether or not the object is beneficial to us,
I regard wonder as the first of all the passions.” (Rene Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, p. 350). In a
whole universe full of objects of wonder what is more wonderous than we ourselves? Our motivations
are endlessly opaque even to our own reflections, our bodies are beautiful in uncountably multiple ways,
our senses and minds are constantly open to what may present itself. Our wonder at ourselves
constantly engenders new ways to look, picture, sound, relate, build and interpret, all in the service of
providing answers to questions that must always be posed anew.
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WINDSOR SPACES: ATKINSON PARK
Originally Posted April 13, 2016
This essay will be the first in an occasional series of unambivalent notes of appreciation for some
Windsor spaces that I like because they make me feel like I live in a city. Moving from Toronto to
Windsor more than a decade ago generated some ambivalent (to say the least) feelings. Still, Windsor is
now home, and I think, without being overly sentimental, that we should appreciate the place we call
home (which does not preclude criticism of it, when necessary). Windsor’s governance and leadership
often leave much to be desired. For someone who thinks, as I do, that the living intensity and cultural
and creative dynamism of cities are the greatest achievement of human social interaction, the suburban
attitude that too often prevails in civic life here is lamentable. Nevertheless, while Windsor is a small
city, it is a city, and these essays will share with the readers my admiration for some spaces that I find
intensely urban. The guide books (are there guidebooks about Windsor?) won’t know about these spots,
so if you ever visit, seek them out and see if your feelings coincide with my own. First up: Atkinson
Park.
No one will mistake Atkinson for Central Park. There was no Olmstedian moving of heaven and earth
to shape it. It is an ordinary one square block flat field stretching from Riverside to University between
Rankin and Partington. It is simply laid out: some picnic tables (far enough apart to conduct sheltered
conversation, close enough to share if you prefer), to sit and listen to Detroit hum, to watch the ships go
by and the river dance from slate grey to tropical turquoise, depending on the light or, in the dark, to see
the water become a mirror, perfectly reflecting the lights of the bridge. A little further in, a utilitarian
change room, swings and monkey bars for kids, a wading and an adult pool, a soccer pitch, and
skateboard park. It is not a memorable work of landscape architecture. But parks are not museum
pieces, artifacts, they are spaces for gathering and play.
Gathering: from around the world the soccer players come every spring, summer, and autumn afternoon
that it is warm enough to play. From Africa, from across the Middle East, from Pakistan and India:
whomever shows up seems to be included. I have never counted, but on good days there are certainly
more than eleven aside. The game is played hard, but relations between the players seem
friendly. Sometimes, when I see foreign students by themselves walking past my house I can see the
depth of their loneliness in the desperation with which they clutch their phones. They are realizing that,
ultimately, there is no substitute for shared presence. They find that shared presence on the pitch, where
no one is lonely and laughter, calling for the ball, sighing after a missed attempt on goal together sing an
atonal symphony of languages and accented Englishes. The joy of strangers together playing…
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… playing and not talking into their devices the local boys (and sometimes girls, but mostly boys) risk a
broken bone or a gashed knee (no helmets or knee pads for most) if they should spill. They nevertheless
dare the jumps and ramps to upend them, hopping in real pain when the trick fails but always laughing
too after even the nastiest of crashes. I admire their adolescent resilience from the soft safety of middle
age rotundity. The equipment is now densely graffitied: an action painting has emerged from the
overlapping and crowding of the individual tags. The Rothko-coloured store wall that frames the west
side of the park is still relatively empty, an inviting blank canvas. If not for this park I might forget that
kids and teenagers laugh, tethered as they usually are, staring mindlessly into a screen with ears plugged
in, cut off from the material world that nevertheless won’t go away. But here phones are not,

skateboards and BMX’s are, carrying bodies (not avatars) in happy sweating motion, recovering a long
suppressed truth: where movement is, boredom is not.
On occasion the acrid fun of pot smoke wafts across the park, and sometimes passing through on my
bike I have to brake quickly to avoid running over shards of broken glass. But there is no moral panic
from the neighbourhood- minding your own business can be a virtue in a city, and it is not that difficult
to stop, bend over, and pick up some glass.
On other occasions a different moral panic threatens: The costs! The costs! Of what? The pool, used
mostly by lower income kids from the social housing units on Union Street and the elderly residents
who still live in the West End in great numbers but whose existence is almost always forgotten and
ignored by the rest of Windsor. The vitriol directed against the meager costs of the meager pleasures of
the poor and old tells one all one’s needs to know about this world.
Or rather, it does not, for there is the other side: the commitment the community has shown to protect
the park from the budget choppers. Atkinson’s most engaged protectors have helped to create and
preserve a small zone of urban neighbourhood life at the edge of the mostly uninspiring sprawl that
concludes the country at its southwestern border.
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OCEAN CYCLE: EIGHT MEDITATIONS
Originally Posted August 24, 2015

Gulf of St. Lawrence: West Mabou Beach
We call Henry Moore a sculptor, why not the sea? What makes a sculpture? Intentional transformation
of structure? Or just material transformation? I stroll to the rhythm of the gently lapping waves and
Moore’s supple organic forms come to mind. I think: “There was a man who learned abstraction from
spending time along the sea shore collecting bleached seal bones and caressing stones whose hard, dead,
unloving, unlaughing mineral angles have been mollified into the rounder and receptive contours of
living flesh.” Metamorphosis of structure without conscious design, like John Cage, letting musical
order evolve by ascesis to chance; not art imitating nature but nature as art. I do not mean picturesque
appearances- they are merely pretty, pleasing to the eye, but the elemental forces of creation and
transformation. The art that created the human artist from molecules in this sea that I walk beside.
Gulf of St. Lawrence: Inverness Beach

25

All along the coast the metronomic shwarshing of the waves, self-ramifying in their intensity under a
steady North Easterly wind, relaxes the tension in my shoulders and dissolves the capacity to care about
anything else but the next step. The mind is free to think and the idea comes to me: a manifesto of
mechanico-natural art. The beautiful as the unintended product of blind natural forces doubling over
against themselves: creation as material structuring, beauty as recreation of the material structure to
something approaching the appearance of conscious intention where there really is none. And then
further: a museum of mechanico-natural art, artistic practice displaced from production to selection (not
curation, for all commentary will be forbidden- one will have to see without looking and feel without
talking). But then, immediately, the objection: the human-loathing eco-crowd for whom nature is stasis
and everything must be left alone, just as it is (forgetting, of course, that “just as it is” is an illusion
born of human time consciousness, that a thousand years ago “just as it is” was very different, and a
thousand years hence, will be very different again, and everything in the universe changes form and
without assemblage and re-assemblage there would be no one alive to worry about the injustice of
moving pebbles). And then the solution: the museum shall be empty, and the idea will be so irresistible
that other empty museums of mechanico-natural art will spring up all along the world’s coastlines, and

superstar architects will be hired to top each other’s hundred million dollar empty buildings, competing
with one another to construct ever more impossible geometries, and the tourists will come by the
thousands to marvel at the exquisite complexes of emptiness, and justify the entrance fees they paid
by projecting ever more elaborate fantasies into the empty spaces, and then afterwards dine at snob
restaurants, drink, and later stroll along the beach, pausing to piss on the pebbles that it would have been
an eco-crime to move.
Atlantic Ocean, Dominion Beach
Fortunately for the locals, the bourgeoisie do not like coal dust mixed with their surf, so the good people
of Dominion have escaped the fate of other indigenous shore dwellers, of being herded inland and
allowed back only with pass cards as servants to the not-beautiful people who fill the resorts that
rise alongside privatised shores. A bay of irony: towering piles of coal feeding a generating station
surrounded by wind turbines built along the headlands defying the Atlantic that will not be forever
resisted. The people and their proud clapboard homes have held out against January gales and
unfavourable economic climates, their past no longer possible and perhaps not ever good; the future
jobless spinning turbines. But fuck ’em both, past and future, today the beach is a perfect crescent
arcing from cliff to cliff. Just off shore, a lobster boat is anchored, lifted gently from below by the
curling waves while above an unrelenting sun smiles at the collective laughing satisfaction with now.
Atlantic Ocean, Ingonish Beach
The inexperienced swimmer has no way of knowing what is coming. A dozen meters away what will be
a six foot wave is just a dark exhalation; a gentle swelling of the sea then suddenly upon you, rearing
translucent blue, at the bottom a turbulent green churning engine driving it up and over, urged by the
whole ocean cramming itself into this bay, curving two-dimensional surface into three dimensional
body, accelerating, rolling, arching over upon itself, holding its topography long enough to propel you
forward, gliding irresistibly along its solid liquidity before it breaks and releases you, its Platonic
geometrical perfection disintegrating into a chaos of bubbles and foam, and there you are submerged
when only a moment ago the water was knee deep. A respite. Peace. It all slides back out to sea,
tugging at your ankles and saying, “just let go, come with us, out to that perfect blue infinity, we’ll carry
you, you don’t have to work, just let your self float.” But the peace of the whole is death for the part, so
you sturdy yourself and walk laughing back to shore, and then look out again to sea, Cape
Smokey driving hard and fast into the Atlantic to the right, toney Keltic Lodge sneering down from the
left. But here below a more proletarian feel. Beyond the massaging sands and exuberant crashing of the
surf, struggle and pain and sadness demand our time. But they are not here, in this
ephemeral democracy of playing bodies.
Gulf of St. Lawrence, Fishing Cove
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Without contrast, no beauty. The sea without headlands, the headlands without sea, the living green
spruce without the dead grey stumps, the dead grey stumps without the living green spruce, the sloshing
of the waves without the trickle of the creek, the trickle of the creek without the sloshing of the waves,
the peak of the mountain without the flat of the valley, the flat of the valley without the peak of the
mountain, the slate grey of the Gulf without the copper of the river, the copper of the river without the
slate grey of the Gulf, would never attract the eye or ear. They would be the whole, and thus not
noticeable in their particularity. Their particularity depends on their opposition to what limits them, and
this limitation is the difference that lets their beauty be perceived. One thinks that one could tarry
forever at the sight and sound, but as beauty depends on contrast, so life depends on movement. The

steep upward path awaits. The pain the descent has produced in one’s thighs has been relieved; the
ascent promises a panting, gasping chest. It is good to be a body that sees and hears and sweats.
Atlantic Ocean, Middle Head Trail
A paradox of distance. From afar it looks higher, but also, more gently sloped. But then the trail ends
like you can’t believe: grassy plane, slight incline, then straight down, forty five meters, no dangerdestroying railing or fence, just sea stirred to churning indigo-sapphire-emerald whirlpools by the rocks
that will one day succumb but not today, and you think: “There would be no surviving that!” And then:
“Yes, it is good to be a body that sweats and sees and hears the haunting roar of the waves,” and,
wanting more, creeps forward a little more, apprehensive, but wanting to feel the sheerness in the tingle
of the arches of my foot that say: “Don’t go too far.” But the good body is not a machine, and heights
can summon strange thoughts: “Wouldn’t my aching muscles be soothed by that frothing turbulence, so
inviting? What if I were to just jump, ignore the height and the jutting rocks and leap?” It would be too
late for that censor reason, once the descent had commenced, to correct the course and return to the cliff,
for my arms, unlike the egrets ignoring me on their perch, cannot command the sky, and then, at the
bottom, it would no longer be good to be a body. These are the thoughts a man thinks sometimes, when
his mind is not set to working.
Atlantic Ocean, Aspy Bay
The clichéd response is to say: “Yes, each is as insignificant as these pebbles slowly being ground to
beach sand in which our footprints disappear after only a half an hour; each is as nothing against
the waves, one withdrawing meeting the other advancing and in the collision spinning themselves, like a
dynamo, from soothing sloshing to jet engine roar, lifting up and crushing down in a tremendous wet
thud that shakes the beach; each has come from those elemental forces and will return to them, and the
names of all of us will be forgotten.” But the truth is that it is the sea that is as nothing without the
presence of the feet of each that feels the sand and the ears that hear the roar and the eyes that look out
into the endless blue openness and the mind that is at once elevated and terrified by what it thinks in that
moment.
Gulf of St. Lawrence, Pleasant Bay
Life and not just theory paints its grey on grey, but in the dreary absent colour of the withdrawing
waves, in the force that sets the pebbles to rattlesnake hissing and the stones to haunted knocking (like
someone trying to escape, but resigned to not being strong enough) there is beauty too: the beauty of
subtle shading, of dynamic patterns in the ripples far out to sea, of its patient inhalation and exhalation; a
beauty that requires attention. But there is no beauty without contrast. The clouds will clear and the
grey will lift, the indigo blue of the Gulf will return, and then the sun will set in a Munchian palette of
yellow and orange and red and magenta striations and swirls. A last exuberance. There is no beauty
without contrast, but when the last purple line between sea and sky is erased, then there is
disappearance. Void.
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COMMEMORATION
Originally Posted January 29, 2016

“But the dead know nothing, they have nothing for their labour, their very memory is forgotten, their
love has vanished with their hate and jealousy, and they have no share now in anything that goes on in
the world.” (Ecclesiastes, 9:5-7)
It is time which is unjust, not we the living. We remember, but time is indifferent to goners, always on
to the next thing. It won’t wait while we shed a tear or tell another story. It insists, and we have no
choice but to follow. It is time that is unjust, not we the living,.
We mean no disrespect. The dead, always gracious, do not accuse us. We say: “It is not true, we do
remember, we have not let you go gently into that good night, you are not lost, the thought of you still
stirs our hearts.” And it is true: we walk around in a cloud of sorrow and every street corner reminds us
of you. We mean no disrespect.
But how quickly the details fade. At first: “it is like he is here with us.” But then: a shrinking
repertoire of stock stories. And then: a shadowy caricature, tragedy lost in comedy. Finally: we are
gone too, and with us, our memories. By what right could we task those who remember us with
remembering our memories too? How quickly the details fade.
If the individual mind is too small, let us remember together. We will co-memorate, call matter to our
aid in the struggle against time. We will outwit time by inscribing in granite all the names of all the
dead. No one’s name will be forgotten. If the mind of the individual is too small, let us remember
together.
But after two generations, who visits? The name detaches from the person and soon there is no left who
can “put a face to the name.” So who is the person, the face or the name? If the face, then what good is
the stone? When the stone is, the face is not. We are creatures of time and our truth lives within it- each
of us comes to be, and each of us passes away. After two generations, who visits?
It matters not how many names are remembered. Of all who have lived, but a few names live on, and
for how long: a couple of millennia? Are we to say that all those whose names have been lost
amounted to nothing? But they are your ancestors, and if even one had not been, you too might never
have been. It matters not how many names are remembered.
The dead escape the vanity of the living. They do not ask whether or how they are remembered. Life
does not tarry with the dead. It urges the living on to fresh action. Our work, not our names will
endure, since it is what makes the difference. No one knows the name of the painters of Lascaux, it is
their deed that endures. The dead escape the vanity of the living.
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There is a reason we think in circles. As you did before, so others shall do after you–live. Once, you
looked to the sky and expected it to darken, but discovered that it did not even flicker. The sky does not
change colour at anyone’s passing, the mountains do not surrender their majesty in sorrow, and the
dance starts up again after only a moment’s pause. There is a reason we think in circles

“Who can tell if the spirit of a man goes upward, while the spirit of a beast goes down into the earth? So
I saw the best thing for man was to be happy in his work; that is what he gets out of life–for who can
show him what is to happen afterwards?” (Ecclesiastes, 3: 21-23)
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Interventions
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AMERICA ON THE BRINK?
Originally Posted March 21, 2016

In 2006 I was attending the ReThinking Marxism conference at UMass Amherst where I heard a paper
by Michael Roberto and Greg Meyerson. In as richly detailed and engagingly presented paper as I have
heard at an academic-political conference, they examined the political, economic, and cultural tensions
in America as they had intensified since 9/11. They concluded that American society was headed
towards a crisis of such severity that a fascist solution could not be ruled out. “In short, ” they argued,
“the general crisis of Pax Americana becomes acute with 9/11 and the U.S. ruling class
response to it. We suggest that this acute stage of the crisis may become the basis
for what we call a fascist tendency in the United States.” They were careful to avoid a superficial
identification of fascism with the particular appearances it assumed in Italy and Germany in the 1920’s
and 30’s. They defined it in class terms as a unified ruling class response to a structural crisis of
capitalism which could not be solved without the elimination of political pluralism and formally
democratic institutions. The fascist solution is a single party that gains mass support with the promise to
save the nation from imminent catastrophe before revealing the ruling class interests that actually drive
it as soon as it gains power.
Fascism in this sense need not rely on uniformed armed thugs like the SA in Germany or mass spectacle
propaganda. What is essential is ruling class political unity in eliminating existing democratic avenues
of working class and subaltern opposition. “If the general crisis of Pax Americana in its
acute phase contains a fascist trajectory, it will result from a crisis of capitalist rule, as
history reveals. Equally important, it will look quite different from past fascist
trajectories. In the case of Pax Americana in crisis, the intensification of fascist
processes would unfold in a bipartisan political context, liberals and conservatives acting
in concert – the whole ruling class.” Their fear in 2006 was that the still-reverberating aftershocks
of 9/11 would be exploited to produce consensus around the claim that any opposition to whatever a
government of national unity commanded as necessary to “fight terrorism” would be labeled treasonous,
and liquidated on that basis.
It was a superb paper, and, with the spectre of The Patriot Act looming over the conversation, not
without empirical support. Still, I left the room wondering whether their conclusion was rather too
alarmist. I was not convinced that the crisis (of the economy and of democratic legitimacy) was as
severe as they argued. As it turned out, despite the American financial sector leading the world into a
recession from which it has still not recovered, Obama won the next American election. The central
pillar of their argument– that American fascism would come wrapped in bi-partisan embrace of the Stars
and Stripes– seemed to collapse. If anything, American politics in the last ten years has become more
polarized, even as the economic crisis and the political crisis of Pax Americana has become more
severe. While prospects for a fascist movement in Roberto and Meyerson’s sense has retreated under
deepening splits in the American ruling class, talk of fascism has escaped stuffy classroom at UMass
and entered the mainstream of American political discourse.
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The never-to-be-confused-with-a-Marxist-or-alarmist Roger Cohen has warned twice in the New York
Times of parallels between Trump and Mussolini and Weimar Germany and contemporary
America. The parallels are superficial– at the level of rhetoric one the one hand and political stasis on
the other and do not add up to conclusive proof that a Trump victory would lead to the destruction of

liberal-democratic institutions and fascist rule. On the other hand, that even a conservative like Cohen is
sounding the alarm against Trump’s race baiting, Islamophobic, the-country-is-on-the-brink-and-only-I
can-save-it rhetoric highlights the real danger of the forces that Trump has mobilized.
While Trump is obnoxious, megalomaniacal, has not shied away from encouraging thuggery, and has
warned of riots if he is somehow denied the Republican nomination, he has not invented the deeperseated ideological tropes he is relying upon to build his base. Trump did not create Islamophobia and he
is hardly the first American politician to race-bait his way to popularity (does anyone remember George
Bush Sr. and Willy Horton)? By the standards of official organized violence directed against Civil
Rights protesters in the 1950’s and 1960’s (often unleashed by Democratic state governors) Trump’s
campaign had been mild. That is not to say that the forces that Trump is trying to cultivate are not
dangerous. They are. But they are the same dangers unleashed by any xenophobic campaign: the
nation is reduced to supporters of the candidate and everyone outside is demonized as a threat to the
nation’s survival and “greatness.”
Rather than a fascist, Trump is perhaps better understood as an example of the phenomenon that Max
Weber called “plebiscitary democracy.” Andre Gorz’s explanation accords well with what we are
seeing from Trump. When a “society has disintegrated and been replaced by an industrial-bureaucratic
megamachine, [it] can only gain the loyalty of the masses through the person of a charismatic
leader. This leader must possess both the majestic authority that befits the driver of the state machine …
and a sympathetic concern for the interests and everyday problems of the people called upon to leave the
management of the state in his hands.”(Critique of Economic Reason, p. 49). Trump exemplifies both
sides of Weber’s charismatic leader: he promises to bring his business expertise to bear on the problems
of the economy, and puts on an effective “I feel your pain” routine that has proven quite successful thus
far with a large subsection of disempowered white workers.
Under constant social and economic pressure, seeing little hope for the future, a large section of the
white working class see in Trump some sort of saviour. The Tea Party has already blazed the trail that
Trump is following: Obama+Mexicans+the Chinese+radical jihadis are ruining and threatening
America. All that is needed to solve the problem is a leader with the balls to stand up to them (which
Trump has promised-literally– he owns). The machismo spills over into overt violence when anyone
has the temerity to challenge the position– as the black protester punched by the Trump supporter in
North Carolina found out. Still, the unity of the movement is not found in its macho-aggressiveness but
in the magic-thinking involved in the belief– based on no evidence at all- that a billionaire is
fundamentally concerned with changing the socio-economic structures that have undermined the lifeconditions of the white working class. For magic thinking, material forces do not exist– they can be
eliminated simply by the word of the magician. And so Trump will speak, the economic forces that
have led American manufacturing industries to Mexico and China will be overturned, and steel mills
will return to Pennsylvania and Nike factories will sprout up in the corn fields of Ohio.
The attraction of magic thinking is that it does away with the need for collective political work. If
structural social and economic problems can be solved by incantation, then nothing is required of the
victim save to trust. Whereas the trade union and socialist movement argued that only the working class
could solve the problems of the working class, magic thinking invests supernatural power in the leader
to vanquish enemies and restore the nation to its mythic greatness. While right-wing commentators
crow about how Trump proves the vitality of American democracy, what he in fact demonstrates is the
loss of mobilizing power of the idea of self-emancipation in favour of magic thinking.
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The relationship between Trump and mass passivity is not accidental. The demobilization of working
class politics is the other side of plebisctary democracy. Trump (or any charismatic leader) needs
crowds to generate the feeling of collective power, but at the end of the day he can succeed only by
substituting himself for democratic collective action. If people organized themselves in a political
movement that identified the causes of the threats to their livelihoods and well-being they would not
need Trump. But self-organization and understanding takes time and effort, whereas Trump is
promising immediate solutions. Time and again, despite the fact that abundant and easily accessible
evidence proves that those who promise everything to the working class will deliver nothing, too many
people choose to cast their lot with magic.
Is the Bernie Sanders’ campaign the sort of mobilization I am talking about? No. While the fact that
Sanders can call himself a democratic socialist and run a competitive campaign for the Democratic
nomination is historically significant, Sanders is not running to create an extra-parliamentary movement
that can carry him to victory and start to make the sorts of structural socio-economic changes that would
begin to improve workers’ lives. Instead, he is mobilizing supporters to fund his run for the Presidency
but to otherwise leave matters in his hands to address in a top-down way.
Let me be clear. Of the alternatives on offer, Bernie Sanders is by far the best candidate for
President. But simply electing a social democratic president is not sufficient to bring about the
structural in-roads against the social power of capital that must be made if real improvements in
workers’ lives are to be accomplished. The history of the working class movement in Europe (and to a
far lesser extent in Canada) is littered with the corpses of social democratic politicians who de-mobilized
the movements that brought them to power as soon as they took their seat in government. So, while it is
understandable that American socialists are excited by the success of the Sanders’ campaign it is far too
hopeful to say, as Brad A. Bauerly and Ingar Solty, recently said, that:
“the American left has won by establishing Sanders’ concrete left-wing social-democratic and/or
transformative transition demands in the American political landscape and imagination: single-payer
health care, free public education, a federal living wage of $15/hour, the Workplace Democracy Act
facilitating unionization, fundamental banking reform (even if focused on dismantling instead of
socialization…). Hence, the American populace is now much more aware about the real tertium-nondatur alternative: A left-wing Social Green New Deal as a general, inclusive and solidarity-based highroad exit strategy from the crisis, which would re-shift the relationship of forces between capital and
labour and could function as the most coherent entrance project to a post-capitalist future, or the global
neoliberal unity coalition’s low-road exit strategy of austerity with further immiseration, nationalist
exclusion and destruction of the public good.”
What this assessment ignores is the fundamental importance of what Sanders is not building: a political
organization outside the Democratic Party that can sustain the struggle for those laudable objectives
between election cycles and after the disappointment and disillusionment with Sanders sets in. And set
in it will, because the forces that will align against Sanders should he be elected will stymie him at every
turn. If you think that Congress undermined the progressive heart of the Obama administration, what do
you think it will do the agenda of a self-declared socialist? The only hope to moving Sanders`agenda
forward (and then once it has started moving forward, to push it to the left) is a movement outside the
Democratic Party that is broad and deep enough that it cannot be ignored and can bring business-asusual America to a halt. It would have to link a revitalized labour movement to the young people and
students who are propelling the Sanders` candidacy at the moment and build bridges to AfricanAmericans and their myriad, creative, and powerful community-based organizations.
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That said, the American left has indeed won something: the opportunity to build a new political
movement that can make it relevant and effective for the first time in decades. And a relevant and
effective American left could not be ignored by the rest of the world or have terms dictated to it by the
financial industry. The worst thing that could happen this election cycle is not a Trump victory, but the
squandering of the political energy of millions of hopeful Sanders supporters. Another generation lost to
political cynicism could prove fatal to any future form of the American left.
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NOW IS THE TIME!
Originally Posted June 17, 2016
We live our lives as socially self-conscious subjects, experiencing the world from our unique
interiority. It is this interiority that makes life both valuable and our own. The essential difference
between a human being and a robot is that while the robot can perform certain forms of movement and
work, it does not know or care about what it is doing.
At the same time, our lives, experienced and valued subjectively, are caught up in complex webs of
external objective forces and dynamics that can undermine us even though we in no sense “deserve” to
be undermined. Economic and technological change can destroy historically established forms of life
and the subjectively valued lives that were dependent upon them. People can thus exist “out of
time” with goals and skills valued in an earlier era but now obsolete. But the obsolescence of skills
does not kill the person, and those who are “out of time” are damaged by the changes they had no say in
approving. Much of the manufacturing segment of the North American working class finds itself in this
position today– alive, but no social demand for its skills.
Change in the objective circumstances of life that undermines demand for a certain from of labour does
not negate the value of the people who formerly did that labour. While this point might be
acknowledged as an abstract moral principle, at the level of social organization those who find their
former occupations eliminated by technological development or relocation to markets in which labor is
cheaper are actively devalued. They are lectured and hectored to get with the times, re-train, re-skill, reinvent; they are forced into precarious labour or service (servant) industries without unions or
bargaining power to dignify the work. Entire communities and working class cultures are gutted and left
swamps of anger and addiction.
The simultaneous collapse of working class living standards and fighting organizations ignites anger and
anger seeks immediately release. Demagogic politicians have long used this anger to pole-vault to
power. Donald Trump is but the latest in a long-line of populist American politicians who have mixed
legitimate white working class anger with the toxic racism never far from the surface in America to
create political momentum. While his racism needs to be condemned roundly and repeatedly, it is also
essential to acknowledge the causes of the real and legitimate anger of working class people. I think a
recent essay by McMurtry over-estimates Trump’s commitment to curtailing the power of money-capital
and armed violence as the default policy of the United States, but his essay does lay bear those elements
of Trump’s platform that (at least rhetorically) challenge the forces that have undermined working class
living standards in the US.
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Critics of Trump have not consistently acknowledged this legitimacy, tending to treat his supporters as
little more than a racist mob. While there have been awful displays of racist violence, the deeper issue
is that Trump is giving voice (cynically, I would argue) to real and legitimate frustrations of millions of
working Americans whose lives are being actively dis-valued by the loss of manufacturing
industries. Cut off from a past that is gone and shut out of a capital and not labour intensive digital
future, without fighting unions or a working class party to constructively channel their frustrations,
millions of white workers are looking to Trump to restore dignity to their lives and security to their
livelihoods. If there is such a thing as class-interest– and the capital-friendly policies pursued by
governments everywhere prove that there is– then I predict Trump, should he be elected, will prove a
disappointment.

At the same time, the political mobilization of working class anger should not be regarded as a bad
thing– but it needs to be re-directed, away from nativist and racist anger against Chinese and Mexican
workers and towards the global ruling class- whose interest in accumulating ever more money-value is
the reason for lack of investment in life-valuable work– and the system-dynamics of capitalism- which
unhinge objective social forces from the subjective good of individual lives. There should be common
cause between the white working class, youth, energized by sanders talk of “political revolution,” and
the women and African Americans mobilized by the Clinton campaign.
While the particular experiences of white manufacturing workers, university students, and the sexually
and racially oppressed are distinct, the structural conditions that cause the oppression are the same. The
collapse of manufacturing industry, the skyrocketing debt and predominance of precarious employment
for youth, the intensifying attacks on women’s rights and black communities and the growing backlash
against LGBTQ gains have different experiential contours, but they all flow from the same underlying
system-drive: turn the world into an instrument of the production and accumulation of money-value for
appropriation by a largely white, male, straight ruling class and use politics as a means of distracting and
dividing those harmed by this dynamic. This dynamic generates all the social pressures that set people
in conflict with one another: where life-resources are not democratically controlled their will be
competition over access to them and where there is competition, there is the potential for
conflict. Where there is the potential for conflict there is the potential for it to be exploited by those who
benefit from the current arrangement, as well as opportunities for normalizing and demonizing
campaigns, surveillance and policing, and repressive strategies of mass incarceration.
My point is not to say that the concrete expression and experience of racism, sexism, homophobia etc, is
everywhere the same. Instances of hate-driven mass homicide such as that which just occurred in
Orlando cannot be predicted in their singularity from any model of society. What is predictable is that
in social circumstances where political power depends, ultimately, upon the control a small minority
exercises over universally needed resources, everyone who is not in that majority is set against each
other in competition for the resources that they need. This competition generates all manner of
possibilities for the construction of demonizing ideologies. Internalization of the demonizing ideology
creates feelings of collective strength against the perceived opponent (White Americans against Mexican
workers, white against black, etc.,) but in reality weakens the group in the fight against the real
opponent– the institutions of money-capital. That result is of much service to the ruling class, which
typically does not even have to consciously stoke such conflicts (although it can). Setting everyone in
competition for life-resources generates the social pressures necessary to engender invidious hierarchies
and demonizing ideologies.
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Today’s predominant metaphor for understanding the multiplicity of experiences of oppression is
“intersectionality.” The metaphor has the merit of highlighting the specificity of the historical
development of different forms of oppression. Moreover, it highlights the complexity of identity: it is
composed of individuated experiences of these histories and is not an undifferentiated point of
consciousness. However, while intersectionality is useful for highlighting complexity and historical
specificity, it has the demerit, I would argue, of failing to capture the internal unity of social
identity. Roads intersecting are externally related to one another: the path of one does not shape the
path of the other; they just happen to intersect at a given point. Social identity, however, is internally
unified in such a way that each element shapes the others to form a person who experiences the world,
acts and is acted upon, as this specific person. Of course, different contexts might call attention to one
or other element of that identity (at work class might predominate and in a relationship one’s
sexuality) but the person one is is the unified totality of the elements, not a crossing point where
externally related factors happen to meet.

Why is this significant? Politically, it is significant because it emphasizes the need for an internally
unified social and political movement directed against the underlying structural causes of all oppression,
alienation, and exploitation, rather than an externally related coalition of different particular
groups. The specificities of histories of oppression need not be submerged in an abstract unity in which
one difference (class, in the Marxist tradition) predominates. We get around the problem of domination
of the movement by one difference by working beneath them all to the common cause: all forms of
oppression alienation and exploitation are different forms of being deprived of that which a human life
requires to realize its life-capacities in concretely individual, socially valuable and valued, and
meaningful ways. Racial oppression denies access to life-resources on the grounds of race and sexism
on grounds of sex and one is not reducible to the other. But the general cause and experience of
deprivation is the same.
By all means we should each tell our own stories and learn from one another. But common cause–
which is what real social change ultimately requires- means finding a way of translating those particular
stories into universal values. When we find that key we stop demonizing others who are, objectively
speaking, on the same side. We do not dismiss unemployed white workers as racists when they lash out
at foreign workers, we engage them in a debate that shows the underlying common structure of
problems all workers face. So too for the black sexist or the female homophobe. We don’t moralize and
lecture at them; we work down to the common ground that has impaired all oppressed groups from
expressing their human capacities in concretely individual ways.
In a recent New York Times essay Thomas Friedman has argued that the Republican Party is a lost
cause that should be abandoned for a new center-Right party. The Left in the United States should draw
the same conclusion with regard to the Democrats (but drop the qualifier “center.”) This new party
needs to find the common ground linking those who have been “left behind” by the economy to those
who fear for their future (the young people mobilized by Saunders). It also needs to link together the
best of working class politics (solidarity across differences and the discipline of democratic
centralism) to the legitimate concerns underlying the practically and theoretically problematic identity
politics that attracts the passions of the young. It also needs to draw upon the rich cultures of
community-based constructive politics of radical feminist and African-American history.
Clearly, building a new party and a new movement is not a short term project and there is no substitute
for actual political arguments between activists on the ground to build it. Nevertheless, the threats posed
by either a Clinton or a Trump presidency indicate that now is the time to break free from all cults of
personality– Trump, Clinton, or Sanders— to build a new unified left movement for change.
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RUSSIAN LIVES (DON’T) MATTER
Originally Posted November 11, 2015

I have been listening for a week now and have heard no lamentations for the Russian lives lost on
Metrojet Flight 9268. I can sit on my step and hear Detroit across the river, but I have not heard a peep
about “ISIS barbarians,” renewing their “war on civilization” by bombing a plane full of
vacationers. Russia must no longer be part of “civilization” as I cannot even hear any crocodile tears
falling. Just silence. Stone, cold (like a tomb) silence.
From Britain too, (usually quick to sing tenor to the United States’ bass when it comes time to compose
songs of mourning), silence. As usual, one hears post-facto reports about terrorist “chatter” about the
bombing, but no expression whatsoever of solidarity with the Russian people in their time of collective
grief. No “We are all Russians now” headlines, pas de “Je suis Russe” t-shirts, no “You are either with
us or with the terrorists” ultimatums. Instead, a silence that tells us much about geo-political reality.
For all the posturing and poetry the “leaders of the free world” produce about the sanctity of life when it
is their citizens being killed, their silence about the horrors of violent death when it is their opponents’
dying proves that for them it is not life that is sacred, but only strategic advantage. Their ability to
subordinate life to strategic advantage does not stem from some innate monstrous character deep within
them, but from their willingness to manage a monstrous world-system. They become monstrous in their
differential apportioning of life value to friends and enemies, but just changing the people without
changing the system means the same monstrosity will replicate itself. Obama replaced Bush, and the
Middle East continued to be bombed. Trudeau’s “sunny days” are shining on an Ottawa made grey by
Harper’s dour and destructive politics, but there is little chance, beyond cosmetic changes, that our
foreign policy is going to change decisively in the direction of dialogue, disengagement, and peace.
Willingness to manage this world-system means willingness to calibrate the value of deaths in relation
to an overarching strategic vision. At the moment, this strategic vision involves constructing a new and
completely unnecessary cold war with Russia. Given that Russia has been reduced to “Putin-land” and
Putin-land has been demonized as a new Stalinism, no Western leader even bothers to offer public
condolences. Why? because when “enemies” do exactly as we do– support their allies with (ill-advised,
to be sure) military adventures- and suffer “blowback” (Chalmers Johnson) they are just getting what
they deserved (and what ‘we’ warned them would happen). When the Russians suffer a terrorist attack,
it is just the karmic wheel turning; when it is the United States or Britain, it is decried as unholy injustice
of cosmic proportions. Which proves: neither preserving life nor fighting terrorism is the issue for our
leaders, but only pressing their agenda and their advantage, by any means necessary.
In their struggle to secure all of the world’s resources and subject everyone to their hegemonic
decisions, they reject life as the ultimate and highest value. Entire peoples can be destroyed directly or
indirectly if they are on the wrong side, or even just in the way. Doctors Without Borders’ hospital was
knowingly destroyed and doctors gunned down in cold-blood by American forces, but neither their
superiors, nor their political leaders, nor American religious leaders who never tire of shoveling their
sanctimony in everyone’s face said: “These people are deranged psychopaths and war criminals who
deliberately destroyed a known hospital and trained their guns on people they saw fleeing from the
wreckage.” Since the hospital was in Kunduz, and Kunduz had recently fallen to the Taliban, the deaths
of these doctors and patients means nothing to the perpetrators. They will do it again (and again, and
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again) . “Civilization,” when it is on the march, can kill whomever it needs to kill, and ignore the deaths
of others if memoriating them serves no political purpose.
So don’t expect any condolences. In any case, who cares about that bombing and that over two hundred
Russian vacationers are dead? Didn’t you hear that their athletes have been cheating?
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PHILOSOPHY’S ROLE IN
UNDERSTANDING PARIS AND THE ONGOING CRISIS: 10 THESES
Originally Posted November 17, 2015
At the basis of all concrete identities: “Muslim,” “Sunni,” “French citizen,” etc., lies a core
human being, a capacity for self-making within the objective contexts of natural and social
life. Selves are made, identities forged, reproduced, modified, and developed through processes
of work and affective-symbolic interaction with other people within and across societies. Work
relations and social interactions are contradictory– they are both creative and
alienating, mutualistic and antagonistic, peaceful and violent. When politics loses sight of or
ignores for partisan advantage the underlying human capacity for self-making and re-making it
fixates on the abstractions. A fixation on the abstract markers of particular identities leads to
their reification, and their reification leads in turn to false, quasi-natural explanations of conflict
(the problems in the Middle east are the consequence of a ‘clash of civilizations,’ racism is a
result of the ‘natural’ inferiority of the demonized race, etc).
2. Digging beneath the surface identity to the core human activity of identity formation, reveals it
as the result (always modifiable) of a process of practical and symbolic labour that unfolds in
dynamic interaction with other selves and the objective world. Other selves, the natural world,
and the social institutions that mediate the relationship between individuals and nature are
themselves dynamic and change in response to changed activities. Foregrounding this dynamic
process and using it as a wedge against the stereotypes of reified thinking is the constructive
political role that philosophical thinking can play. While philosophers will also be motivated by
concrete political evaluations of the relative legitimacy of conflicting positions, if they are to be
active as philosophers, they must ground their political assessments in the deeper understanding
of human self-making activity explained above. By demonstrating the ways in which all sides to
the conflict are struggling to forge a coherent and satisfying individual and collective identity
and the social and environmental conditions in which that identity can be secured, the underlying
humanity of all parties to any conflict is made clear. Once this underlying humanity has been
made clear, invidious contrasts between positions according to which one side is inhuman and
monstrous, the other side human and pure, (positions which, because they are reversible, do
nothing but ensure cycles of violence) break down, and the opposing sides can begin to think
about the reasons why the other side behaves as they do.
3. History proves that human beings, when they identify themselves as a member of a community
under existential threat, can convince themselves that the most abominable acts are justified as
matters of group survival. No religion, or culture, or ethnicity, or nation-state is prone by its
very ‘nature’ to violence, but all can become violent when they are set in conflict with other
religions, sects, nation-states in ways that impair the ability of the group to survive, develop, and
flourish. When these conflicts are interpreted as zero sum games, such that the victory of the
opponent would mean (or is feared to mean) the elimination of the group to which the self
identifies, a logic of exterminism can be unleashed. Victory becomes associated with the
complete pacification through the total destruction of the other side. Once this logic is
unleashed, it appears impossible to arrest the cycle of violence, because any voice calling for
restraint and negotiations will appear not only weak (which is typically politically unacceptable)
but also suicidal.
1.
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4. Nevertheless, those voices, the ones that sound most irrational and out of touch with “political
realities” are the only ones in touch with the deeper reality, namely, that no matter how abhorrent
the tactics adopted, the struggle is comprehensible and defensible in human terms as a struggle
for security over the natural and social conditions of life. Killing in response to killing is not the
mark of a strong leader, but of a person who is behaving predictably, i..e, the way a machine
would, and not like a rational human being. When thought is directed towards the causes of the
opponents’ actions, the cyclical nature of violence becomes apparent. A political conflict
degenerates towards a violent confrontations, which further degenerates towards a logic of
exterminism, which amps up fears on both sides and makes it appear that the cycle can be
resolved only by superior violence, i.e., by completely destroying the enemy. However, the
struggle to destroy the enemy contributes to the destruction of the community one is trying to
protect. The main victims of ISIS are Syrian and Iraqi civilians, hard won democratic freedoms
have been undermined by the War on Terror. Further steps down this path of ”victory’ via
extermination can only further destroy all parties to the conflict.
5. There is a time to assign blame and evaluate the relative merits of the opposing parties’ demands,
but assigning blame and evaluating legitimacy, if it occurs outside of this deeper context and
frame of the cross cultural human struggle to forge identities and secure the natural and social
conditions of their development, will only allow the conflict cycle to repeat. Philosophy seems
useless because it thinks at different time-scales than politics. Sometimes, the longer time scales
in which philosophy thinks are useless– decisions sometime have to be made right away. But
peaceful co-development between cultures formerly at odds with each other takes longer to
develop and can only be grounded in mutual recognition of the different ways different groups
can express their underlying human capacity for self-determination and self-making and the
satisfactions that come with realizing that capacity. The practical value of philosophy is not only
to bring to light that underlying capacity, but also to defend the need for long-term perspectives
on conflict resolution which depend upon transformations of self-understanding and reinterpretation of the reasons why former ‘enemies behaved as they did.
6. The duty of philosophy in cases of violent conflict is thus not first of all to pick sides but to
encourage each side to consider itself in light of the way the other sees it, and in light of the
actual success or failure of its tactics. ISIS might think that it is conducting a heroic struggle
against Western imperialism, but on its current path it will accomplish nothing but to ensure the
ever more complete destruction of the lands and cultures of those areas of Syria and Iraq that it
occupies. Western leaders might think they are defending the highest values of Western
civilization against barbaric terrorists, but they have eviscerated the highest constitutional
principles that past democratic struggles have achieved and killed hundreds of thousands of
innocent civilians across the Middle East, stoking the very anger and hatred that fuels the desire
for revenge that leads to terrorist attacks. Both sides are destroying themselves as they try to
destroy each other– irrationality at a mass scale.
7. Pointing out this reciprocal irrationality is not a substitute for concrete political struggle, but
rather a precondition of turning those struggles in efficacious directions. All efficacious political
struggles must be directed at the precise cause or causes of the problem threatening the
groups. In the case of the current crisis across the Middle East, the depth causes are: the history
of Western imperialism in the region, the destruction of the infrastructure of life-support by the
“War on Terror,” and cynical exploitation of sectarian and ethnic differences by major Western
powers and their regional allies. Simple Western withdrawal from the region, while a
precondition of solving the domestic conflicts, will not be enough to ensure lasting peace unless
a constructive politics emerges within the region. That constructive politics must stop targeting
individuals in the West and justifying such attacks as justified vengence. Such tactics undermine
support for the legitimate demands of the peoples of the Middle East, embolden racist-militaristic
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forces in the West, encourage backlashes against Muslim and Middle Eastern citizens of Western
countries, as well as refugees and ordinary Muslim travelers.
8. Within the West, the political struggle has to be focused not only on particular governments and
their policies, but the structural causes of military intervention in the Middle East and
elsewhere. That which must be contested is the principle that the world’s resources are valuable
to the extent that they are controlled by Western corporations and exploited in the interests of
their ability to maximize money profits and the world’s people valuable to the extent that they
serve these interests (and legitimately destroyed ton the extent that they resist this subjugation).
Both sides must work towards recognition of the deeper, common life-interest in living in a
society that ensures the satisfaction of their fundamental life-requirements, that is governed by
institutions that allow individuals to make decisions democratically, and that is open to
mutualistic, respectful interaction and growth between distinct cultures.
9. Critics will respond to the last point in thesis 8 with the argument that there are radical
differences between an enlightened secular cosmopolitan society and the reactionary, atavistic,
irrational fundamentalism that drives groups like ISIS. There can be no reconciliation between
western liberal democracy and the reactionary fundamentalism of the caliphate, critics will
rejoin, because to do so would betray not only our own ideals, but also the goals of the majority
of people in the Middle East struggling to create liberal democracy. In response, while I agree
that Western philosophers should not make any excuses for religious fundamentalism of any
stripe, at the same time we must not lose sight of the political dimensions of the conflict in the
Middle East, i.e., we must not fall into the trap of seeing it as nothing but a problem of irrational
sectarian hatreds. A group like ISIS might have irrational elements driving certain of its more
horrific propaganda stunts, but a careful analysis cannot but uncover legitimate demands
amongst Sunnis in Iraq and Syria for protection against the violence of the Syrian and Iraqi
states. ISIS may be destroyed, but another movement will take its place until some political
rapproachment is worked out by the parties to the domestic conflict themselves. At the same
time, it is appropriate to criticize religious justifications of the tactics that target Western
civilians. The legitimate critique of religious illusion should not be confused with Islamophobia
(especially since most Islamophobes are Christian fundamentalists, who are equally irrational
from the standpoint of enlightenment reason). By the same token, the value of enlightenment
ideals of rational analysis and argument should not be exchanged for an uncritical pluralism, or
worse, a belief that groups like ISIS should be celebrated for their uncompromising antiimperialism. The struggle internal to the peoples of the Middle East is precisely to create a
broad, democratic, anti-imperialist alliance of secular left and critical Islamist movements (the
later might be understood as an Islamic version of liberation theology). Overall, an effective
philosophical analysis and argument needs to identify the rational and the irrational in the
opposed camps in order to demonstrate the possibility of future co-development in which
cultural, religious, and sectarian identities open towards their outside. Beyond this outside
exclusive communal closures give way to dynamic and democratic cultures that cross-fertilize
and encourage creative ways of organizing human societies at all scales. One historical example
of this process is the triple cross-fertilization between the remnants of Greek antiquity, the
Islamic society of the Middle Ages, and Europe. When the Roman Empire closed the Greek
schools and after Christian fanatics had burned the library of Alexandria, the works of Greek
philosophy contributed to the flourishing of philosophy and medical science in the Islamic world,
where they were preserved, built upon, and ultimately re-introduced to Europe through Morocco
via Spain.
10. Nevertheless, it may also be objected that this argument is naive because it imagines that
Western politicians will have to sit down with ISIS, that the caliphate will have to be reckoned
with diplomatically and politically, its sins forgiven, and that it is inconceivable that such

meetings could ever take place. The actual process of political problem solving cannot be
predicted at this point, only that the attempt to bomb ISIS out of existence will fail and provoke
more attacks in the West. The current moment does not bode well for a political, non-violent
solution. Nevertheless, thirty years ago, it was equally inconceivable that America would sit
down with the Iranians who held American diplomats hostage and negotiate in good faith with
them. Yet, this past year, American and Iranian negotiators worked out a treaty on the Iranian
nuclear program. It is thus true, as Lord Palmerston said, that nations have no permanent friends
or enemies but only permanent interests. What he did not understand– and this point is the most
important– is that those interests are the permanent life-interest of the human beings who make
up the citizenry of all nations, not the raisons d’etat that have typically treated those human
beings as expendable cannon fodder and collateral damage.
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THE SPEECH I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR
Originally Posted on December 6, 2015
President Barak Obama is scheduled to address the American people on the evening of Sunday,
December 6th, regarding the attacks in San Bernadino, California. Here is the imagined speech I would
like to hear him give.
My fellow Americans,
Once again our nation is forced to confront the spectre of gun violence, but this time the issue is
complicated by the fact that the shooters were, in some way that is still unclear, inspired by ISIS. While
it is too early to say definitively what the precise nature or degree of external influence on their
decisions was, it is clear that there was a political dimension to this shooting. The stark reality of
bloodied and dead bodies that just moments before had been enjoying a holiday celebration forces us to
confront some hard questions, and make some hard choices. The truths I feel compelled to share will be
painful for you to hear, as they are painful for me to speak, because they require us to shed the illusions
that we have been living and acting under since 9/11. However, at this late day in my Presidency, I want
to be the leader that millions of people thought I could be. I speak not to ensure any legacy for myself,
but rather to try to stop the headlong rush to openly Nazi tactics that some of my Republican colleagues
are calling for, and to stop the decline of our nation towards a cowering police state domestically, and
murderous imperialist abroad.
The first truth that must be spoken is that absolute security is impossible. Since 9/11 our nation has
undermined the constitutional freedoms that our revolutionary founders secured in their struggle against
British imperialism. The Patriot Act, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, mass
surveillance, bulk collection of phone data, the militarization of the police, and the illegal rendition of
suspects has pushed the United States towards the sort of authoritarian police state we used to abhor in
our long struggle with Stalinism. Yet, none of this surveillance has provided any protection against the
primary violent threat to our lives: death by gun at the hands of a fellow citizen. The truth is– and this
truth is brought home very clearly by San Bernadino– no one can know who is harbouring a murderous
grudge, or what its source may be. It can be purely personal, it can be delusional, it can be racially
motivated, it can be inspired by ISIS, but the actual event cannot be predicted. Since it cannot be
predicted, it cannot be prevented by police-state methods. If there is a solution, it has to be political and
philosophical. Politically, we need new laws which immediately remove military assault weapons from
gun store shelves as a prelude to much stricter gun controls across all types of firearms.
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That will not be easy. Yet it will be far easier than the philosophical work we need to do as a
nation. Philosophically, we need, first, to stop fearing one another. Second, we need to stop valorizing
violence as the only means of resolving conflict. Thirty thousand of us were killed by guns last
year. Guns do not kill people, people kill people, it is true. But why do we kill each other at such higher
rates than other countries? Fear and the belief that only violence can solve the problem of violence. It is

clear that there are racial and gendered dimensions of each problem. Why are we more fearful of each
other than the people of other nations? No doubt that is a complex question. But certainly part of the
answer has to be: the foundation of our country is not only Enlightenment ideals, but also slavery. In
order to justify slavery, African Americans were constructed as violent sub-humans ready at any
moment to destroy white “civilization.” This racist ideology has worked deep into the American
psyche, and drives the fear that fuels the gun sales that put assault weapons in the hands of people alltoo-ready to use them. So we need to overcome the fear and the racist roots that nourish it. That will
not be a short process, but it has to begin.
As for the valorization of violence, can we not see here all too clearly the psychology of the adolescent
male who thinks that his masculinity requires him to respond to any challenge with physical
force? Whenever there is an attack, whether politically motivated or not, the demand from almost all
quarters is: respond with more devastating violence. If there is a killing in a church or a school, the
“solution” is to arm the priest and the professor. If our nation is attacked, the “solution” is to kill orders
of magnitude more on the other side. We have tried both. We are the most heavily armed nation on
earth, and our wars have led, directly and indirectly, to the deaths of 4 million people in the Muslim
countries of the Middle East, Asia, and East Africa since 9/11. Saddam Hussein and Mohammar
Gadhafi are dead, but their nations lie in complete ruins. We eliminated Al-Qaeda in Iraq only to watch
it be reborn as the far more deadly and effective ISIS. All the evidence is clear: we cannot destroy
violence with superior violence. You cannot kill every enemy. As long as there is an enemy who
remembers that we have killed some of his comrades or her family, the possibility will always exist that
he or she will want revenge. And if the desire for revenge is there, the possibility of its being exacted
exists too. We cannot kill our way to peace and security.
Three weeks ago, my mind clouded by sorrow at the deaths of over 100 citizens of France, I agreed with
President Hollande that we needed to intensify our attacks against ISIS. I can now see that this approach
is not only futile, but irrational. It is not driven by a coherent political strategy, but only anger and the
desire for vengeance. It is time now to break out of this cycle. In the place of vengeance we need
understanding.
Let me be absolutely clear: “Understanding” does not mean sympathy for the perpetrators of attacks
against unarmed civilians. At the same time, I have to say that Prime Minister Cameron is grandstanding
in the worst way when he called MPs who voted against expanding the British bombing campaign
terrorist sympathizers. Until last night, I would have agreed with him, but I now see that such attitudes
are exactly what keeps the conflict moving in perpetual cycle. That cycle keeps the terrorists happy,
because we furnish them with excuses to attack us. It keeps the generals and the military industrial
complex happy, because they can demand more bombs which arms industries will happily supply. But
for the people of the Middle East it means more life-destruction, and for the people of the United States
it means more fear, which drives more gun sales, which ensures more killing of Americans at the hands
of other Americans.
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There is a terrible tradition, not only in this country, but throughout political history, of equating
leadership with hard choices and hard choices with killing people. The first link is true: leadership does
involve hard choices. The second link is not: when you have unchallengable military superiority over
any foe, especially a foe like ISIS, which has no sophisticated weaponry or air defenses, the choice to
kill more is easy. No one can stop us from killing weaker enemies. But look at the evidence– this
approach has not eliminated the threat it is supposed to eliminate. Instead, ISIS is spreading, from Iraq
to Syria, from Syria to Libya. The truly hard choice is to not strike, when one has the power to strike,
and when everyone else is urging you to do so. Yes, the hard choice is to work to understand the causes,

and start the political process that can lead– over the long term,– (let us not kid ourselves, the roots of
these conflicts are deep, and cannot be solved overnight) to real progress.
What can be solved overnight is our involvement. In closing I am announcing that all US military
forces are being withdrawn from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and anywhere else they are currently
operating. Our presence is doing nothing save to exacerbate the sectarian conflicts that only the parties
to those conflicts, the members of those cultures and religious traditions, can solve for themselves. We
hope that they will find their way to peaceful resolutions, but also know that wars sometimes have to
exhaust themselves before they end. But they do end. Who, in 1983, would have thought that Lebanon
could become a relatively stable and peaceful society in which the factions to its long civil war learned
to work together? But they did, and eventually, in some configuration, the parties to the current
conflicts will work things out, if they are allowed to do so. The United States would never tolerate
foreign political and military intervention to solve our racial conflicts, it is nothing more than arrogance
to think that others genuinely desire our meddling in their business.
So, in closing, I say to everyone, Americans and others around the world, we have made many errors in
our dealings with the Arab World, mistakes which have fueled anger and the desire for revenge. Yet,
the anger of the Arab world has fed tactics that have caused us to respond in ways ever more destructive
of Arab societies. It is time to change course. From tonight on you are free to resolve your conflicts
with no more counter-productive intervention. Our door is not closed to constructive interaction, but
our bomb bay doors are closing once for all. We have erred, and we will try to correct those errors. As
for your conflicts, you are free, as we all are, to resolve them as you will.
Thank you, and good night.
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CREDIT DUE, BUT …
Originally Posted August 9, 2015
August 6th, 2015, marked the 70th anniversary of the American atomic bomb attack against Hiroshima,
Japan. Contrary to widely circulated myths, the bombing was not a necessary evil to force the surrender
of Japan and avoid an invasion predicted to produce even higher number of civilian
casualties. Abundant testimony from the highest ranks of the United States military and government,
including Douglas MacArthur (commander of US forces in the Pacific), and Dwight Eisenhower,
(Commander of Allied Forces in Europe and later President) as well as military historians, conclusively
proves that Japan was willing to surrender and that the bombing was really about sending a message to
the Soviet Union.
August 6th, 2015 was also the day that Sen. Charles Schumer decided to cave into pressure from the
Israel lobby and not vote for the recently negotiated treaty to limit Iran’s nuclear program to purposes of
civilian power generation. Succumbing to the Orwellianism of the Israeli threat narrative, according to
which the strongest Middle East power by far (Israel) is under “existential threat” from forces with no
where near the military capability to carry out such threats (and only threaten in the ways that they are
capable because of on-going Israeli aggression and expanding colonialism); in which a nuclear capable
Israel is threatened with non-existent Iranian nuclear weapons; in which a treaty to prevent Iran from
acquiring those weapons (assuming, as is not certain, that Iran ever had their acquisition as a goal),
becomes licence for the Iranians to acquire them, Schumer announced that after much “soul
searching,” he would not support the treaty when it comes to Senate for ratification in September.
Schumer’s reasoning is deeply confused. He argues that once European countries sign lucrative trade
agreements with Iran, they might back down from the demand for rigorous inspections, even though it is
the agreement and its inspections regime that would allow them to sign those deals in the first
place. Moreover, he has no answer to the question of why Iran, after signing a deal precisely to gain
that investment, would risk it by re-starting a military program, or how it would do so, given the
inspections regime to which all parties including the Iranians have agreed.
Nor are his political calculations at all clear. If he is worried about losing Jewish votes in New York, he
should consult The Jerusalem Post, which recently published a poll showing that 49 % of American
Jews back the accord, with only 30 % opposing it. More than a dozen retired Israeli military officials
also recently signed an open letter to Benjamin Netanyahu urging him to support the deal.
The reasoning of these groups is clear: negotiations and verifiable treaties lead to peace from which
new plateaus of constructive interaction can be built, while military adventures lead to wars whose
outcomes cannot be predicted (see Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya …) but which are always life destructive to
the targets of Western armed force and lead to violent revenge cycles that serve no one’s good. When
people are threatened and killed, their cultures demonized and their institutions and infrastructure
destroyed, they fight back, because they have no choice since it is their home being attacked. Their
response fuels Western accusations of “terrorism,” which is invoked to justify further military
adventures, which generates more destruction, which fuels more resistance, and on it goes– for more
than ten years in Iraq, for more than thirty in Afghanistan.

47

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the political orientations of a threatened regime, or the variety of
popular resistance organizations neo-imperialist invasion spawns, all historical evidence proves

that people will defend themselves, and any sound moral system must recognise and accept peoples’
right to defend themselves as an indispensable element of their right to life. The best way of protecting
one’s own life, politically, is then, not to threaten others’ lives, and the legal-institutional means of
mutual life-affirmation is the international treaty. The Iran-P5+1 agreement does not radically alter the
balance of power in the Middle East, it does not erase decades of British, French, and American
imperialism in the region, but it does prove that the military strategy pursued in the Middle East since
the First Gulf War (1991) by America and its allies and aided and abetted for the most part by the
United Nations has been an unmitigated disaster.
Perhaps the real reason so many odious American congress members are vocal in opposition to the deal
is because it obviously stems from a clear political defeat for American policy in the region. Every
political objective driving that policy as laid out in the Project for a New American Century and as
pursued since the first Bush administration– creating new client states, securing access to Iraqi oil,
isolating Iran– has failed, and failed absolutely. The failure of these neo-imperialist policies is a good
thing, for worry all you want about ISIS or Iranian terrorists, they have not killed hundreds of thousands
of Canadians, Americans, and Europeans, but Canadians, Europeans, and mostly Americans have killed
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Afghans, as well as untold numbers of Pakistanis, Yemenis, and
Somalis in the on-going “drone war.”
Western societies remain politically stable and relatively prosperous, while Syria and Libya are
consumed by civil war, Egypt is back under the control of the generals, and Saudi Arabia is given a free
hand to fund and support the very ISIS and al-Qaeda “terrorists” we are supposed to fear. The Second
Gulf War created the conditions for Shia hegemony in Iraq, which made it the natural ally of Iran,
which that war was supposed to isolate and contain. Now, in order to combat ISIS, the United States is
forced into a de facto alliance with Iran, while its NATO ally, Turkey, bombs another US ally, the
Kurds, in Northern Iraq, and openly refuses to identify ISIS as the main enemy.
Oh what a tangled web we weave …
To support my claim that the current negotiations with Iran are a consequence of defeat of American
policy in the region, let us turn to the explanation of one of the main architects of the strategy that led to
the treaty, President Barak Obama. While his recent speech defending the agreement was replete with
the expected boasting and swagger about his military bona fides, it also contained this extraordinary
admission:
If, as has also been suggested, we tried to maintain unilateral sanctions, beefen them up, we would be
standing alone. We cannot dictate the foreign, economic and energy policies of every major power in the
world. In order to even try to do that, we would have to sanction, for example, some of the world’s
largest banks. We’d have to cut off countries like China from the American financial system. And since
they happen to be major purchasers of our debt, such actions could trigger severe disruptions in our own
economy, and, by way, raise questions internationally about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve
currency. That’s part of the reason why many of the previous unilateral sanctions were waived.

What Obama is clearly asserting is that it is time for Americans to shed the illusion that that their geopolitical and economic power is unlimited, that everyone will simply fall in line with the demands of an
American foreign policy conceived with parochial American interests at its root; that the age of
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American exceptionalism is over. This reading is further supported by the sharply critical barbs directed
against supporters of the Second Gulf War that Obama included later in the speech:
For the last couple of weeks, I have repeatedly challenged anyone opposed to this deal to put forward a
better, plausible alternative. I have yet to hear one. What I’ve heard instead are the same types of
arguments that we heard in the run up to the Iraq war. “Iran cannot be dealt with diplomatically.” “We
can take military strikes without significant consequences.” “We shouldn’t worry about what the rest of
the world thinks, because once we act, everyone will fall in line.” “Tougher talk, more military threats
will force Iran into submission.” “We can get a better deal.”
I know it’s easy to play in people’s fears, to magnify threats, to compare any attempt at diplomacy to
Munich, but none of these arguments hold up. They didn’t back in 2002, in 2003, they shouldn’t now.
(APPLAUSE)
That same mind set in many cases offered by the same people, who seem to have no compunction with
being repeatedly wrong…
(LAUGHTER)
… lead to a war that did more to strengthen Iran, more to isolate the United States than anything we
have done in the decades before or since.
As Habermas once remarked, the human species seems to learn geo-political lessons only
through catastrophe. Sine World War Two, those catastrophes have generally played out far from
European and North American shores. They have been visited upon peoples of Asia and Africa and
Latin America by bombs wrapped in American flags and platitudes. Despite the overwhelming military
violence brought to bear against them, the peoples of the Third World have not surrendered their right to
determine their own futures. Perhaps at least a few people in the West have now learned from the latest
series of Middle East catastrophes that real progress can only be achieved through real negotiations.
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THE POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN
DISASTER
Originally Posted on September 9, 2015
“Even the mind of the small man is no different. Only he himself makes it small. Therefore when he
sees a child about to fall into a well, he cannot help a feeling of alarm and commiseration. This shows
that his humanity (jen) forms one body with the child. (Wang Yang Ming, Confucian philosopher,
quoted in McMurtry, Unequal Freedoms, 1998, p.368.
And when millions of people see a dead child washed up on a beach in Turkey, their anger and their
outrage and their demand to help the suffering refugees fleeing their destroyed homes in the Middle East
and Africa proves that their humanity forms one body with this child. Wang Yang Ming’s observations,
as moving as any I have read in 20 years as a philosopher, still ring true across cultural differences and
2500 years because they state what most of us know to be the case from our own lives: when we pay
attention to the suffering of another living being, we suffer too and cannot bear it, and we instinctively
want to do something about it. This capacity of fellow feeling (what McMurtry calls the life-ground of
value) cuts beneath all differences of culture, nationality, gender, and species. If you let your
consciousness focus on anything that is clearly suffering you will suffer too, and be moved to try to
relieve it (or flee because of your inability to help).
The conscience of the world has been aroused, and our shared humanity recognized and
affirmed. Ordinary people in Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Austria, and Germany have been
reaching out in support and solidarity and doing what they can to assist their fellow human beings. As
one volunteer from Austria, when confronted with the fact that it was illegal to transport refugees in her
car from Hungary to Austria said, “It’s a global problem. It’s very important that we, altogether, give
this big sign that refugees — the people that need our help and come from the war — have our solidarity
and support.” This type of solidarity and support is pre-political, the fellow feeling from which demands
for institutional changes derive and without which critical politics is just words.
But if this response is in a sense natural to human beings, why is it not universally expressed? Not
everyone has responded with support and solidarity. The Israeli, Hungarian, and Macedonian
governments are building barbed wire fences to keep refugees out, the chilling spectacle of razor-wire
enclosed camps has returned to Europe, and neo-fascists have attacked refugees in Germany. Just as it
is natural for functioning eyes to see, but what they look at and notice depends upon where the brain
directs their attention, so to our capacity to feel the suffering of others and respond in solidarity depends
on our directing our attention to the other person. It is when our focus is on our own self, “our”
country/land/resources/wealth as exclusive private possessions, that we see the needy other as a threat,
and work to fence them out. However, it is always possible to redirect the eye, for people to open
themselves to the needs of others. The suffering that the eye sees is all the ethical argument
needed: suffering cannot be borne, so it must be alleviated, and that is the material basis of any
conception of the human good.
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Getting people to shift their focus, from holding on to what they have to sharing it with vulnerable
others is made more difficult by the fact that there is often political advantage to be gained from
exploiting xenophobic fears. But as the massive outpouring of critique against the Canadian minister of
Immigration Chris Alexander proves, xenophobia can always be trumped by human heartedness. At the

root of xenophobia lies ignorance: of the actual wealth of this country, of its capacity to help without
noticeable cost to Canadians, but also, the ignorance lying behind the nonsense that refugees are lazy
and greedy, simply looking for “handouts” and a free ride. It is obvious to the eye that looks at what is
really happening that people do not undertake life-threatening ocean crossings and then walk hundreds
of kilometers on foot unless they have concluded there is simply no other way to save their
lives. Windsor has the highest unemployment rate in the country, but I do not see people trying to swim
across the river and walk to California in search of work. People flee their homes only as a last
resort. And that which they must undertake to reach their destination is work if anything is, and the
hardest imaginable.
Again, no theoretical sophistication is required to understand this truth. Moving voluntarily can be an
exciting and life-affirming experience, but people will also fight to stay in their homes. Whatever
“home” means exerts a powerful emotional pull on human beings and they do not easily abandon
it. That is why civil wars are so brutal and deadly. Both sides claim the same space as home, and
neither can be driven out. Likewise, to those who pay attention to their humanity, refugees elicit a
sympathetic response precisely because everyone with a home understands how traumatic it would be to
have to leave it under duress. Thus, they reach out to try to help.
At the same time as everyone who can must be willing to help in what ways they can, it is also true that
individual acts of solidarity are not going to be enough to solve this crisis. First of all, the scale of the
crisis already exceeds what individual sponsors will be able to solve. That is not an argument against
individual sponsorship or the human heartendess from which it flows. But no individual or family
acting alone will be able to house, clothe, feed, provide language training, help re-start careers, deal with
the psycho-social trauma the experience of war will have caused in the refugees, ensure that they have
access to health care and can re-activate their lives in meaningful ways.
Individual responsibility is real and must be assumed to the point of everyone’s individual capacity, but
we must not lose sight of the collective responsibility we have as citizens of a global North whose ruling
classes have pillaged and stolen the wealth of the rest of the world to hold those ruling classes and the
governments that serve them to account. The Conservative government would like nothing more that to
privatize ethical responsibility– “if you love them, you save them,” while continuing its policy of
starving public institutions of the publicly created wealth they require if they are to serve the needs of
Canadian citizens and refugees alike. Exercising our collective responsibility means not only forcing the
government to become the primary sponsor of refugees, but also not letting them blow the ideological
smoke of the need for ‘security screenings’ in our eyes, and most importantly, of ensuring that the
government makes available to the refugees allowed in the full range of public institutions and resources
they require.
If anyone objects that Canada cannot afford to take in anymore refugees, they need to be confronted
with some of the comparative numbers. First, let us take the case of Germany. Germany predicts that
within a year it will have welcomed 800 000 refugees. The population of Germany is 81 million
people, and its GDP is 3.4 trillion US dollars. That means that Germany is taking in 1 refugee for every
101 Germans. Canada has a population of 33 million people and a GDP of 1.61 trillion dollars. If
Canada took in 1 refugee for every 101 Canadians, we would be welcoming 300 000 (instead of the 25
000 that opposition parties are talking about). GDP per capita in Germany is approximately 41 000 US
dollars, and in Canad approximately 48 000 US dollars. If Germany is not worried about bankrupting the
country or imposing impossible costs on its citizens, then neither should Canada be reticent about taking
a proportional number of refugees, given our higher per capita income.
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But there is another comparison that needs to be made. Venezuela has just volunteered to take in 20000
refugees. Although it is suffering an economic crisis in part caused by the decline of the price of oil, in
part by a capital strike driving up inflation, and partly by on-going hostility from Washington because it
has, since the Bolivarian revolution of 1998 had the gall to expropriate capital and use national wealth to
satisfy the needs of and politically empower the poor, the Maduro government understands what is most
important: to share that which one has with those who have even less so that their lives are
maintained. The per capita GDP of Venezuela is roughly 12 000 US dollars– about one quarter of
Canada’s.
Pointing out the mismatch between Canada’s resources and willingness to help and that of a struggling
country of the global South only emphasizes the life-blindness of the Conservative government. It has
ideologically committed itself to the geo-political economic system that is the underlying cause of this
crisis. For more than a century the lives of people in Africa and the Middle East have been treated as
expendable to the machinations of European and American Imperialism. The natural wealth of Africa
has been plundered and the life-spaces of Arab peoples manipulated to the detriment of all save the
elites who are willing to sacrifice their own people for the sake of local political power.
The crisis, therefore, is a crisis of the money-value system and the politics of military violence that
supports it that is causing millions of people to flee their homes. This crisis is certainly not caused by
“jihadi terrorism” as Chris Alexander argued. Rather “jihadi terrorism,” in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria
is an effect of, a reaction to, imperialist intervention in the Middle East. That is not to say that it is an
effective response– it has simply provided the pretext for more destructive intervention, but it is clear
that ISIS would not now exist had there been no second Iraq war. The main organizers of ISIS are
former officers in Saddam Hussein’s army.
Unfortunately, path dependency exerts a powerful hold on politicians. Once you have invested money,
materiel, and people in “military solutions” it becomes more and more difficult to admit
failure. Instead, like a gambler trying to recoup his loses by placing another bet, the architects of war
think they only need to refine their strategy, or bring in more allies, or attack another target. Thus, last
week we heard Prime Minister Harper argue that the only solution to the refugee crisis was military
victory in Iraq and Syria. Victory for whom, however? The Western alliance, which (historically, since
the end of the Ottoman empire) and proximally (since the first Iraq war) has been the cause of the lifedestroying instability in the first place? ISIS, who will benefit most of all from a “no fly zone,” in Syria,
calls for which have now been renewed? Assad? who only a year and a half ago was being compared to
Hitler? The secular revolutionaries of Syria? That would be excellent, but it is obvious, no matter what
one’s political affiliations, that they are marginal to the struggle. The Shiite government in Iraq, whose
allied Shiite militias have perpetuated the massacres that have pushed Sunni villagers into supporting
ISIS? Iran, who, despite the recently concluded nuclear treaty, is still itself threatened repeatedly with
invasion of bombing?
In situations like these, where millions of lives are in the balance and the warring factions lack the
strength to win but are not weak enough to lose, temporary solutions that save lives and allow for the
constitution of progressive political forces has to be the short term goal of anyone who actually cares
about the refugees. That means that somehow- and it will perhaps prove impossible– all sides, ALL
sides, including ISIS, need to be politically engaged, to sit down and to work out some sort of calming
compromise. If that cannot be accomplished– and frankly, I do not know who in this world has the
credibility, power, and political intelligence and human heartedness to do it, there will be no end to the
refugees crisis no matter how heroic the response of individuals who stand up to help.
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THE PERSISTENCE OF MISERY
Originally Posted April 26, 2016
Fantasies of Classlessness
The justification of re-distribution through taxation is that by this means the wealthy contribute to the
commonwealth of the nation. It is a justification that presupposes that all citizens of a nation share a
common interest in each other’s material well-being. This assumption of a shared national interest has
always been contradicted by the reality of class interest, which, in economic matters, typically trumps
the ideology of shared citizenship. That classes and class interest are still real and not just a problem of
the past or a construct of Marxist argument is proven once again by the revelations contained in the
Panama Papers.
While the revelations contained in these papers cost a few sitting politicians their jobs and occasioned
promises for investigation and change, the key political truth that the papers revealed is that most of the
practices that allow the wealthy to shield their income from national taxation by hiding it in tax havens
are legal. Those methods that are not strictly speaking legal are not pursued (typically) with the
diligence one would expect if the law were really no respecter of persons. It might not be a respecter of
persons in their individuality, but it is certainly a respecter of class. How could it be otherwise: the poor
do not write the law; they are its objects, not its subjects.
And When They Try to Become Subjects…
…they are demonized and attacked no matter what means of resistance and change they choose to
employ. The latest victim of the global right-wing reaction is Dilma Rousseff and the Brazilian
Workers’ Party. She is suffering from the same mobilization of anti-democratic forces that have largely
undermined the Venezuelan experiments with new models of socialist development.
Anti-democratic? Did I say anti-democratic? How can massive street demonstrations against proven
corruption and obvious economic crisis be anti-democratic? The answer demands that we think through
the value-implications of the term “democracy.” By “value-implications” I mean the goods that
animate the struggle for democracy and the institutional requirements the realization of those goods
entail.
We can start to get at these implications by looking historically at who has led the struggle for
democracy. In all cases, excluded groups have been central to the mobilizations against entrenched
elites. While ancient and modern conceptions of democracy are distinct, as are liberal, republican, and
socialist conceptions, what they all have in common is a rejection of the principle that political power is
the proper preserve of a noble class fit by their superior nature to rule. In a democracy the shared
interest is supposed to rule. It is because there really is a shared interest in access to fundamental means
of life and life-development that demands for democracy arise wherever these life-goods are denied by a
ruling elite claiming the mandate of heaven or nature to rule. Spartacus and the protesters of the Arab
Spring were united by the rejection of the idea that it is ever just to prevent the majority (who do the
necessary work of society) from accessing the means of life and life-development by excluding them
from political and economic power.
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If we look at the current mobilizations against Maduro and Rouseff, it is clear that many of the
protesters are working class men and women, but they and their life-interests are not driving the
movement. While the specific history of state development in Latin and South America encourages
corruption (for the case of Brazil, see Perry Anderson’s excellent article in this month’s London Review
of Books) corruption is the surface justification but not the real driver of the mobilization. The leaders
of the reaction are the leaders who have been displaced from their historical positions of power by the
“Bolivarian” Revolution in Venezuela and the Worker’s Party in Brazil.
The right-wing reaction has been made possible by the end of the boom in commodity prices. It was this
commodity boom that allowed the Venezuelan socialist party and the Brazilian Worker’s Party to fund
real improvements in the lives of working and poor Venezuelans and Brazilians. As prices collapsed,
government income was reduced, an inflation crisis hit Venezuela, and austerity measures introduced in
Brazil in an effort to placate the right wing. But rather than placate them it has emboldened them to
discredit the socialist parties as the cause of the economic crisis (when in fact of course the cause was
the banking industry, centred in New York and London, not Brasilia or Caracas).
The real democratic movement was the mobilization of the social power of working people and the poor
that Chavez and Lula were able to ride to victory (and, in the case of Chavez, mobilize to defeat a rightwing coup attempt). If anyone has any doubts about the real social achievements of Chavez (vastly
improved medical care in alliance with Cuban doctors, public housing, the slow emergence of a parallel
solidarity economy, nationalization of key industries) they should read Gregory Wilpert’s superb
account of the first ten years of the Bolivarian Revolution (Changing Venezuela by Taking Power,
Verso, 2007). Wilpert is far from uncritical, but puts paid to the slanderous misrepresentation of the
Chavez government that is typical fare in even the best North American newspapers.
While the achievements (and limitations and problems) were real in both Venezuela and in Brazil, the
decline in commodity prices has exposed the fatal flaw of the model pursued by both countries. In
neither case were there system-wide efforts to change the structure of property ownership. As a
consequence, economic power remained in the hands of the traditional ruling class. So long as there
was a lot of money flowing into the state, public infrastructure projects could be advanced and the lives
of the poor improved. But as soon as that money dried up, the traditional elites struck back, asserting the
power they never lost over the economy and exploiting the local effects of a global economy to discredit
the alternative model (very tentatively) explored by the left wing parties.
This leads us to what me might call a paradox of transition: if electoral parties of the left pursue a
vigorous transition to socialism through wide-spread expropriation and socialization of property, they
risk the coup d’etat and civil war their electoral alternative to armed revolution was supposed to
avoid. On the other hand, if they avoid civil war by being cautious, they leave preponderant power in
the hands of the right wing and risk being undermined from within, as is currently happening. There is
no easy or obvious solution to this paradox. To simply allow the achievements of the past decade to be
undone by a right-wing re-conquest of power would be a defeat that would undermine the credibility of
the South American left for the foreseeable future. At the same time, with unfavourable global
economic conditions, a return to policies that helped consolidate the legitimacy of the alternative will
prove difficult if not impossible.
The Political Stakes
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Whatever policy decisions are ultimately made, the crucial political task is to defend the democratic
legitimacy of the Bolivarian Revolution and the PT. That does not mean uncritical support for either; it

means that democracy remains rooted, as it always has been, in the shared life-interests, and the struggle
for democracy with those popular forces whose life-interests are most threatened by undemocratic forms
of social organization. Those undemocratic social forms are the very social forms the right-wing is
trying to drag Brazil and Venezuela back to, and they are why people who support democracy in the
Global North must avoid being hoodwinked by mainstream media reporting about the “democratic”
opposition to authoritarian and corrupt socialist governments. The structures that feed corruption (as
Anderson shows) long pre-dated Lula and the PT and the real authoritarianism is the authoritarianism of
capital, which claims the sovereign right to rule over everyone and the shared life-interest,
unaccountable to and unconcerned with real life-conditions on the ground.
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DEMOCRACY AGAINST CAPITALISM
Originally Posted July 6, 2015
The development of a body of philosophical work, in my experience, is not a linear progression from
insight to insight but a constantly circling back and going further/deeper into a set of problems. Hence,
in the course of my own philosophical development I have found my thinking drawn back to certain
books that continue to help make sense of structural problems as they manifest themselves in changing
contexts. One on those books is Ellen Meiksins Wood’s Democracy Against Capitalism. 2015 is its
twentieth anniversary. Far from being dated, it is essential reading for anyone trying to understand the
current conflict between Greece and the European Central Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. Despite its unsurpassed insights into the limits that capitalism poses for democratic selfgovernance, Wood’s book, I feel, has never received the attention that it its due.
When it was published, it significantly advanced the state of Marxist political philosophy, replacing
the unenlightening blanket rejection of “bourgeois democracy” with an historically rich and
philosophically astute critique of liberalism. Against received wisdom in both Marxist and liberal
camps, Wood demonstrated the undemocratic origins of liberal democracy. Drawing out the hitherto
overlooked sophistication of Marx’s own critique of liberal democracy, Wood revealed that the essence
of liberalism was a formal distinction between public and private realms, a distinction which allows the
social forces generated in the ‘private’ economic sphere to undermine the democratic decisions made in
the formally ‘public’ sphere. The briliiance of the argument– and what should have made it more
widely discussed in liberal circles- is that Wood substantiates her claims not through rote citation of
Marx, but from an historical comparison between the practice of Athenian democracy and the pains
English and American liberals took (following their respective revolutions) to normalise the
identification of democracy with voting, and then only on those issues which had no bearing on socioeconomic life. “In Athens, there was no …clear distinction between ‘state’ and ‘civil society,’ no
distinct and autonomous ‘economy.’ … Political and economic powers and rights, in other words, were
not as easily separated in Athens as in the US, where property was already achieving a purely
‘economic’ definition, detached from juridical privilege or political power, and where the ‘economy’
was acquiring a life of its own. Large segments of human experience and activity, and many varieties of
oppression and indignity, were left untouched by political equality.” (p. 224). Political equality and
voting rights might be necessary conditions of free social life, but they are by no means sufficient. The
current crisis in Greece illustrates clearly why not.
That which so alarmed European and global finance capitalists about the Greek referendum is that it
forced open the normally closed circuits of money-capital to democratic power. Under normal
circumstances, as Wood notes, economic forces are treated as if they were powers independent of
human social activity to which that activity must conform in order to be rational. “Freedom” including
democratic freedom, is thus identified with its opposite– compliance to external and unchallengeable
forces.
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To understand my point, consider any of a number of official response to the Greek referendum. They
all end up sounding the same alarm: the Greeks have defied the power of “markets” and will now suffer
even worse consequences than had they complied with finance capital’s demands. Here is one example
amongst many that could have been chosen. Simon Smith, an analyst at FxPro concludes: “If Europe
isn’t prepared to relax the terms it was offering Greece just last weekend, and there’s no indication it
will, Greece will have to start printing its own currency so . On the other hand, if Europe compromises

and agrees to write off some of Greece’s huge debt, the credibility of the currency will suffer.
“Whatever the outcome of the next few days, there is no way that the eurozone or the single currency
can come out stronger as a result.” The point to pay attention to is the hidden framework within which
Smith’s “no way” comment is made. He assumes, not only as given (as is the case) the ways in which
financial markets operate today, but also that they are obligatory for all time and unchangeable by
collective social decision. It may well be the case that tomorrow a revived drachma will be weak or the
Euro will decline, but that is not equivalent to the implication (which Smith wants us to draw) that
Greek society will be weaker, over the long term if it rejects the demands of its creditors.
Smith thus excludes the possibility (of which human history is the living proof) of fundamental social
change– change in the ruling value system and the purposes of major social institutions. He cannot
imagine that the Greek crisis could be the begining of transformational changes in the advanced
capitalist West, changes which reconnect economies to their real purpose: the production of lifecapital: “the life wealth that produces more life wealth without loss and with cumulative gain.” Life
capital is not a fictitious or a utopian idea– it is the food you eat, the water you drink (processed for
safety) the education you have enjoyed, the health care that is available for you when you need it, the
roof over your head. If you live in a society in which these life-goods are not available, then you live in
a society that is failing, regardless of what financial markets “think.” Greek society is failing, precisely
because governments before Syriza have obeyed the dictates of financial capital to convert their shared
life-resources into money-capital for bankers to appropriate for themselves. Even mainstream business
papers now recognise that the loans being given to Greece are part of a shell game in which money is
advanced to pay back money that is owed– Greek society starves, goes deeper into debt, and the banks
receive back only that money they have already leant. Money is certainly not being extended to the
Greek people so that they can survive (the crisis has created a massive public health crisis that is killing
people. (see Stuckler and Basu, The Body Economic, pp. 77-96).
By voting “no,” not only have Greeks magnificently refused to give into blackmail and intimidation,
they have also exposed the fundamentally undemocratic character of capitalist society and
the traditional parties, including social democratic parties, that support it. (If anyone needed more proof
than Tony Blair that social democracy is fully incorporated into the capitalist mainstream, Francois
Hollande and German Finance minister Wolfgang Schaeuble are it). What was so alarming about the
referendum was that it gave Greeks an explicit say in the macro-economic policy their government
would pursue. Of course, part of the strategy here is brinksmanship of a thoroughly ordinary sort–
Tsirpas trying to give himself some leverage in future talks. But principles matter in politics– and the
principle instantiated by the referendum is dangerous to the ruling financial oligarchy and orthodoxy: if
democracy is a formally legitimate political system, indeed, the one that capitalism is naturally supposed
to lead to, and citizens begin to democratically reject cornerstone elements of capitalist society,
capitalism will not be able to legitimate itself by its traditional means– that it is the only democratic
society. The contradiction between capitalism and democracy will be exposed again, and the capitalists
will have to choose to re-impose their will by force (as they have never been shy to do, when pushed) or
they will have to yield: in the short term, substantive concessions to Greece, and in the longer term, an
opening into which more systematic transformational projects in democratic economic organization in
the shared life-interest can be set up.
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The no vote clearly does not solve all of Greece’s problems. Nor can they be solved simply by reciting
slogans about worker’s control. While it is indeed time, as John Milios and Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos
argued back in March, is for Syriza to mobilise the Greek people, not just against the bankers, but for
concrete steps towards mobilising Greek labour to rebuild Greek society, not so that the surplus can be
pumped out of the country as money-capital for the financial oligarchy to consume, but to satisfy the

life-requirements of Greek citizens. But in taking this step caution is required: nothing will spell doom
for Syriza more quickly than failed experiments in socialising key sectors of the economy. That is what
must be done, but it must be done with care and intelligence, and it will require international solidarity
to succeed. That solidarity may be taking shape. In May, Podemos and its allies swept the municipal
elections in Spain and are poised to win parliamentary elections in the fall. Should that occur, and the
powerful social movements unleashed by resistance to authoritarian austerity in Spain keep a Podemos
government pushing to the left, a period of serious challenge, not only to neo-liberal orthodoxy, but to
capitalist misrule might really be emerging.
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CAPITALISM AGAINST DEMOCRACY
Originally Posted July 13, 2015
By fortuitous coincidence, I happened to be reading Paul Virilio’s The Futurism of the Instant just as the
breathless rush to judge the meaning and implications of Syriza’ agreement with the Eurozone
consumed the left bank of the Internet. Virilio makes a most salient point about the patience that
historical understanding requires: “we now have a better sense of the disastrous importance, for the
human environment, of this information bomb that disintegrates all natural magnitudes, the very scale of
all natural reality, whether geographic, cultural, historical.” (p. 78). Unceasing streams of data flowing
from every point on earth demand instant response, whereas actual understanding of historically
significant events requires that judgement be held in abeyance until the actual implications of particular
decisions reveal themselves. The web generates the illusion of omniscience, but no finite intellect is
omniscient, and the whole truth of an event is never fully disclosed in the immediacy of its present.
The Syriza information bomb was detonated by Richard Seymour when he claimed, within hours
of Greece’s agreement with its creditors, that Syriza’s capitulation was a “world historic defeat for the
left.”
So it is important to be clear: if Syriza supports and implements this deal, it is over. It will not
recover. It may exist as a party, but as a force of the radical left it will be all but redundant. It may as
well be a centrist, austerian coalition. A left that goes along with this will be committing suicide. And
finally, don’t put your faith in the idea that maybe if Syriza hangs in there, does what it’s told,
eventually, after a while, Podemos will come, maybe some other radical left formations will come, and
the balance of power will tilt. Even if that was how the European institutions work – and they have
proven they aren’t susceptible to that kind of pressure – this outcome will seriously undercut the chances
for the European radical left. Be clear that we are looking a world-historic defeat in the eye.
This outcome is certainly possible, but it is not inevitable. Even if it were, Seymour does not answer the
most important question raised by his position: if European institutions are not susceptible to pressure
of even multiple far left formations, then how can it be the case that Syriza’s capitulation is a world
historical defeat? If Syriza plus Podemos plus other left movements cannot tilt the balance of power,
then Syriza in particular, and the left in general, it would seem, was already defeated. If not Syriza and
Podemos and other far left groups winning power, then what real alternative would Seymour
recommend? If there were an appetite for vanguardist revolution in Greece, or Europe generally, it
seems reasonable to believe that it would have been satisfied by now.
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Seymour’s criticisms drew a swift reaction from Leo Panitch. Writing from Athens, Panitch argued that
Seymour failed to give appropriate weight to the force of immediate circumstances: the very real threat
of the collapse of the Greek banking system, and the failure of workers in northern Europe to mobilise in
support of their Greek brothers and sisters. With no cards left to play, Syriza struck a deal which,
according to Panitch, staves off an even more severe crisis and thus (perhaps) saves the government to
fight another day.

It will not be a “world historic” victory, for those who like such language, since it will still involve tying
the revival of the Greek economy to the fate of what remains a very much capitalist Europe, but this
would not mean that the Syriza government would exclude itself from the continuing struggle to
challenge and change that. On the other hand, if Tsipras walks away today accepting the same
conditionalities as before to debt restructuring, and without any guaranteed investment funds on top of
this, then it will indeed be interesting to see where Lenin will take us once he is let out of his tomb, and
sees that he faces yet again the sad fact that a break in the weakest link could not break the stronger links
of the labour movements in Central and Northern Europe to both domestic and global capitalism.
While Panitch’s long-standing contribution to radical political economy earns his perspective the utmost
respect, I cannot agree with this assessment.
To read the text of the agreement that Tsirpas signed, it is difficult, even on the most liberal application
of the principle of charity, to understand Panitch’s interpretation. Syriza has committed not only to
wholesale privatization of vital public services like electricity distribution, increases in consumption tax
increases, cuts to pension programs and social spending of all sorts, weakening job security, and mass
layoffs of public sector employees. No: after agreeing to all that and potentially more to come, it did not
even secure agreement that they will get the money they are counting on to bail out the banks. The
transfer of funds is still conditional on the Greek parliament proving to Europe that they will make good
on the promises made in the agreement:
Immediately, and only subsequent to legal implementation of the first four above-mentioned measures
as well as endorsement of all the commitments included in this document by the Greek Parliament,
verified by the Institutions and the Eurogroup, may a decision to mandate the Institutions to negotiate a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) be taken. This decision would be taken subject to national
procedures having been completed and if the preconditions of Article 13 of the ESM Treaty are met on
the basis of the assessment referred to in Article 13.1.
In order to form the basis for a successful conclusion of the MoU, the Greek offer of reform measures
needs to be seriously strengthened to take into account the strongly deteriorated economic and fiscal
position of the country during the last year. The Greek government needs to formally commit to
strengthening their proposals in a number of areas identified by the Institutions, with a satisfactory clear
timetable for legislation and implementation, including structural benchmarks, milestones and
quantitative benchmarks, to have clarity on the direction of policies over the medium-run.
In other words, this agreement comes at the cost of surrendering Greek economic policy completely,
making Greece in effect a vassal-state of the European Central Bank.
It is difficult indeed to see anyway in which Syriza can regain any political momentum after this deal.
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However, the fact that they signed this deal in the first place indicates something of importance about
their bargaining position going in to the talks. The courage that a majority of Greeks showed by voting
no in the July 5th referendum was a direct challenge to the power of its Eurozone partners. However,
when a nation of eleven million people, without formal support from any other quarter, takes on an

international coalition of three hundred million, it could only ever have been a bluff. Bluffs can work,
but only if the other party does not pay to see your cards. The Eurozone could afford to pay to see
Greece’s cards. Once their bluff was called, there were no politically real options left but to accept
Europe’s terms, given how the process had unfolded up to this point.
Let us therefore be clear: the real enemy and the real problem is the Eurozone governments and the
European Central Bank, who have clearly set out to destroy Syriza as a potential challenger to the power
of money-value, and as a warning to others (Podemos) not to follow suit. If this claim is true (and what
evidence could falsify it?), then what others owe Syriza is support– critical support, yes, but support
nonetheless.
In a follow up piece to his original (obviously rushed) intervention, Panitch and Sam Gindin make
roughly this point:
Syriza’s unique capacity on the international left to build the type of party capable of both mobilizing
against neoliberalism and entering the state to try to actually do something about this has always hinged
on the way it sought to find room for manoeuvre within a European Union which has neoliberalism in its
DNA, going back all the way to the Treaty of Rome let alone the Economic and Monetary Union thirty
years later. Anyone who at all seriously followed developments in Greece over the past five years
should have known that the leadership of the party would only go as far as the Europeans would let it,
and that the balance of power inside the party made the Left Platform faction’s strategy for Grexit an
effective non-starter. Those on the revolutionary left who hoped that after Syriza’s election this
leadership would get swept away by a massive popular upsurge for Grexit in face of the limits and
contradictions of a Syriza government were, as usual, dreaming in technicolor.
.
While it is true that technicolor dreams rarely come true, it is also true that anyone who is committed to
a future in which the life-destroying norms of capitalism have been finally overcome must allow
themselves to dream at least in black and white. Otherwise, it is impossible to ever get beyond what
capitalist normality dictates.
I am a philosopher and not an economist, but if there is a promise of debt relief that even the
International Monetary Fund acknowledges is necessary in the agreement that Greece just signed, I did
not see it. Unless there is significant debt relief, then the measures just agreed to– which amount to
nothing more than taking on more debt to pay existing debt– will only exacerbate the crisis. Might that
intensifying crisis produce a revolutionary break? Perhaps, but there is no evidence to this point that a
politically significant number of Greeks want socialist revolution. They want a solution to the
murderous austerity imposed upon them. If they turn now turn on Syriza as the cause of austerity (rather
than on the Eurozone and finance capital), a much darker future might be in store for Greece.
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In a recent interview with The New Statesman, ex-Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis returns to an
article he first wrote in 2013, and which explains Syriza’s reticence to choose the Grexit strategy. (To
be fair, Varoufakis also noted that he did set up a team to study a measured way of exiting the Euro, but

those who favoured it could never win a majority to their side). Varoufakis was afraid that a Greek exit
from the Euro could have a cascade effect that would plunge Europe into a deep recession and
strengthen neo-fascist forces:
A Greek or a Portuguese or an Italian exit from the Eurozone would soon lead to a fragmentation of
European capitalism, yielding a seriously recessionary surplus region east of the Rhine and north of the
Alps, while the rest of Europe is would be in the grip of vicious stagflation. Who do you think would
benefit from this development? A progressive left, that will rise Phoenix-like from the ashes of Europe’s
public institutions? Or the Golden Dawn Nazis, the assorted neofascists, the xenophobes and the spivs? I
have absolutely no doubt as to which of the two will do best from a disintegration of the Eurozone.
Perhaps Varoufakis exaggerated the threat. Nevertheless, if even left critics of Syriza like Seymour
seem to rest their arguments on the weakness of the left, then it is not sheer cowardice or over-caution to
worry about the potentially disastrous implications of forcing through anti-Euro policies without welllaid alternative plans in place.
The looming spectre of the Golden Dawn is another reason why the left has no choice but to (critically)
support Syriza. Its election was not a world-historic victory of the left; its signing on to this agreement
need not be a world-historic defeat. The Greek people retain their freedom of action. They are not
bound for all time by this agreement if they decide not to be. But that decision has to be made in light of
a social alternative whose first steps can be taken right now. The difficulties standing in the way of even
small concrete alternatives are formidable. With no alternative source of funds to the European Central
Bank and the IMF, and without the natural resources of Venezuela and other Latin American countries
which enabled them to support small but real movements away from capitalist markets in the provision
of life-necessities (at least until the price of oil fell) Greeks are in a profoundly difficult situation.
Whether it is a world historical defeat for the left will depend upon whether they can mobilise
effectively in the short term to protect public institutions and assets (as potential sources of funds for
reinvestment in need-satisfying economic activity) and in the longer term on their ability to mobilise
effective (and not just rhetorical) solidarity. This solidarity must take two key political
forms: 1) elected governments of broadly representative parties to the left of now fully complicit social
democratic parties willing to challenge the hegemony of the forces of austerity in Europe, and 2) a
reactivated labour movement willing to organize behind demands for an economy that understands value
in terms of life-needs satisfied and life-capacities enabled.
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ON CORBYN, COMPLIANCE, AND
CONFIDENCE
Originally Posted September 20, 2015
Second Time Farce?
Less than one month after Syriza’s capitulation to the combined forces of European and and global
finance capital, the UK Labour Party has, surprisingly, elected Jeremy Corbyn as its leader. (See
Democracy Against Capitalism and Capitalism Against Democracy for my analysis of the Syriza
situation). Corbyn articulates many of the same structural criticisms of capitalism as the original Syriza
program, and is advocating an analogous set of radical reforms. By “radical reforms” I mean policies
which challenge the principle that collectively created wealth belongs to the owners of capital
exclusively, and that that proper use of such wealth is to create more capital for the owners. Instead,
Corbyn defends a program which would end austerity, re-invest in public institutions, re-nationalise
certain industries, replace a foreign policy based upon military adventurism with one based upon
diplomacy and dialogue, and promote environmental health through support for ecological localism. As
an open letter from the leadership of the Socialist Worker Party to Corbyn rightly argued “his success is
a clear sign of the feeling against austerity, racism and war. His victory is an utter rejection of the
warmongering and veneration of big business that were the hallmarks of the Tony Blair era.” The same
letter points out the danger he will face. “There are 20 Labour MPs who really back Corbyn. There are
210 who don’t.” While new members to Labour attracted in the wake of Ed Milliband’s disastrous
election campaign forced this new direction (which is, in essence, a journey back towards the sort of
labour Party Tony Benn and others in the left opposition wanted to see), the party establishment is
certainly not on board.
Syriza stirred similar hopes (mine included) that a new generation of socialist politics was emerging in
Europe, learning the positive lessons taught by Venezuela under Chavez and Bolivia under Morales, in
which the power of past democratic victories, embodied in parliamentary institutions with the formal
power to change property relations and make in roads against ruling class control over universally
required life resources, would become the primary vehicle of struggle. The power of this politics (I and
others hoped, and still do) derived from its democratic legitimacy. A party duly elected on an explicit
platform of investing collectively created wealth to serve the shared life-interests is (as the United States
found in its long history of trying to undermine Chavez) almost impossible to discredit.
Thus far, Syriza itself it has disappointed those hopes, although not to the point where everyone on the
Greek Left has abandoned it. Still, its performance lends support to critics like Richard Seymour who
have argued that Syriza’s disintegration in the face of ruling class opposition was a world historical
defeat. Whether Corbyn’s election signals an over-hasty rush to judgement on Seymour’s part about the
radical potential of parliamentary socialist parties remains to be seen. In any event, Leo Panitch is
correct (even thought he was not correct in his own rush to defend Syriza) that “the kind of democratic
socialist struggle that we are embarked on is a marathon, not a sprint.” However, even marathons have
ends, and if runners are not periodically refreshed along the way, they will die. Unless a movement like
Corbyn’s insurgent candidacy, or Syriza, or some other movement attains some sort of concrete victory
soon, this new path of socialist struggle will be found along the roadside next to the corpses of Third
Way social democracy and Leninist vanguardism.
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Fuck You, I Won’t Do What You Tell Me.
The election of Corbyn is a refreshing example of people doing exactly the opposite of what the power
brokers told them to do. They were irresponsible, they took a risk, they turned their back on the polite
alternative. Such refusals are rare. As if Corbyn and others struggling against austerity and ecoenvironmental crisis did not have enough objective- structural opposition to contend with, there are also
powerful subjective headwinds impeding the ability of socialist to build a unified and powerful
movement. Even though the necessity for fundamental change cannot be rationally denied in the face of
the evidence (faltering economies, a culture of cynical withdrawal from mainstream politics, a global
refugee crisis, unending wars, the manifold threats posed by climate change), this necessity has not
proven sufficient subjective motivation for new movement building in most of the Global North. A
culture of compliance dominates working class consciousness that complicates organizing the sorts of
mass movements parliamentary socialist parties need as goads to stay consistent with their
transformational platforms.
Two examples, one seemingly frivolous (but not), and one serious, (but presented as frivolous) illustrate
my point.
We are all shaped by the culture of our origins, and for me that means loving hockey and wasting time
reading about it in the sports pages. Training camps are opening and the papers are full of analyses and
prognostications about each team’s prospects for the coming year. The news from the Toronto Maple
Leafs camp is focused on changes to management (which is itself telling). One story in the Toronto Star
last week noted how in response to an edict from the new General Manager, Lou Lamoriello, the players
have shown up to training camp clean shaven. It turns out Lamoriello does not like beards and has
banned his players from sporting them. It would seem all have complied, without argument.
Well, so what– team sport is a school of conformity, one might quite sensibly reply. It is that, to be
sure. On the other hand, hockey players are also unionized workers. Moreover, they are unionized
workers many of whom have talents that are for the most part irreplaceable. On top of that, many of
them have guaranteed contracts worth millions of dollars, which gives them tremendous leverage in any
conflict with individual owners and managers. No one is going to pay to watch a 72 year old
authoritarian scowl from a press box. In other words, had the players all said: “Go to hell. We are
adults and we will dress however we want to dress,” (i.e., had they reached the level of political
consciousness of adolescent girls in Toronto High Schools fighting against dress codes) Lamoriello
would have had to back down. But they have not. They did what they were told. And if even the most
wealthy unionized workers cannot stand up to the petty totalitarianism of management, that tells us that
working class power has been profoundly undermined by four decades of neo-liberalism.
The second example is, at a substantive level, far more troubling. A recent story reported by the
CBC reports that the latest trend in worker oppression is a badge worn by employees that records
everything they say for later analysis. “The information from the badges,” the story explains, “which
were created by the Boston-based company Humanyze, was gathered anonymously, and workers were
given personalized dashboards that benchmarked their performance against that of the group.” One
might expect that workers would immediately see what these technologies are really about– complete
control over all thought and action in the work place– but by and large they do not. One of the directors
explains just how effective the technology is at making workers want to change their day to day
performance:
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‘”The minute that you get the report that you’re not speaking enough and that you don’t show
leadership, immediately, the next day, you change your behaviour,’ says Silvia Gonzalez-Zamora, an
analytics leader at Deloitte, who steered the Newfoundland pilot.”
“It’s powerful to see how people want to display better behaviours or the behaviours that you’re moving
them towards.”
There is something bewitching about these technologies which makes managerial domination seem
fun. Instead of throwing them out the window, they are embraced as games in which people compete
against themselves to conform and become more productive– serving the bottom line of the company,
revealing information that could be used against them, all the while believing they are engaged in an
amusing self-improvement project.
It is true, of course, that part of the culture of compliance is real and heightened vulnerability of workers
to management power. Still, even in those cases where workers have a high degree of job security (like
hockey players or tenured professors) too often the response to increased bureaucratic oversight and
interference is: comply first, complain (over drinks) later. Compliant is not critique: the path to change
begins with protecting existing workplace rights and ends with overthrowing the exploitative and
alienating structures of capitalism.
Looking, Not Leaping
The culture of compliance is not a function of individual character flaws, but a real crisis of confidence
in working people borne of decades of defeat. Hence we find ourselves in a catch-22- in order to break
the cycle of compliance, we need confidence, and to gain confidence, we need a victory, but to win a
victory, we need to stop complying, but to stop complying we need confidence.
People are confident when they feel that other people have their backs and that there are organizations
and institutions in place that can protect them from reprisals. But solidarity and the fighting and
protective organizations working people have created over two centuries of struggle have been the
targets of neo-liberal globalization. Where labour markets are tight, workers can easily be set against
each other, non-unionized labour undercutting unionized labour, unionized labour in the Global North
seeing lower cost labour in the global South as the enemy. Everyone’s bargaining position is
weakened, everyone becomes fearful of losing even more than they have already lost, and the idea of an
offensive struggle to reclaim form capital what we all need for life sounds insane.
Thus, when a movement like Syriza or Jeremy Corbyn makes noises about the need to make those sorts
of structural inroads against capital, they are mocked and called mad. Like the fool in King Lear, they
are actually speaking the truth, but it takes confidence to listen to fools.
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ON RADICALISM
Originally posted October 2, 2015
The world capitalist system is obviously exhausted. The values that distinguished it as a progressive
alternative to feudal aristocratic-monarchical rule- liberty, equality, fraternity- have been replaced by
surveillance, inequality, and violent factionalization. True, people are still free to pursue happiness, but
the form of happiness on offer– the accumulation of money and consumer goods– is, on the one hand,
impossible for more and more people because they lack secure and well-paid employment, and, more
deeply, unfulfilling, even for those who can afford it. The system lives on only through violence and
distraction.
The distractions have become increasingly perverse. Physicians for Social Responsibility, using wellestablished empirical and statistical methods, estimates that 1.3 million people have been killed in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan in the “War on Terror” since 9/11, almost all of them Muslims, killed
either directly or indirectly by Western armies. (By ‘indirectly’ I mean killed as a result of the sectarian
violence engendered by Western intervention. In this case the Western arnies are not the cause of death,
but the cause of the cause of death; i.e., the force that created the conditions in which the sectarian could
be enflamed). Yet, absurdly, governments continue to portray our societies and our lives as under
threat. Disgracefully, unacceptably, too many citizens in the West allow themselves to be frightened by
racist government led fear-mongering.
The lengths to which Western governments will go to excite this fear and to turn each citizen into a spy
on his or her neighbour leap into the deepest wells of stupidity. Recently, the Australian government
published a guide for parents and teachers purporting to help them spot “radicalization” in Australian
teenagers. Harkening back to the “listening to heavy metal leads to devil-worship” idiocy of my own
teenage years, the pamphlet warns that one sign that your son or daughter might be planning to pack his
or her bags and head for Syria is that he or she starts listening to “alternative music.” If you do not
believe me, throw a shrimp on the barbie, open up a big can of Foster’s, crank up your favourite
Birthday Party album as loud as you can, and read it here (then weep).
Perhaps I should not poke fun. It is true that there are a large number of foreign fighters in ISIS, but, as
with their targets, these are mostly young men (and some women) from the Middle East. The latest
estimate puts the number of foreign fighters at 30 000, from 100 countries, but of those 30 000 only 250
are known to be American (out of a total US population of 318.9 million) and, from our cousins of the
Southern hemisphere, a grand total of–wait for it– 61 from Australia (population, 23.13 million).
By contrast, there are an estimated 100 000 satanists in the world, most of them in the United
States. Statistical correlations between membership in various satanic churches and having been a
metalhead as a teenager were not available, but on the basis of the raw data we can conclude with
certainty that devil-worshipers are much more effective recruiters (about 400 times better) than ISIS, at
least in America.
More seriously: since 2004, Americans have killed 316 545 other Americans with firearms. During the
same period, 313 Americans have been killed by terrorism. In other words, “ordinary” gun violence in
America out kills terrorism by a factor of 1000.
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While these numbers show that the endless droning about how ISIS is coming to steal your baby to be
moronic, it does cause a real problem. It diverts critical intelligence away from the real issue. The real
issue, the real threat to peaceful co-existence in the world, is the messaianic zeal with which the West
destroys other societies and cultures from the air and then blames the victims as “enemies of
civilization.” Astounding, no, that our governments can get away with destroying what civilization
there was (functioning health care systems, schools, water treatment facilities, museums, family and
social life, …) in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and so on, and then blame forces like ISIS, which were able
to grow only because of the power vacuum our assaults caused? That they can get away with it suggests
that the problem is not radicalization of Western youth, but rather the de-radicalization of almost
everyone.
The Australian government’s pamphelt and analogous ideological devices hope to link
‘radical,” “radicalization,” and “radicalism” with “violence,” and to frighten people on that basis from
doing or saying anything that can be construed as radical. Yet here again an astounding inversion of
reality obtains– these political masters of the world’s most lethal military machines, these directors of
global surveillance and police regimes, these hoarders of the earth’s wealth, call those who would
merely criticise them “supporters of violence” for the act of pointing out the truth– they are the cause of
most of the violence in the world.
It is true that such arguments are radical. But “radical,” (as Marx famously argued in 1843) derives
from the Latin for “root.” All a radical agenda or a radical person demands is to understand the causes of
problems. In this proper sense, science just as much as philosophy or politics can be radical. Think of
the leading work scientists have done to expose the links between fossil fuel consumption and global
warming, or the heroic efforts of Physicians for Social Responsibility to uncover the true death toll of
the War on Terror.
Violence is always a substitute for understanding– where everyone concerned knows and acts on the
truth- or at least agrees on the procedures by which the truth may be discovered– violence is impossible,
because irreconcilable opposition of interests has been set aside in favour of a joint search for solutions.
If everyone together looks to find the cause, the root of the problem, then it becomes apparent what the
real danger is: not the radical demand to understand, but the distractions and the ideological
obfuscations that impede understanding. Radicalism is not violent, it is the opposite of violence; the
obfuscation in itself is not violent, but it prevents the real causes from becoming known.
Properly understood, all thinking is radical in so far as it aims at the truth. When we confront any social
problem: poverty, anomie, violence against women, climate change, and, yes, terrorism, the properly
attuned mind wants to know the cause, so that appropriate measures can be taken to solve the problem,
by addressing the cause. We know whether or not our account has captured the truth by whether or not
the problem is solved, or keeps recurring. Let us perform a simple test to see whether the War on Terror
has gotten to the truth, or addressed the causes of, terrorism. In 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, the avowed
aim of the War on Terror was to eliminate Al Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors. Al Qaeda has been
weakened, but it still exists, the Taliban have been toppled from power, but are still very much active in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a new force, which did not exist in 2001, ISIS, now currently controls
half of Syria and Iraq. Insurgencies have also cropped up in the Sinai peninsula, and a brutal, US-Saudi
enflamed civil war is raging in Yemen. In my assessment, these facts spell failure, on the War on
Terror’s own terms.
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Nevertheless, it would be naive to expect that Western policies will be changed. First, there is no
political pressure behind demands to change course and deal with the causes. Far too many people in

the West fear terrorist attacks, although there is almost no evidence that the groups they fear will carry
them out– ISIS above all, right now– have any capacity to do so, their internet blather
notwithstanding. More deeply, there is little reason to expect change because change would require
admitting that the West itself has caused the problems it projects on to others. As the Palestinian activist
and intellectual Rami G. Khouri argues, any approach to the problem of “violent extremism” “that
leaves in place existing Arab, U.S. and Israeli policies merely perpetuates the colonialist idea that
violence is a consequence of alien values or mindsets in the Arab and Islamic world.” Unless those
policies are radically challenged, there is no reasonable hope that the violence everyone in the West
claims to abhor will stop.
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ON THE MEANING OF “POTENTIAL” IN
POLITICS
Originally Posted October 15, 2015

In “The Problem of Society,” George Herbert Mead argues that a most important outcome of the French
Revolution was the incorporation of the principle of revolution into the basic institutions of democratic
society itself: “The French Revolution … in a sense incorporated the principle of revolution into
institutions. That is, when you set up a constitution and one of the articles in it is that the constitution
may be changed, then you have, in a certain sense, incorporated the very process of revolution into the
order of society.” (p.20). If his argument is correct, then the age of violent revolutions should end with
the universalization of the democratic principle, since the main aim of revolution– overcoming a
systematic divorce between the interests of the ruling group and the majority of people– should always
be corrigible by legitimate mass mobilization in the service of constitutional change.
Mead’s principle has been put to the test recently in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, where citizen
assemblies wrote new constitutions which challenged foreign and corporate control over these nations’
life-resources and asserted the principle that natural wealth and social labour are for the sake of need
satisfaction. Most crucially, these new constitutions formally repudiated the distinction- central to most
liberal-democratic constitutions– between politics as the public sphere and economics as the private
sphere not subject to even regulation in the universal life-interest. The achieved results have fallen short
of the principles, but where and when in history have the comprehensive progressive implications of a
principle been fully realized in the first attempt?
What is more important than the setbacks is the demonstration that Mead’s argument is not- as it might
at first blush be dismissed as being- liberal-pragmatic wishful thinking, but rather indicative of a hidden
potential in liberal-democratic institutions that Marxists and others committed to fundamental social
transformation might at first ignore. That potential is that if people can be mobilized in support of a
project of constitutional change, these constitutional changes can make inroads in the struggle against
class power. In the short term, there may not be dramatic effects on the extent of ruling class control
over life-resources. On the other hand, dramatic intensification of ordinary peoples’ active
engagement in the democratic process can occur. Whatever one believes about the necessary means to
system-transformation, only those forms which involve the majority of the people becoming subjects of
their own history, awakening to the fact that nature and labour, not money-capital, is the basis of life and
social development, can be actually liberatory.
It seems a long way from processes of popular constitutional assemblies and society-wide debates over
the sources of wealth, the centrality of labour to human life, the practical implications of the idea of
democracy, and the real value of socialism (sustainable use of natural and social wealth for the sake of
the free development and enjoyment of individual life-capacities) to a Canadian election campaign as
intellectually and politically dreary as a grey October afternoon. It is a long way, but still, it is important
to look at every election as a crack in that facade of seamless institutional continuity which every society
relies upon for its own reproduction. While the undemocratic first past the post electoral system and the
deep uniformity (beneath superficial differences) of major party platforms do well to hide the fact, every
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election cycle is, in principle, an actual holding up to question of the legitimacy, not only of the
government of the day, but of the entire system.
However, this depth questioning, while objectively possible, is never systematically
pursued. Opposition parties question the record of the government, but never whether the ruling value
system, class structure, and political institutions are consistent with the idea of a free society all
invoke. Such superficiality is not surprising: mainstream politicians of all parties all have a material
interest in preserving the legitimacy of the existing institutions and the value-system that makes them
appear good, just, etc. The mainstream media muckrakes, but never provides a forum for robust critical
investigation of the crucial political questions in a democratic society: does what is on offer in the
policies of the contending parties satisfy the real life-interests of the human beings who make up that
society, and, if not, what are those citizens going to do about that failure?
Election time is a time of much hymn making to the power of the people. What is missing is any space
for a philosophical intervention. Because philosophy is not beholden to the empirically given as
ultimate and final, it can articulate the deeper human values existing potentially within the problematic
actuality. The idea of “potential” is the idea of a hidden reserve of value lying unrealized within an
already existing system. No process of fundamental change can be initiated without the idea of
potential– if no one believes that there is anything left to be realized, no one can struggle to realize it.
Furthermore, since potential can be demonstrated by philosophical argument (drawing on the reality of
historical change, one can demonstrate the actual role the idea of potential — rather than ex nihilo
invention– played in times of fundamental transformation) it undermines the charge that the ideals
fundamental change seeks to realize are utopian (u-topos– “no place”), and therefore
irresponsible. Potential is not an empty box into which any idea whatsoever can be placed, but is always
emergent from the existing state of affairs. If liberal democracies like Canada claim to be free, it
follows that they must enable each of their citizens to fully exercise their life-capacities, which current
economic and social structures clearly do not. Since the material and social means to enable everyone’s
life capacities do demonstrably exist, there is no magic involved in the claim that the potential for
Canada to become a fully free society is present, but it requires removing the institutional impediments–
and the values that legitimate those impediments as just and necessary– to the ability of each and all to
fully express and enjoy their life-capacities.
Hence, there is nothing utopian or irresponsible with the argument that takes us from where we are
(systemic blocks to people’s free activity) through the idea of potential (the existence of life-requirement
satisfying resources combined with the idea of a different use of those resources), to where the idea of
freedom implies where we should be (a social structure and value system which distributes resources on
the basis of life-need, for purposes of free self-realization). If that goal is not definitive of a free society,
what is?
Liberal democratic institutions and the elections they require for re-legitimation do not so much deny the
possibility of citizen mobilization (and therefore, political potential) as they do channel it in the least
demanding ways. Political potential is confined to the potential to change the government and the
prevailing policy options, but not the values and the institutions that are the cause of the damage every
party’s platform promises to solve but never does.
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In order for people to realize the deeper potential that the idea of a free society contains, they need to
mobilize as a collective (or interlinked collectives) and work to realize it. In order to mobilize in the
service of this potential, they must be exposed to arguments that it exists. But neither candidates

debates, nor the distractions of attack ads, nor the platitudes of speeches, nor the meaningless microanalytics of ever fluctuating poll numbers refer to this idea of potential, even though real political action
cannot even be imagined without it. Real political action is not system-management, but collective
work in the service of better lives for each and all. Philosophy, therefore, is that which is missing from
official politics. A free society does not require philosophers to be kings, as Plato thought, but it does
require them to intervene as critics who give voice to the reality of a potential for “real change” (as both
opposition candidate keep repeating, without specifying what it is they mean by that all important ontoethical term “real”).
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ESSAY OF 1000: CAMPAIGN BLUES
Originally Posted August 4, 2015
It’s not that it didn’t go down well – it’s that there was point blank refusal to engage in economic
arguments. Point blank. … You put forward an argument that you’ve really worked on – to make sure
it’s logically coherent – and you’re just faced with blank stares. It is as if you haven’t spoken. What you
say is independent of what they say. You might as well have sung the Swedish national anthem – you’d
have got the same reply. And that’s startling, for somebody who’s used to academic debate. … The
other side always engages. Well there was no engagement at all. It was not even annoyance, it was as if
one had not spoken.
Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis explains the mindlessness of European politicians and
bureaucrats.
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The philosopher embroiled in politics has no choice but to stick by reason, not out of a self-righteous
sense of superiority, but as a commitment to the human capacity to solve problems through dialogue,
through commitment to letting the truth of the object decide the dispute between subjects, but at some
point, this commitment to rational argument in politics becomes irrational, since it rests on faith against
all evidence that arguments matter in politics; that the force of evidence and the better reasons will carry
the day; that there is all-round shared commitment to objective evaluation of policy in terms of service
to the shared life interest rather than one’s partisan advantage or ideological perspective; to changing
that perspective and foregoing private advantage if the either demonstrably fails to serve those interests;
to listening to critique and counter-argument, to admitting fault; but now the writ has been dropped and
we know what is coming, not argument, not reason, but: derivative theatre; staged debates, a tired
production, same story, different actors clustering around the safest of safe positions; defending,
attacking, distorting, manipulating, spinning, selectively selecting, stoking fears and allaying fears and
decrying the politics of fear while pointing the finger at something else to fear, posing, posturing,
tendentiously packaging, repeating, emphasising, tweeking, hair-splitting, staying on message and subtly
changing the subject, sloganeering, disseminating sound-bites, floating trial balloons and serving red
herrings, fashioning the right image, striking the right pose, sounding the right note, choosing the right
tie, timing the bad joke, pounding the fist and shaking the finger, standing on one’s record, downplaying
the economic situation, evading the issue, playing up the failures, harping on the scandals, ignoring the
evidence, sidestepping the inconvenient contradiction, concentrating one’s fire, holding one’s fire,
feigning interest in the factory, looking for the fatal flaw and exposing the faux-pas, invoking history,
puffing the chest, waving the flag, deflecting scrutiny, reminding of the gaff, taking the attention off,
dodging, prevaricating, rewording, rebranding, qualifying, insisting, emphasising; all the while
relentlessly campaigning, mobilising the base, getting the vote out, suppressing the vote, analyzing the
data, gauging the influence, making the hard choice, sacrificing a region, seeking the women’s vote,
pleading with the young to vote, cultivating the ethnics, demonizing the ethnics; energy devoted not to
proving the case but mining the data, mapping the demographics, reading the tea leaves, seeing what the
metrics say, analysing the polls, tracking the trends, predicting the seat distribution, currying the
pundits’ favour, targeting the audience; at root fundraising and spending, an avalanche of spending, yes,
building up the war chest, lengthening the campaign, emptying the war chest, advertising, messaging,
busing, flying, flyers, social media strategizing, stupid faces popping up, dinner-interrupting door to
door volunteering, securing support, spreading patronage money, hand shaking, hair tossling — to hug

or not to hug– smiling, always smiling, polluting with lawn signs, rallying, asking for trust, decrying
untrustworthiness, barbequing, regular-guying, promising, promising, promising: change, stability, a
different sort of change, the same sort of stability; all distractions distracting from the real issue: how the
resources are used, to what ends, for who’s good, who owns them, who controls them, how are they
valued and what alternatives are available; if we, we the people, so chose to exercise our energy and
intelligence in a different way, to assume our responsibilities as free people to do more than complain
and let someone else do it, to actually demand an accounting of what has gone wrong and why, what are
the causes and how can they be addressed; to demand an argument and to respond in kind, not
with platitudes but ideas that can be substantiated, with actual positions, not likes and dislikes and
laundry lists; engaging, challenging, exposing, not-allowing-them-off-hook but setting it, firmly, in their
ideological gums and reeling them in, proving that not only do they look the same (white, men) but also
that they all affirm the same value system, hammer the same talking points: security, economy,
accountability, the other party’s misdeeds, floating free of the real ground, making lives better and
explaining what they mean by that; instead, money-power rolls on whatever its costs; human costs, not
jobs lost and gained, enough of jobs, good jobs, bad jobs, well-paying jobs, we are not born just to find
a job but to do things that befit human beings, yes, human beings, social selfconscious individuals, not just dumb unfeeling elements of a “labour force,” a mere/sheer surging to be
absorbed, not tax payers to be appeased or voters to be groomed, but participants, citizens, the demos,
subjects, the creators of social reality re-awakened to their constitutive role, for whom x marks the spot
is not enough, but barely a beginning of self-government; but never, it never happens premisesupporting evidence-valid inference-conclusion-counter-consideration-repeat for as long as it takes,
never an admission that expectations were wrong, predictions were off, assumptions were faulty,
evaluative grounds and criteria inadequate to the object evaluated, the opposition correct; this road never
taken is too long and too uncertain, along it lies weakness and vulnerability; politics is power, securing
victory, exploiting positions of advantage, exposing the soft underbelly of the opposition, pouncing,
crushing, imposing generational defeats, that is the way of politics, not truth but winning.
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SO IT COMES TO PASS…
Originally Posted April 1, 2016

In Fear and Loathing in Ottawa, I worried that Bill C-51 contained provisions that made it analogous to
the self-undermining Law on Suspects from the French Revolution. According to this law, the police
could arrest anyone based only on the accusation of another citizen that he or she harboured antirevolutionary sentiments. The end– protecting the revolution against monarchical enemies– was good,
but the means– arrest without solid evidence or trial– was certain (we can now see in retrospect) to help
destroy the democratic politics necessary to ensure the revolution’s success. Allowing arrest on mere
suspicion could not but become a political tool to eliminate not only monarchical opponents, but also
factions within the revolutionary camp who disagreed with the leadership. From being a tool justified
in the name of democracy, the Law on Suspects contributed to the undoing of the revolution as a
democratic mobilization of the majority of (poor) French citizens.
The analogy with Bill-C-51 can no longer be denied with news of the arrest of Kevin Omar Mohamed
under the “fear of terrorism” provisions contained in Bill C-51. Supporters of the bill will no doubt
rejoin that extraordinary conditions (the ever-present threat of terrorist attack on civilians, a threat only
reinforced by the Belgian attacks) justify extraordinary measures (i..e, measures which contradict the
long-established principles of liberal-democratic right). Moreover, they might say, the authorities
cannot simply round up anyone they chose, but must have some real evidence to support their fear that
an individual under suspicion really is about to commit a terrorist act.
Let us start with the last point first. It assumes that there is some way to tell the difference between a
person who is merely ‘talking’ about terrorism and a person who is on the verge of translating theory to
practice. However, a recent story in the New York Times reports that all psychological and social
scientific attempts to date have failed to isolate any set of factors consistently correlated with terrorist
activity. If there is no consistent correlation, there is no known causal connection that determines what
sorts of people become terrorists and what sorts do not. If there is no knowledge of causal connection,
there can be no prediction, and if there can be no prediction, there can be no justification of preventative
arrest on the grounds that someone fits a profile or that there was a high probability– based only on what
the suspect said- that he or she was likely to commit an attack.
Worse, fixation on “fear” of terrorist attacks over-valorizes the role of increased surveillance and more
totalitarian police activity in the prevention of terrorism. This fixation displaces effort from what alone
can, over the longer term, help prevent terrorist attacks: critical reflection upon the life-destructive
implications of American (and allied) foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. While there
might not be any consistent psycho-social markers of terrorist behaviour, there is a consistent political
marker, typically ignored by governments and the police, because it exposes Western complicity with
the terrorist outrages they claim unique power to prevent: opposition to the destruction of Muslim life
by American and NATO armies and their local allies. As Sheldon Richman points out in a recent essay,
“telling the full story about the terrorists’ objectives might inadvertently prompt a fresh look – maybe
even a reevaluation – of America’s atrocious foreign policy. The ruling elite and the military-industrial
complex would not want that.” So instead of self-scrutiny, self-criticism, and self-transformation,
Western nations continue to portray themselves as the victims and persist with the same failed policies.
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(As a corollary, it is worth pointing out that those who choose the terrorist path are also pursuing the
path of murderous failure. Each attack in the West only intensifies the violence of the Western

response, ensuring only more suffering in the Middle East and North Africa. Revenge cycles are
irrational by definition, since they never achieve satisfaction each side desires. Instead, each side
provokes the other to more of the same life-destructive behaviour that motivates the desire in each for
revenge on the other. Desire seeks satisfaction, so rational behaviour in this dimension of human
activity is activity likely to ensure the satisfaction of the motivating desire. Revenge cycles ensure that
the desire can never be satisfied. Hence their structural irrationality).
However, it is not my main purpose here to examine the irrationality of revenge cycles or propose a
fully worked out solution, but to respond to the counter-argument to my criticism of the “fear of
terrorism” provisions of C-51. The other plank of that counter-argument was that extra-ordinary
measures are required in the wake of Paris and Brussels to disrupt terrorist plots before they result in
attacks. The problem with this argument is not only that this policy will not prevent some attacks from
happening– as long as there is wide-spread revulsion with Western policy there will be attacks,– but that
there is no specifiable limit to interference with freedom of thought and political expression if something
as vague as “fear” of terrorism is allowed as cause for arrest and preventive detention.
Let us take two examples– hypothetical, but hardly hyperbolic. A Muslim author writes a fictional
account of a sleeper cell organizing an attack in a major Western city. The narrative is crafted in a
realist fashion to be as accurate as possible to the known training and communication methods of
Islamic terrorist groups. On reading it, a number of citizens become alarmed and start to worry that the
novel is not a novel but coded instructions to a real sleeper cell. can we not imagine this author being
targeted for arrest and interrogation?
For the second example, let us consider a politically charged debate in a university classroom (let us say,
in a political philosophy class), about the legitimacy of terrorist methods. Free inquiry, as as well as a
good faith attempt to understand terrorism in order to solve the problem, demands that all perspectives
on a given problem be aired. Is it unreasonable to imagine a group of students who object to the tenor
of the debate and complain that the professor or another group of students are terrorist sympathizers,
again sparking an inquiry and perhaps arrest?
Opponents might object that I am committing a slippery slope fallacy (drawing outlandish conclusions
from limited or no evidence). I am certainly exploring worst case scenarios– the loss of artistic and
academic freedom if imagination and critical discussion are confused with advocacy, and advocacy
confused with the actual commission of political crimes. However, there is abundant evidence that
unless restrained by clear legal limits, police authority will push beyond traditional liberal legal
constraints on their surveillance activities. Moreover, there is some evidence that even the threat of
surveillance causes people to censor themselves. A recent study by Elizabeth Stoycheff of Wayne State
University has found that people are more and more reticent to express challenging political positions on
Facebook for fear of attracting the attention of the police.
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If we see liberal democratic rights as important victories on the road to a fully democratic and lifevaluable society in which problems are solved by mutual understanding and not violent destruction of
the opponent, then we must be loath to allow the ruling power, against whose interests the rights were
initially secured, to weaken or undermine them. When the ruling power is allowed to weaken
democratic rights, people are never made better off. If- as defenders of emergency measures maintain,
citizens can be made better off by having some of their democratic rights curtailed, then would they not
be best off with no rights at all? Of course not. But this totalitarian logic is implicit in the fearmongering and unwillingness to change our own geo-political course that underlies wrong steps like
Bill-C-51, whose most dangerous implications now appear to be coming to pass.

THE UNSAID
Originally Posted on August 31, 2015

Unlike the physical world studied by natural science, political reality is not simply given, but is in part
the outcome of people’s beliefs, actions, and interactions. There are of course objective structures and
forces in social life (laws, institutions, resources), but their effects on people are not like the force of
gravity (which is indifferent to peoples’ beliefs). Instead, objective social forces change as beliefs and
actions change and give rise to new patterns of interaction in the service of different goals and values.
One way to understand political power is as the collective capacity to define and change the given
reality in according to a guiding value system.
Struggles for institutional power always involve struggles to define the scope of possibility for political
action. Mainstream politicians of parliamentary parties all define political reality in such a way that
changes to the objective forces that currently structure social life and the existing money-value system
that legitimates those forces appear unchangeable. The way they accomplish this goal is to not speak
about these objective forces as social, political, and economic products of collective human action and
interaction, but as permanent constraints on human life which must be accepted as limits within which
“realistic” policies must operate.
Hence, to understand the deeper identity of interest that all mainstream politicians and political parties
serve, we need to pay attention to what they leave unsaid. Their differences—always superficial—are
disclosed in their policies, platforms, and pronouncements, but to understand what they are really about
we need to bring to light the unstated assumptions about what they take the field of legitimate political
action to be.
One of the most difficult, but also most important abilities, that critical social philosophy teaches is this
ability to uncover and understand the relationship between the unsaid in political speech and the attempt
to make changeable institutional forces appear as unchangeable natural laws. While understanding the
way in which what mainstream politicians keep silent helps them make the historical appear natural does
not in and of itself lead to the solution to key problems, it is a first step in understanding why
parliamentary politics never solves the problems the different parties all claim to want to solve. They
never solve the problems because they accept the real causes of those problems as unalterable structures
of social life. The result is that the real issues never even get discussed, let alone systematically
addressed. Let me illustrate my point with three examples drawn from recent history and relevant to the
on-going federal election campaign.
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A few months ago the Truth and Reconciliation Commission examining the history of residential
schools and their destructive impacts on the lives of people of the First Nations submitted its final report.
It made a number of far reaching recommendations about how the historically oppressive relationship
between the Canadian state and the people of the First Nations could be transformed and equality and
justice promoted. While all political parties are courting the aboriginal vote, there is complete silence
about the report. Why? Because the testimony, analysis, and recommendations it contains all smash key
elements of the myth of Canada: as a historic compromise between two founding nations, as the triumph
of conservative (in the true sense of the word) pragmatism over mutually destructive confrontation, and
of democratic accommodation over revolutionary violence. Judged from the perspective of the people of
the First Nations, the truth of the Canadian state is the opposite on every score: not a compromise, but an
all-out attack on First Nations’ societies, not conservative, but destructive of First Nations’ cultures and

institutions, and not democratic, but a colonial expropriation of First Nations’ lands. All of that must
remain unsaid, because all parties (with the exception of the Bloc Quebecois, which relies on a different
myth of origins) tie their own legitimacy to the resonance this myth has with many Canadians.
As always, “the economy” is the focus of most of the arguments between the three major federal parties.
Occasionally, mildly critical arguments erupt about the level and extent of inequality, about the
disappearance of ‘good jobs,’ and the need for financial security in old age. What is always left unsaid in
these arguments is an explanation of why our society is so unequal and growing moreso, what a good
job is and why they are disappearing, and why the financial security of more and more people, and not
only the elderly, is being undermined. To answer those questions would mean using the term
“capitalism” and lead into an analysis of its class structure. An analysis of its class structure would
provide strong evidence that poverty, inequality, menial and poorly paid labour, and financial insecurity
for everyone but the very wealthy is not a function of bad policy-making by the government of the day,
but endemic to an economy that produces profits through the exploitation of labour, that treats working
human beings as disposable “human resources” and has tied personal income security more and more to
volatile stock markets that work for major corporate investors but only rarely for working individuals.
To raise these questions would again jeopardize each party’s election strategy: of positioning themselves
as the best party to manage the economy. Instead, it would allow people to ask the question of whether
we need to build a different economy on the basis of a different value system if the goods of equality,
meaningful work, and life-security are to be served.
Finally, let us take an example from international affairs. The refugee crisis gripping Europe might seem
to have little to do with Canada (beyond the debate about whether the Conservative government has
allowed enough Syrian refugees into the country). While the government`s response thus far has been
shamefully inadequate, there is again an unspoken dimension to the problem. In large part the refugee
crisis is testimony to the failure of the neo-liberal political-military and economic agenda in Africa and
the Middle East, a set of policies which is never exposed to view by any of the parties, (even if some its
results are lamented by the NDP and Liberals). No one is exposing to light the destruction of African
economies through IMF structural reforms imposed through the 80s and 90’s until today, or the way in
which the collapse of stability in the Middle East is a consequence of Western intervention. Instead, all
sing from the same hymn book about ISIS and wave the flag in support of our bombing missions and
blind, unthinking support for Israeli colonialism, when it is clear that no solution that can restore peace
to the Middle East be achieved through bombing and that a better future for everyone will require the
end of the occupation of Palestine and the creation of democratic Palestinian state.
Bringing these unstated assumptions to light shows us that mainstream political parties accept as
necessary the very structures that cause the fundamental problems of our world. Understanding these
causes cannot on its own solve the problems, but there is abundant historical evidence to support the
claim that unless we understand and address the causes of key social problems, solutions will never be
found.
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TAXES AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF PUBLIC GOODS
Originally Posted on January 4, 2016

In capitalist society, surplus wealth beyond what is necessary for basic social reproduction is created by
the exploitation of labour. “Exploitation,” in the Marxist sense means that labour produces more value
over the course of the workday than it is paid in wages. The argument is typically dismissed by
mainstream economists who reject the “labour theory of value” on which it is based. Briefly, the labour
theory of value (which goes back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo) holds that value is created by the
labour time expended in the production of a good. In this theory, labour has a price (the cost of
purchasing the basic goods and services that labourers need to reproduce themselves). This objective
cost of labour establishes the floor of wage rates (any lower, and workers cannot survive, any higher,
and profits are cut into). Let us say that workers require 10 dollars a day to reproduce themselves, but
over the course of a work day produce 30 dollars worth of shoes. Once the shoes are sold, the capitalist
pays the workers 10 dollars and reaps a surplus of 20 dollars. After other expenses are paid, the
capitalist appropriates the remaining surplus as profit.
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One can make all the technical economic criticisms of this theory that one likes, but two facts remain
unavoidable: 1) if there is no labour, there is no product of labour, and 2) if there is no product of
labour, there is nothing to sell, and therefore no possibility of realizing a profit. So whether or not one

believes that the labour theory of value can explain the technical problem of prices, or whether labour
contracts are formally just, there is no getting around the fact that labour cannot be paid the full moneyvalue of the product it produces if there is going to be profit for capitalists to appropriate.
However, the real problem with capitalism is not the exploitation of labour in this somewhat narrow
sense, but with the private appropriation of the surplus wealth that labour creates. Profitable production
is made possible by nature (which contributes raw materials) and multiple forms of labour (scientific,
technical, physical), and protected by the laws and institutions of capitalist society. In other words,
profits depend upon the cooperation of almost everyone in society, in one way or another, but most
people whose labour creates the profits have no say in how they are re-invested (or whether they are reinvested). The surplus wealth generated by collective labour is appropriated for the exclusive use of
individual capitalists. This process of private appropriation of a surplus that depends upon collective
labour is the underlying dynamic that drives the inequality that has become such a concern, even for
critical mainstream economists (see, for example, Thomas Picketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First
Century).
Both exploitation and inequality are real problems, but they are only expressions of the deepest problem
of capitalist society: there is no system requirement that the surplus wealth produced by the
exploitation of labour be invested in what McMurtry calls “life-capital” (“life wealth that produces more
life wealth without loss and with cumulative gain”). Life-capital (food, homes, education, health care,
the arts, etc.,) sustains life and enables the development of the capacities that make it meaningful and
good. The system dynamics of capitalism encourage capitalists to chase the highest monetary return on
investment rather than contribute to life-capital development (expect accidentally). This process is
justified by the claim that when capitalists are allowed to decide as individual competitors how to
reinvest their capital, the market works ‘efficiently.” There is a high demand for labour to produce goods
and services that people want. Workers are happy because there is work, consumers are happy because
there are goods to consume, and capitalist are happy because their capital is producing profits.
The problem is not only that markets are not always efficient in the real economy, but also that even if
they were, they would waste resources in the production of goods and services with no value as lifecapital at all. There is no reason why a capitalist should not invest in a chemical weapons plant if she
can make more profit there than invest in an organic farm in her home town. Nor is there any
requirement that capitalists invest in any physical good or service at all. As of 2014, Canadian
corporations were sitting on cash reserves of 630 billion dollars. This money is not creating any jobs, is
not being invested in anything that anyone needs; it is only earning more money by being invested in
stocks and bonds and other securities, enriching the owners but contributing nothing of life value to
anyone else.
Just because the socially produced surplus is controlled by individual capitalists with the right to invest
it to further enrich themselves, the surplus is always an object of struggle. Workers have typically
struggled to secure as much of the surplus as possible in the form of wages. The struggle for higher
wages is an important element of the struggle against inequality, but on its own does not solve the
deeper problem noted above: individual workers can spend their wages as they see fit, and how they see
fit to spend them does not always coincide with the consumption of life-valuable goods and services. A
vast network of consumer industries has arisen since the 1920’s devoted exclusively to finding ways to
get workers to spend their money as soon as they are paid, thus returning to the capitalist in the form of
expenditure the capital he just paid out as wages.
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However, while it might be more ‘fun’ in the short term to buy a dune buggy than a bicycle, life (and
good lives, too) ultimately depend upon investment in life-capital. Some life-capital takes the form of
goods that are best distributed through producers markets and consumer choice (healthy food, for
example), while institutionalized forms (water treatment plants, schools, hospitals, libraries) require
public investment. Alongside the struggle over wages (which, if spent wisely, procure life-capital for
individuals) there is a struggle over the social re-appropriation of the surplus. Taxes have been the
primary vehicle for this social struggle.
Historically, the struggle for socialism was a struggle to overcome the private ownership of the universal
means of life-support and development. Taxing capital and the high incomes that derive from it does
not on its own overcome this structure of private control. Nevertheless, historically, taxes, and
especially progressive income taxes, have been the primary means by which capitalist states have been
pushed by workers’ struggles to control inequality and reclaim part of the social surplus as a pool for
investment in public goods. The anti-tax ideology of the ruling class is directed against the role
progressive taxation has played in redistributing wealth. Their argument is couched in the language of
taxes as “job killers,” but this argument assumes that all surplus wealth not taxed will be invested in the
domestic market to create jobs, which, as we saw above, is not always the case. So, the argument that
there is a necessary connection between lower tax rates and job creation does not stand up to analysis.
The forgoing argument provides some context to decipher what is at stake in ubiquitous debates about
the value or disvalue of taxes. Let me take one example, the now eight year saga of property taxes in the
City of Windsor. In December, Windsor City Council approved its 2016 budget which held the line– for
the eight straight year– on property taxes. The right-wing press crowed at this triumph of fiscal
prudence, but even they cannot ignore the fact that frozen property tax rates have done nothing to attract
either investment or people to the city.
Between 2007 and 2014, youth unemployment has held steady, at around 16%.
During the same period, the city has failed to recoup the jobs lost during the recession. In 2014, there
were almost 4% fewer jobs than there were in 2007. The overall unemployment rate stood at 10 % in
November, 2015. Holding the line on taxes has not produced the “private sector” investment taxfreeze champions cite in support of their policy.
Well, one might respond that the tax rate applies to property taxes and property taxes alone are not
positively correlated with business investment. Let us grant the objection for the sake of argument. One
would expect that property tax rates would be positively correlated with population growth, but that is
not the case here. Windsor has a shrinking population despite frozen taxes. If low and frozen taxes
were the panacea they are supposed to be, should Windsor not be reaping the rewards in terms of
population growth?
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Source: Conference Board of Canada
Of course, there are a wide variety of factors that determine where people live. My point is that not
raising tax rates has clearly not helped to address the severe economic problems the city continues to
face, while the right-wing argument hangs everything- jobs, population growth, the good life itself– on
lower taxes. I am not claiming that simply raising tax rates will address those problems either: taxes are
neither good nor bad in themselves, but a means of raising revenue. They become good when they are
progressive, when they leave individuals with sufficient income to purchase the life-goods it makes most
sense for people to purchase as individuals as well as to save, and when they are used as a pool of
investment for life-valuable public goods. And that is really the argument that citizens of Windsor (as
elsewhere) need to be having: not whether to raise or lower or keep tax rates the same in the abstract,
but whether the revenue existing taxes are raising is adequate to the public goods required. Related to
this debate is a debate on whether existing public spending is directed to the public goods required. We
have seen that not raising taxes on Windsor property owners has not led to economic development or
attracted new people to the city. Perhaps focused investment in the life-capital of the city: bike paths,
cleaning up polluted brownfields, adding green space, community gardens, supporting local producers
markets (but not subsidizing the individual producers), libraries, galleries, and other public cultural
institutions, a strategy to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, subsidies for workers’ cooperatives rather than
private corporations, schools, and protecting public sector jobs, etc., will.
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PITY POOR WINDSOR B/W THE
IMPORTANCE OF BEING PHILOSOPHICAL
Originally Posted on November 3, 2015
Pity Poor Windsor
Money follows money, and it also follows lack of money. Growing urban centres whose economies are
dominated by advanced industry and research clusters exert a centripetal effect on money-capital,
drawing it in from around the world. Massive inputs of capital fuel cycles of “creative
destruction” (Schumpeter) which knock down the old, re-develop the freed up space, generate new
technologies and methods of production, and experiment with new cultures of work, organization, and
play. For people at the centre of these city-regions there is unlimited money to be made– a building
purchased today can be flipped tomorrow for double the price, companies compete for workers, driving
salaries up, exciting urban neighbourhoods arise and spawn global styles that enrich the designers and
chefs and lifestyle promoters that create and market it all.
But poverty also draws money, but for different reasons and with different effects. In the impoverished,
abandoned, and desperate small cities of the manufacturing heartlands of central Canada and the US
Midwest, a massive reserve army of labour is in need of work. Their need for work– exacerbated by
cuts to unemployment insurance and public assistance– draws money capital too, but not to creatively
destroy past accumulations of capital but just plain old destroy the hopes of the masses it has
abandoned. The creation happens in Stanford and San Jose, the destruction is felt in Windsor and Gary,
Indiana. Those on the wrong side of the dialectic are hunted down by money-capital on the lookout
for impoverished and demoralized workers who can be repurposed as low-wage, non-unionized
servants of the “creative capital” working its magic elsewhere.
It is with this system in mind that we must understand the “major jobs announcement” that had
Windsorites holding their breath during the last week of October. When we exhaled: 320 part-time
positions at Sutherland Global’s existing call centre operation. Hooray for the company spokesperson’s
attempt to make this announcement sound transformational. She promised future workers that they
would be answering phones for “a very hip, innovative and fast-growing high-tech company based in
Silicon Valley.” San Jose has its Google bus and Windsor has the Crosstown 2– not hip, but it does
have wheels.
If the 12$ an hour salary (which wouldn’t by a Martini– hell, it probably would not buy a pint of craft
beer– in Silicon Valley), is not enticing, the spokesperson promises a coffee bar and, (perhaps if
workers are well-behaved and do not call UNIFOR) “maybe” ping pong tables! While a confidentiality
agreement prevented the spokesperson from disclosing the name of the customer, she did note that the
firm was “high value” (to Sutherland Global) and “known for its hipness.” I am getting older, it is true,
but “hipness’ and “corporate world” were once antitheses. While Sutherland Global can only offer
hipness via ping pong proxy, it is at least seeking the young, underemployed but well-dressed set to staff
those phones (or whatever hip name phones go by these days). Our Mayor, beating the same relentless
drum beat of enthusiasm his mentor never tired of beating, no matter how grim the
reality, gushed: “This is a really great announcement… We’ve been hearing from a lot of youth in the
community looking for opportunities.” Are part time, no benefit jobs the “opportunities” young people
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are seeking? Maybe if they work hard one of them can graduate to the 120 000$ per year “sports
tourism” position the city decided to create three days after these “opportunities” were announced.
Madness, but little in the way of criticism from those who ought to be most critical.
Jaydee Tarpeh, the President of the University of Windsor Student’s Association, simply re-iterated the
mayor’s enthusiasm: “It is awesome news, sometimes it is very hard for students to find jobs.” Indeed
it is, but ought a student leader not question why it is hard for students to find jobs or, better, why society
so disregards the intellectual value of scholarship that it sees no problem forcing students to work in
soulless call centres part time while at the same raising the cost of tuition and turning them into
indentured servants of the banks for decades after graduation? Alas, nothing seems able to motivate
Canadians to question, criticise, and protest for something better .
In South Africa, by contrast, a country with far fewer financial resources, militant students have just
forced the national government to back down from double-digit fee-increases. The South African
university system is not going to collapse, and nor would the Ontario university system were it forced by
(an as yet non-existent) student movement to begin to reduce its fees.
The issue is not affordability, but the principles that govern budget-allocations. At present, neoliberal policy continues to cut spending on public education on the basis of the claim that education is a
personal investment in one’s individual future (for which one willingly pays because it will yield
positive returns in the form of a job). We need a student (and faculty, and society-wide) movement that
returns public education to its real value as an essential life-requirement of human beings. When this
requirement is satisfied, our understanding of the physical, social, psychological, ethical, and aesthetic
worlds in which we live is increased. In turn, this heightened understanding yields more intelligent, farsighted, life-creative action in those worlds, and more peaceful, mutually affirmative relationships
between selves and societies.
The Importance of Being Philosophical
Different models of public expenditure in the service of different values are possible. The victory of the
South African students shows that political mobilization can change priorities. Cuts or fee increases that
are announced as absolutely necessary can disappear from the agenda without the institutions collapsing,
provided people understand how to expose false necessity and ideological generalizations. Properly
questioned, the ruling power’s “necessity” can be exposed as an ideological construction, a sham, a
stick to beat people into line. Philosophy, in its most fundamental public expression, teaches us how to
ask the questions that expose the ways in which power constructs false necessities. In so doing, it clears
the ground for thinking about the values that really are in the universal life-interest, how those values
can be institutionalised, and how resources can be mobilised to pay for them.
Without philosophy (which is not the same thing as philosophy departments, or philosophy professors),
social life remains hostage to ruling group interests and the power rulers employ to maintain that
system. No specialized methods are required to practice philosophy in this way, (although one does
need to practice, always). To begin, all one needs is the capacity to ask two questions: 1) Who is the
stated beneficiary of a given policy championed by the ruling power? and, 2) what actual effect does the
policy have on the lives of its stated beneficiaries? Wherever the stated beneficiary is said to be “the
public” we must press beneath the rhetoric of universal inclusiveness and evaluate whether the public
actually does benefit. Where a contradiction is exposed between the justification and the outcome, we
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know we are dealing with a false universality asserted only to cover the real agenda: the extension or
consolidation of the ruling group’s power.
These questions work to expose ruling agenda at any level: local, regional, provincial, national, or
international. Let us take two examples of local and provincial significance to illustrate my point.
First, a local story. On Hallowe’en the Windsor Star reported that Windsor Chief of Police Al Fredrick
was angered by the Ontario government’s decision to ban the practice of “carding,” i.e., stopping people
at random, because, in the Chief’s words, they “look suspicious.” Across the province, it turns out,
that “looking suspicious” and being black are nearly synonymous. Of course, the Chief is not going to
admit to racially profiling Windsorites, but tries to sell his position on the grounds that it helps keep the
streets safe. In fact, in the article he segues, without any connective argument or evidence, from a
general critique of the province to the suggestion (which readers are clearly supposed to interpret not as
a suggestion, but as fact) that carding keeps guns off the streets. In philosophy, a conclusion that does
not follow from its premises is called a non sequitor, from the Latin for “it does not follow.” Chief
Fredricks certainly commits this generic fallacy.
But more, and deeper, the Chief tries to identify the good of the public (‘safe streets’) with the arbitrary
power of the police to stop and question people for no reason other than that they “look suspicious.” But
there is no such thing, objectively, as “looking suspicious” but only stereotypes about what criminals
look like. Now, these stereotypes can change. Hence, any one is in principle “suspicious looking”
depending upon whatever stereotypes about “criminal appearances” circulate. Thus, the public interest
is actually in constraining police power, limiting it to the investigation of crimes actually committed and
never permitting fishing expeditions like carding. If public safety requires stopping suspicious looking
people, would we not be safer if we moved straight on to imprisoning suspicious looking people? Of
course not, because if the police had the power to imprison on the basis of their “gut feelings” we would
be living in a totalitarian police state, and living in a totalitarian police state is clearly not in the public
interest.
The second example concerns the announced sale of 60% of publically owned Hydro One. Despite a
report from the Province’s Financial Accountability Officer that demonstrates conclusively that the
province will, in the long term, lose money on the sale, the Premier insisted that the sale would go
ahead, because it is good for the Ontario economy. Her argument is based upon speculation (because,
projections about future economic growth as a result of infrastructure investment can only be
speculative, there being no data from the future). The FAO report, by contrast, is based on demonstrable
fact: Hydro One brings in 750 million dollars a year, and will do so in perpetuity, because electricity
must be delivered to end users, and Hydro One controls the means of delivery.
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At present, therefore, Hydro One brings in 750 million dollars a year which, in principle, is available for
investment in ways that the people of Ontario decide (I realize that the truth of public ownership in a
capitalist economy is not as straightforward as I am making it out to be, but the principle, if not the
practice, is clear: public ownership means democratic control over the resources owned; private
ownership means private control over the use of the resource and the money such use generates). If
publically owned resources are sold to private interests, democratic control is eliminated, in principle
and in practice. The citizens of Moose Factory or Kirkland Lake will see no improvement in their lives
because of transit improvement in the Greater Toronto Area, (the stated reason for the sell off). GDP
growth, assuming there is any following the infrastructure investment, tells us nothing about how the
increased money is distributed or spent. All we know for certain is who will benefit: the private
investors who gain control over Hydro One.

The claim is that “Ontario” will benefit, the truth is that “Ontario” gives up control over a public utility
which provides necessary resources to everyone in the province and returns public money to the
provincial treasury, money that is in principle under the control of the collectivity of Ontarians to invest
in institutions and public goods from which we can all benefit.
Simple questions, answers that disclose the truth about the city/province/country/world we
inhabit. Without philosophical questioning (again, always to be distinguished from academic
philosophy) those truths remain buried.
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IN DEFENCE OF LIBRARIES
Originally Posted May 5, 2016
In its colloquial image the library is a place of quiet contemplation and withdrawal from the conflicts of
the world. In fact, since the burning of the library of Alexandria in 391 CE libraries have been at the
centre of those conflicts. The library seems to be a strange target for religious and balanced book
zealots alike, but if we think through the principle on which the library is based, the (sometimes literal)
political firestorms in which they get caught up is not surprising. Libraries are repositories of
knowledge, testaments to the range of human thought and creativity, material proof that not everyone
thinks the same way. Hence they are always a danger to dogmatism, because within their walls opposed
perspectives can be found. That is why the Christians of Alexandria burned the library: it contained
“dangerous” pagan philosophy and literature.
Today there are no Christian mobs threatening to burn libraries (although groups still do get vexed by
this or that book). Today the library is not so much in danger of being torched as axed by budget cuts.
The most recent threat is in Newfoundland, which announced that nearly half (54) of the libraries in the
province will be closed because of a one million dollar budget cut. Presumably the Newfoundland
government is not threatened by the content of the libraries’ collections, but the effect of the cut will be
to deprive rural Newfoundlanders of access to the ideas and stories contained in those collections. And
to save what? One million dollars!
Think of that sum and what the citizens of Newfoundland are getting for such a modest expenditure:
54(!) libraries, for one million dollars. That strikes me as an incredibly productive investment in public
education and edification. Yet, might we not see this efficiency (great public benefit for minimal public
expenditure) as the underlying reason that libraries are under threat: they constitute objective proof that
competitive markets are not always the most efficient means of distributing resources. Their brilliant
success as public institutions is proof positive that collective investment in accessible institutions can–
contrary to neo-liberal dogma that rejects all public institutions as inefficient when compared with
independent firms competing for monetary advantage– meet shared needs and enable life-capacities.
For a very modest investment the public library returns vast stores of life-capital in the form of literacy,
education, edification, and communication. It is a maximally open institution: there is no tuition fee,
you do not have to explain to anyone why you are there, they are at the forefront of the struggle against
censorship; their entire raison d’etre is to make the world of ideas accessible to everyone.
The right-wing disdain for libraries has long roots. In the nineteenth century, forerunners of today’s
neo-liberals denounced public libraries as “socialist continuation schools.” They were not, at least in the
direct sense in which M.D. O’Brian intended when he denounced them as such. (M.D. O’Brian, “Free
Libraries, A Plea for Liberty, p. 415). However, the principle of the public library is socialist: collective
contribution to an open institution through which individuals develop their understanding and interests
through their own decisions: from each according to his ability (paying through taxes), to each
according to his needs (for education, edification, enjoyment, etc). They are proof that this socialist
principle works. And that is why, from O’Brian to Rob and Doug Ford, critics of public institutions
have always included libraries in their attacks.

86

But libraries are not only valuable because they demonstrate the economic rationality of publicly funded
institutions open and accessible to each and all, they are also essential for scholarship. Google seems

magical, an anticipation of your thoughts, but it in fact it can narrow the scope of research in very
pernicious ways. The search algorithm knows nothing about the subject it ‘searches’ for, and there are
all sorts of tricks to move websites higher up the search engine rankings. Invariably, the Wikipedia
entry for almost any serious subject is the first one that appears and people usually click on the first link,
assuming it is the most authoritative. But it is not: it is only the site with the most hits. Hence, a tool
like Google can grossly limit the scope of information that people actually access. As Jean Noel
Jeannneney, director of France’s Bibliotheque Nationale argues, the main problem with Google as a
research tool is that it operates according to the principle that “success breeds success, at the expense of
newcomers, minorities, marginals. Its a system that could seriously harm the balance and energy of
world cultures unless other forces, eschewing market interests, intervene.” (Google and the Myth of
Universal Knowledge, p. 45). In intellectual and cultural life quantity is not quality, the number of hits
and links does not ensure the most penetrating insight or profound revelation (although it can translate
into the most advertising revenue).
Compare this logic of sheer quantity to a professionally organized library. The key to a great library is
not only the size of the collection, but the contiguous organization of books by field and sub-field which
permits, assuming a certain level of comprehensiveness to the collection, the immediate grasp of the
history and the state of the art in the field. To walk the stacks (rather than surf the web) is to be exposed
to the (more or less) full range of thinking in the field, and thus to encounter directly approaches that
you might not have been aware of when you came in, but which claim your attention as you look for the
book for which you were looking. In twenty years of being a professor who still spends time in libraries,
I have never not encountered a book other than the one for which I was searching that I thought I would
have to read at some point. The physical presence of the unexpected is crucial to pushing scholarship to
ever more comprehensive scope.
Of course, the library is not simply a collection of books anymore. Sadly, it has grown to include the
abominable “e-book,” but it has also expanded its role (and the work of librarians) from cataloguing and
organizing a physical collection to helping people negotiate and think critically about information in
cyberspace. Hence, librarians can help to counter-act the uncritical use of tools like Google (which are
of course useful, provided that they are understood and used effectively and treated like the screwdrivers
they are and not the mind of God). Moreover, libraries today are also one of the few places those
without the financial resources to own home computers, pay for high speed internet, or afford a data
plan for their phone can access the Internet. Closing libraries- as with closing other public institutions–
is thus another front in the war on the poor.
So once again we find the most glaring hypocrisy at work in our public discourse. Politicians never
cease singing peaens to the supreme importance of education at the same time as they defund or
underfund or undermine it. Which is, of course, madness, since the humanity of the human project lies
not in the transmission of DNA (which is but a material condition) but in the critical appropriation,
development, and transformation of the values and ideas that regulate our societies and which determine
the extent to which the lives of each are meaningful and good. If we lack access to alternatives, if we
are unaware of historical differences, if we are cut off from the magnificence of human literary
creativity, if we cannot connect with the wider world, then challenging oppressive conditions of social
life is all the more difficult. Attacks on libraries, whatever forms they take, are thus attacks on the
ability of people to access the richness of the intellectual and artistic heritage of human beings as well as
to find silences that call out for new voices. This attack is thus directed against the future development
of that heritage itself. Those are the real stakes of budget cuts.
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AGAINST “INNOVATION”
Originally Posted May 20, 2016
Is there a more ubiquitous category mistake (Gilbert Ryle) today than that involved in the use of the
term “innovation?” Categories are fundamental concepts which do not name things but instead different
modes of understanding reality. “Tree” names a type of plant. There is an actual tree in my backyard,
and the seed it produces is a potential tree (if it takes root it will become an actual tree). If we confused
the potential tree with the actual tree, we would be making a category mistake. We might understand
what a tree is, but not the difference between potentiality and actuality.
In the case of “innovation” the term is merely descriptive but is constantly used in a normative sense
which makes no sense, unless further qualified. Descriptive terms simply assert the way things are or
name the things of the world. Take for example the statement: “The internal combustion engine was an
innovation in transportation.” The term “innovation” refers to a novel feature of reality, typically
created by human thought and action. As a descriptive term it says nothing about whether the
innovation was good or bad, but only that at time t the innovation did not exist and at time t1 it
did. However, if we look carefully at the way in which the term is used in the media, by government
officials, and business leaders, it becomes clear that when they use the term normative content is
smuggled in: the change in question is assumed good just because it is a change, when in fact the
goodness or badness is in fact still in question. The normative content is illegitimate because change is
not necessarily good just because it introduces novelty. A moment’s reflection makes it clear that the
new and the good are conceptually and ontologically distinct (that x is new does not entail that x is
good). Hence to argue as if everything that is “innovative” is good, i.e., better than the thing it changes
or replaces, is to commit a category mistake.
Let us take two obvious examples to illustrate the point before coming back to the real social
implications of the confusion. Plutonium is amongst the most toxic substances in the known
universe. One could imagine scientists devising an innovative method for vaporizing it and
disseminating it throughout the entire atmosphere, thereby poisoning everything that breaths. That
would be an innovation, but it is hard to see it as in anyway good. Perhaps one objects that the example
is too hyperbolic in its negative implications. Granted. Let us take a more mundane example, the size
of a smartphone. Having run out of qualitatively new technical capacities for the time being,
smartphone manufacturers have been reduced to touting merely quantitative alterations as
“innovations” worth opening your wallet to acquire. But is a marginally bigger or smaller phone really
better in some important way? The answer depends upon information that the term “innovation” alone
cannot capture. We have to know what the device is for before we can decide whether the given
innovation is good . An innovation is good only to the extent, a) it enables a thing to better accomplish
its purpose, and b) that purpose is itself essential to the health, well-being, and meaningful life-activity
of human beings.
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The problem should now be clear. When a descriptive term is confused with a normative term, then its
uncritical adoption commits people to accepting the merely different as good. When we accept
something as good we validate it as a goal to which we should aspire. So, when politicians and business
people talk about the need for innovation, they are asserting that whatever changes governments or
businesses introduce that can be sold as innovative are good, and we should not only accept them, but
think of ourselves as “change agents” whose goal in life should be to “innovate” as well, in all spheres
of life, just because contemporary socio-economic dynamics demand it. However, without critical

reflection on the purpose of the processes and things we aim to change, and especially on our own
(human) purposes and what sorts of social institutions support and what sorts undermine them, we can
in no sense ensure that we are making things better just because we are making things different.
Let us take a concrete example to better explain my concern. In a recent series of articles in The
Toronto Star, Don Tapscott argued that Ontario’s universities need to innovate in order to stay relevant
to a new generation of students: “If there is one institution due for innovation, it’s the university. It’s
time for a deep debate on how universities function in a networked society. The centuries-old model of
learning still offered by many big universities doesn’t work any more, especially for students who have
grown up digital.” I will come back to the substantive claims he makes about teaching methods and
students in a moment. First, notice the category mistake. Tapscott clearly means that universities
cannot fulfill their function unless they change (innovate). Innovation is identified with the better and
stasis with the worse. But before we can accept that equation we must know what universities are for,
what it is they are actually doing, and where, in what they are actually doing, they are failing (and where
succeeding) to fulfill the purposes they serve. There may indeed be changes that need to be made in
some areas of university life and others may be perfectly fine. But blanket statements of the form
“universities need to innovate’ clearly confuse a mere change with “better fulfillment of the
function,” because “innovate” is being used in a normative sense to imply that change as such is good.
To better understand the specific and the general social problem involved with this confusion let us
examine Tapscott’s argument in more detail. He argues that universities fail to take advantage of the
full possibilities that digital communication technologies provide for collaborative learning, that they
remain wed to hierarchical pedagogical styles (especially the lecture), and that their insistence on testing
the knowledge of students treated as abstract individuals is in tension with the collaborative learning
today’s students have grown up with on social media.
On empirical grounds much of what Tapscott argues is simply false. No area of university life (save
buildings and administrative positions) has received as much funding as teaching and learning
centres. For the past decade North American universities have dedicated themselves to trying to
understand better what makes for an effective learning environment, what best pedagogical practices
are, how to assess effective teaching, and how to help professors value and improve their teaching
capacities. Moreover, there have been massive investments in technology (smartrooms, campus-wide
WiFi, software platforms for student interaction…), on-line course delivery, digitization of libraries and
archives, open source journals, and more overt collaboration between the campus and the community. If
anything is archaic, it is Tapscott’s understanding of teaching and learning in the twenty-first century
university.
The more important question remains to be asked: has any of this investment improved the teaching
mission of the university, and is technological change (innovation) identical (as Tapscott implies) to
effective learning? The answers here are “of course” and “of course not.” Tapscott complains that
professors are still lecturing, some even (heaven forbid!) reading notes, instead of taking advantage of
technological possibilities for collaborative learning that better fit with students’ experience of
interaction through social media. The implied disjunct: either “traditional” lectures or on-line
collaboration is false. The use of lectures for one purpose does not rule out the use of new media for
others. Beyond the fallacious false dichotomy is the absurd implication that human beings interacting in
shared physical space (the lecture) reduces students to passivity while only virtual interaction is
cyberspace counts as active learning.
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Lectures– good lectures, in any case– are not one way transmissions of information to a passive
audience. To be effective they must be interactive. For the interaction to be effective, however,
students must develop an understanding not only the meanings of the ideas at issue, but the historical
context of their emergence and the purposes to which they were put. These are not just facts that can be
gleaned from a book or website: proper explanation requires expertise, and that is the reason the
professor is there. An effective lecture is a dialectic in the original sense: a dialogue that develops
through opposed perspectives on a shared subject matter: the effective lecturer does not transmit
information but explains so as to engage the interest and critical capacities of the students such that they
become the main drivers of the subsequent development of the conversation. The shared co-presence is
essential: the tension and challenge of face to face interaction is essential for learning (development of
cognitive capacities to more comprehensive scope and not just information acquisition).
The point: “old” techniques like lectures are not worse because they are old and new technologies like
on-line networks are not better because they are new. Good and bad, better and worse in education, as
in all fundamentally important social practices and institutions, is determined by whether and to what
extent the technique and the technology satisfy the human needs that bring people together in the
institution in the first place. It would be as contrary to the realization of essential human purposes to
forbid old techniques that have proven effective for millennia as to ban the introduction of new
technologies that open up new forms of satisfying the needs that the realization of the purposes
presupposes.
In order to have a rational conversation about how best to satisfy human needs, it is necessary to avoid
the category mistake of confusing the novel with the good. The novel might be good, but it might also
be bad, while an old practice or technique might be good and its elimination bad. But the category
mistake is no mere logical error. Behind the conceptual confusion lies social and economic
interest. The supporters of innovations always have something to sell: the innovation. In order to cure
the conceptual problem the self-interest behind the sales pitch needs to be exposed in all cases.
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THERE’S NO APP FOR THAT
Originally Posted February 23, 2016
Faced with the prospect of being left by his girlfriend, Rasheed Amini, a physicist working at NASA’s
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, worked out a mathematical proof of why she should stay with him. (Toronto
Star, Sunday, February 14th, 2016, p. A1). There is an app for everything else, why not one that takes
all the fun out of fighting with your partner: when times are tough, turn to the spread sheet.
On one level Amini’s app is certainly au courant, yet another attempt to marshal computing power to
discover patterns which, when modeled and used to predict outcomes, can unburden us from decisions
which, when not made in light of “the data,” can be messy. On another level, however, Amini is not
really doing anything new. Both arranged marriages and bad poetry have tried to eliminate chance and
work from love, the former by subordinating the impetuosity of youth to the wisdom of aged command
and the latter by reducing love to list of properties (“How do I love thee, let me count the ways”
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Sonnet 43). All three commit the same mistake of reducing feelings (love,
happiness) to end states (family honour, economic advantage, desirable properties) the attainment of
which can be guaranteed by following a mechanical pathway. They confuse knowing what the value of
the feeling is with providing an account of some of its properties.
One does not have to give into any mysticism of romantic love to object to all three. Love may not be
ineffable, but that does not mean that it is explicable by lists or mathematical functions. As with every
element of human emotional life and motivation, the experience of love can only be understood in terms
of the commitments and desires it provokes in us as specific individuals and the precise ways in which
these are qualitatively different from closely related but distinct feelings (liking someone, lusting after
them, etc). It is by paying attention to the nuance and the specificity, searching for the words to capture
the uniqueness of the feelings (as good poetry does), that we understand love, and any other human
emotion. We would destroy the qualitative richness of human experience– the very substance of lives
worth living– if we reduce it to those aspects of it that can be listed or modeled.
Here is the real problem with Amini’s and all related attempts to model emotional life so as to guarantee
the attainment of some purportedly desirable end-state (happiness, etc). It is not that they simply cannot
work because there is something essentially unknowable about the “passions of the soul.” Rather, they
depend upon reducing those passions to their quantifiable elements only: the predictive devices work, in
their own terms, but their own terms are so one-dimensional that any victory over messy uncertainty is
pyhrrich. If we equate love with happiness and cash out happiness as a set of typical social outcomes
(nice house/career/kids/sexual relations within the statistical norm/enjoying time together/ etc…) then it
is certainly possible to write a computer program that will predict whether two people will likely attain
those outcomes. However, as divorce rates between couples “who seemed so happy” prove, it is quite
possible to have all the external trappings of happiness, and be miserable “inside.” It is the inside that
matters, and it is the inside that cannot be modeled. It can be understood, but only by paying attention
to what is unrepeatable, what is unique, what is most you. Love is the attunement of the lover to the
unique identity of the beloved, not a set of generic properties instantiated in the individual. The ubiquity
of the question: “How can you love him/her” is all the proof we need that its ways are not subject to
understanding through observation of external properties.
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The uniqueness of our identity means that not only is there is no formula to making one another happy,
happiness is not the truth of love. Much of life does not make us happy, and nor should it, and love

must persist through these moments (in pain we need love most of all, a truth which no love-ashappiness predictor is going to be able to capture).
In the rush to turn decisions over to apps which function by discovering patterns in behaviour, the real
risk is that we begin to edit our identities and our decisions according to what the app is capable of
modelling. La Mettrie was wrong when, in 1752, he argued that man is a machine. But he was not
wrong to point out that there are many mechanical dimensions to life, only to ignore all the nonmechanical dimensions of the same phenomena. The computer has carried forward this same
lamentable human propensity for turning parts into wholes, metaphors into literal meanings. The
partisans of “big data” still think of humans as machines, digital machines, which can program
themselves for optimal success. Since they treat the outcome as given (happiness), they think they can
guarantee a life worth living, if only they set the value of the inputs correctly.
What is missing here is not only valorization of the effort which the attainment of any worthwhile
outcome requires, but, more importantly, reflection upon the meaning and value of the ends of
decisions. If we take happiness to be some quantifiable end state whose attainment can be modeled
statistically, then a program that we ask to predict happiness will make predictions for us. And if we
allow ourselves to be programmed by the program, we can then start making the decisions that are
statistically correlated with the quantified definition of happiness.
And then what? A prediction of my own: we will not be any happier than before, not because there are
not statistical correlations to draw between behaviours and outcomes, but because happiness is not
something that can be modeled in the same way as a weather system. Since it necessarily involves
evaluative interpretation of particular and unique lives (yours, mine), there is an irreducibly subjective
and particular (i..e, not modelable without loss of that which was to be modeled) element to
happiness. But the more important point is that happiness is not the only end of a meaningful and good
life, and part of what any reflection on happiness must include is a reflection on the proper place and
scope of happiness in a life like ours: uncertain, with competing demands, ambivalent desires,
conflicting goals, the need to make ultimately unrevisable choices.
If you try to manage this complexity by assigning weights so as to be able to include them in a program,
you have already misunderstood the issue. Take ambivalence, the most human of all feelings. When we
are ambivalent, we want one thing, and we want its opposite. Mathematically, the two would cancel,
and so an ambivalent desire would actually appear as zero (want= +1 want the opposite = -1 = 0). Yet
this result is the very opposite of what ambivalence actually is in life: a tension that pulls us in opposite
ways at once with equal force.
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We learn to deal with ambivalence by tormenting ourselves and playing over different scenarios and
making decisions– often, if life is fully lived, the wrong one, from which we learn, but which we had to
choose in order to learn. In order to live fully, humans have to make mistakes. To rob someone of the
mistake is to cheat them out of an essential element of life. Sparing people the mistakes of
ambivalence is thus not helping them live a better life, it is emptying life of the most powerful and
valuable experiences. Life needs tears and anger because both let us know that we are alive as
embodied, committed, engaged, passionate beings making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. If
a program could spare us tears and anger it should be avoided for precisely that reason: in sparing us
both, it spares us of life. That which is satisfying to a program (efficient attainment of the outcome) is
death to a thinking and feeling individual, who must learn for him or herself through experience what
the right decision will be (there being no way to predict in advance whether any choice will produce
happiness and whether this happiness proves ultimately worthwhile).

In making these decisions we are not completely blind– literature and philosophy are both repositories
of qualitative insights into the human condition. Unlike the hoped for predictive models, they do not try
to eliminate the messiness, but learn from it that in essential dimensions of human experience certainty
is the enemy of meaning and life-value. Ask yourself whether you could value a life that was nothing
but the predictable execution of a routine. By definition, such a life would exclude our decisions
making any difference to outcomes. A life in which our decisions have no causal efficacy is
unfree. Hence, the logical implication of the search for algorithmic solutions to existential problems is
the elimination of freedom from human affairs.
My argument is taking a long time to get to the main point: models are useful solutions to problems that
involve patterns generated by inanimate matter, or problems of human interaction in domains of life that
have purely instrumental value (traffic flows, for example) but for all problems that concern motivation,
mutualistic relationship and interaction, and political goals, conflict, and structure, there is no app that
can solve our problems. Since there is no quantitative model, our motivations, our relationships, and our
political problems need to be worked out and solved on the basis of interpretative understanding of what
life is and can be, what the value of other people in our lives is going to be, and how we can arrive at
institutional structures that are as free of destructive conflict as possible.
I do not want to pose solutions to these problems here, but instead conclude that because the most
essential problems in life (the one’s that no person can avoid, no matter what historical period they live
in or what culture they come from), are not soluble through the mechanical application of an algorithm,
literature, philosophy, and history must always have a place in any credible education system. And so
when we hear that universities (and even secondary and primary schools) need to prepare students for
“the jobs of the future,” those of us who toil lovingly in the jobs of the past (as poets, literary critics,
philosophers, and historians) need to stand up and say to the young:
“Emancipate yourselves from the republic of fear that politicians and business people have tried to trap
you in, so as to determine your choices for you.
Not even engineers are always engineers: if they are at all reflective they too have to pose questions
about the meaning and value of their work, and answer them in non-engineering terms (the value of a
structural engineer’s work is not measurable by its load bearing capacity, since the work as vocation
does not bear any load). The most pressing philosophical problems are at the same time the most
pressing practical problems of our age: cultural difference, civil war, religious belief versus secularism,
the possibility of artificial intelligence, the future of art, the status of democracy, the best economic
system, the meaning of love and happiness (and also hate and sorrow), the meaning of human
freedom. There are no mechanical solutions to these problems, but all require attending to experience,
your own, and the accumulated wisdom of past ages of all cultures, the ability to detect contradictions
between principle and practice and principle and stated goals, to discover hidden agendas, private
interests masquerading as the general, but also the ability to see underlying shared interests and
commonalities, the ability to make an argument without ad hominem attack, and the ability to accept
criticism without thinking your person is under attack.
Laugh when they call these “soft skills,” and rejoin: “what important human problem can be solved
without them, and what aspect of the human project (to build a world in which each person who is born
into it finds a place to freely contribute to its further unfolding) can be advanced if we were to close off
the institutional time and space required to develop them?”
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WHAT IS CALLED CRITICAL THINKING?
Originally Posted December 17, 2015
On December 7th, 2015 the Ontario Ministry of Education released a report detailing what it heard
during its year long consultation with university educators and administrators regarding planned changes
to the province’s university funding formula. The report does not make recommendations, but it does
telegraph the government’s position that any new funding formula be tied to measurable outcomes. This
position is not new, and I do not want to concentrate on the general problems raised by the belief that
everything of value in an education is subject to quantifiable measure. That which I would like to
examine is the suggestion- repeated three times in the report- that one key outcome of a quality
education is the development of “critical thinking skills.” The problem, as the report notes, is that there
is no agreed upon method to measure the development of these skills:
Many jurisdictions are trying to find ways to measure learning outcomes – an attempt
to capture growth in cognitive abilities that should reasonably be expected to occur as a result of an
undergraduate education. Problem solving, critical thinking, and communication are all higher-order
thinking skills that are generally agreed to be core to an undergraduate experience, yet these are not
transparently or consistently measured, assessed, or validated across the system.(p. 38)
Before we can agree on how the development of critical thinking skills can be measured, there needs to
be some agreement on what “critical thinking” is. The report makes no effort to define the term. Hence
my interest here is not to propose a metric, but to answer two questions: what is critical thinking, and
do all disciplines equally cultivate it.
Let us start with the second question. One danger of tying funding to outcomes and defining outcomes
in terms of generic skills purportedly subject to definitive quantitative measure is that in an effort to
protect their funding, all disciplines will be forced to engage in bad faith re-descriptions of themselves in
terms of whatever buzz-word the government has latched on to as its preferred criterion of quality. If
“critical thinking” catches on and funding becomes tied to demonstrating that each discipline cultivates
it, then you can be certain that Chemistry, Business Administration, and every other academic
department will start producing arguments that purport to show how they teach critical thinking
skills. They will not define “critical thinking,” but instead simply repeat what they have always already
done– teach chemistry, etc., but call what they are doing critical thinking.
I think that there is a good faith sense in which any department can teach critical thinking. However,
before we can understand what that sense is, we must turn to the first question and try to come up with a
working definition of critical thinking.
Let us begin by treating each element of the compound term “critical thinking” separately. In colloquial
language to be “critical” means to point out flaws in the object of criticism. If it is possible to point out
flaws in the object of criticism, then it must be the case that the object is subject to better or worse
states. Criticism is thus an evaluation that demonstrates the ways a given object of thought falls short of
whatever criteria of excellence properly applies to it. Is critical thinking therefore nothing but the
application of given standards to given objects?
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No. it is not, and in order to understand why not, we must turn to the second term: thinking. What does
it mean to ‘think” about an object? First, if we think about objects, it is clear that thinking and the object

of thought are distinct. Thinking is, therefore, in the most general sense, the subjection of the objects of
thought to concepts. This subjection is not random or arbitrary: when we think about a given object, we
are trying to discover something about it: what elements it is made of, or what categories of
classification apply to it, what its mass is, etc. An innumerable number of empirical questions can be
asked of any object, and it is by various types of empirical thinking that these questions can be
answered.
However, as our analysis of “critical’ revealed, not all questions are descriptive or empirical. There are
also evaluative questions. If a descriptive question asks (in general) “what is x,” an evaluative or
critical question asks “what is a good x and is y a good example?” Hence, critical thinking is in the most
general sense the subjection of objective reality to evaluative (critical) appraisal. Here we find a role for
all disciplines to teach critical thinking. Rather than just teach students to follow the rules of the
discipline, teaching that develops critical thinking skills must enable students to evaluate the content and
history of the discipline and subject its methods to critical appraisal. By teaching students to think
critically about their discipline their capacity to think beyond the established consensus in the field is
enabled: they will be able argue about why theory x is a good theory, and not just that it asserts a,b, and
c.
Despite the spirit of positivism that still too often rules discussions of the value of higher education, the
objects of thought are not limited to the objects of the empirical disciplines. Thinking can become its
own object, not (as in psychology) as a function of brain operations, but as the defining human practice
of trying to understand our world as a meaningful whole. Philosophy is the discipline that studies
thought in this sense. The most fundamental form of critical thinking is the critical evaluation of
thought itself: what is good thinking? The philosophical understanding of critical thinking will be (as it
was in the empirical disciplines) evaluative, but its object of evaluation will be universal in a way in
which the empirical disciplines cannot be.
The first point to note is that when we approach thinking as practice of understanding our world as a
meaningful whole, the strict distinction between thought and world breaks down. A “thing” may be
distinct from the thought of the thing, but “meaning” is a creature of human reality alone. When we
think about the meaning of objects we cannot radically divorce the reality of the object from the
concepts that we apply to it, concepts which are not thought up ex nihilo but develop out of human
historical experience. When we think about things philosophically, it becomes apparent that thinking
itself changes reality, converting it form a mere set of givens to a set of problems or questions that
concern the reasons why we confront one reality and not others and whether the reality that we inhabit is
the best reality possible. Philosophy thus allows a gap to open between the reality that is given,
alternative realities that are possible, and thus the question of which reality, the given or the possible, is
better.
The fundamental problem of philosophical critical thinking is, therefore, the problem of the criteria by
which given possibilities for living can be evaluated: why is one form of life better than another form of
life? Again, we cannot answer this question in abstraction from the systems under which people have
actually lived. Hence, an important element of critical thinking in the philosophical sense is
understanding that human life has a history. No past form of life proved permanent, and if no past form
of life proved permanent, then none (in their details) were natural or necessary. Still, although no
particular way of life has proven natural or necessary, they may share some common features that help
us discover the criteria of better and worse living in general.

95

The idea that there are objective criteria according to which better and worse ways of living can be
determined has been subject to skeptical criticism since ancient times and the work of Sextus
Empiricus. However successful skepticism has been in destroying naieve illusions and one-sided
theories of truth, there is always one reality which no skeptic has been able to undermine, and that is that
human beings are (as are all life forms) vulnerable to external threats to their life. There is therefore an
objective basis to distinguish better and worse ways of living. Those ways of living which protect us
from objective threats to our existence are better than those which do not. As threats can be both natural
and social, the critical judgement applies to all human activity and organization: the better way to live is
to ensure that all are protected from the natural and social threats to their life and well-being (leaving
open the question for now about the meaning of “well-being.”)
Societies can both protect well-being (for some, the ruling groups and those who unquestioningly serve
them) and damage the life and well-being of other groups (who are subordinate and meant only to serve,
and who are attacked if they cease to comply). As philosophy makes inquiries into the principles that
governed different ways of living, it is impossible not to notice that in all cases of subordination and
servitude, the subordinate groups eventually become conscious of their subordination, organize against
it, and articulate a set of more comprehensive principles for life-organization which demand that their
interest be included in the circle of interests recognized and protected by society. And from this insight
comes the basic criterion of better and worse lives: those forms of life are better that “coherently
include” the satisfaction of the life-interest of everyone, now and into the open-ended
future.(McMurtry, The Value of All Values). In every case of real growth of understanding, what
happens is that a new, comprehensive, more inclusive system of thought replaces an older system
reduced to the status of legitimating the power of ruling (social, scientific, etc) groups.
Since human life is complex and multidimensional, many disciplines can contribute to the “coherent
inclusivity” of better forms of life. To cite just one example recently in the news, the science of climate
change has helped promote a growing global consensus (at least in theory) against the dangers of overconsumption of fossil fuels. However, the critical value of the empirical disciplines depends upon their
insights being integrated into an overall criticism of the systematic blocks to the formation of a society
that coherently includes and satisfies everyone’s fundamental life-interest. Hence, philosophical critical
thinking remains basic and foundational to the critical thinking other disciplines might cultivate. All
contributions are valuable, but philosophy’s is essential because only philosophy can integrate distinct
insights into an overall criticism and alternative.
Thus, in its philosophical sense, critical thinking is thinking that exposes the contradiction between
established systems of thought and the steps that would have to be taken to improve the conditions of
life and the goodness of life itself. How to measure the growth of critical thinking is a practical question
which concerns the degree to which the social commitment to the satisfaction of life-interests is
advanced by the solution to pressing social problems. Universities can contribute to this advance to the
extent that disciplines are allowed to cultivate the desire to pursue the truth free from government and
market demands to produce commodifiable research. In order to do this work the real funding problem
must be solved: not absence of bureaucratic-generic measures, but a steady decline in public investment
in the space and time necessary to inquire into (and teach about) social life, its natural foundations, the
problems current social organization poses, and the alternatives that can make life better in the terms
defined above.
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UNIVERSITIES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
DISCIPLINARY TRADITIONS
Originally Posted January 15, 2016
In “What is Called Critical Thinking” I promised to provide a comprehensive analysis of Focus on
Outcomes, Centre on Students. The document provides an overview of submissions made to the
government’s consultations on the future of Ontario’s university funding model. My reading has made it
apparent that because it is an overview of positions articulated in the consultations on which it does not
itself take a position, it does not lend itself to the sort of analysis I initially promised to provide. A
better approach seems to be to identify those sites where it appears that the government is telegraphing
its position and examine those as potential trouble spots for academic freedom and institutional
independence of centralizing political and economic agendas. Thus, rather than a single overarching
analysis and critique, I will develop specific arguments to address areas of concern as I discover them
through careful reading of the document. Today I focus on the implications the epigraph to the
document might have for the future of discipline-based teaching and research at Ontario
universities. The epigraph reads:
The province no longer funds “universities” per se.
It funds quantifiable outcome(s) or achievement(s) it
wants from universities for the betterment of the public
good. The things to be measured and applied to
determining funding shares must be the outcomes that
matter to Ontario. In the past, this has been enrolment
growth. Today, as identified in government policy and
consultation papers, they are measures of “quality”
and “improving the student experience”.
Design Questions: Funding Models for Ontario
(Toronto: Higher
Education Quality Council of Ontario, 2015), p. 2.
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The initially puzzling opening line “The province no longer funds universities per se” is HEQCO’s
interpretation of the introduction two years ago of “Strategic Mandate Agreements” (SMA) between the
province and Ontario universities. The SMA’s detail for the province the institutional strengths of
particular universities and explain how provincial finding will be used to support these strengths. The
SMAs were launched in response to an earlier report on the need for Ontario universities to differentiate

themselves from each other. At present, (at least judging from my own institution, the University of
Windsor) the SMA’ s have not had any noticeable effect on teaching and research in departments and
disciplines. The real impact will be felt through hiring priorities, as those areas designated an
institutional strength will be able to hire, while those which are not will face a more uncertain
future. However, at present the real problem is not explicit threats to disciplinary integrity and
autonomy, but old fashioned underfunding of everyone, a problem for which current provincial policy
bears a great deal of responsibility.
Nevertheless, if we read between the lines of the epigraph, and connect what is implied with what has
been made explicit in other documents (like the differentiation strategy paper) we can detect looming
threats to the traditional structure of universities as institutions organized around more or less selfgoverning disciplines. “Outcomes” “student experience” and “quality are codes words, as I have
demonstrated before, for “subordinating the acquisition of disciplinary-based knowledge to labourmarket demand.” Whenever student experience and quality are invoked in these sorts of documents they
are never defined, save in terms of providing students with the generic skills that they will need to find
paid employment.
The still-growing institutional and governmental push of disciplines towards centrally-managed and
imposed learning outcomes is explicitly defended as an attack on archaic, elitist discipline-centred and
specific knowledge in favour of generic skills-based approach to education which purportedly better
prepares students for the “real world.” For example, a document that my institution’s Centre for
Teaching and Learning directs faculty to for an explanation of learning outcomes argues that
there is no question that the learning outcomes approach to developing curriculum does not begin with
the question “what does my discipline traditionally teach at this level?” Most teachers consider this
question as part of their strategy for determining curriculum. They also ask “will this curriculum
adequately prepare students for subsequent courses in the discipline?” and faculty in so-called sending
institutions must also ask “will this curriculum be acceptable to the receiving institutions?”
The learning outcomes approach does suggest a different leading question: “what do students need to
know and be able to do after they graduate (from this course, from this program, from the
university…)?” In directing our attention to what students will ultimately do with the knowledge and
abilities they acquire, the learning outcomes approach does ask us to look beyond the strict boundaries
of disciplinary tradition and demands.
The paper does not reject the validity or importance of disciplinary traditions (although when outcomes
are discussed in policy papers rather than academic papers the value of the disciplines is typically not
recognized). Rather, it cashes out their importance as vehicles for the teaching of these generic skills,
whose value in turn is understood as an instrument of life-long-learning and successful job
hunting. Harvey Weingarten, the current head of HECQO argues, in this regard, that the priority for
Ontario universities has to be the improvement of the teaching of these generic labour market skills:
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Learning outcomes assessment is an exercise in continuous quality improvement, not punishment — a
way of improving education, a way of identifying what is working and where remediation is needed. By

measuring critical learning outcomes, our postsecondary institutions would clearly identify areas for
remediation and unambiguously document their value-added impact: the acquisition of these core skills
that underlie professional and personal success. The key measure is not the absolute level of these skills;
one expects the performance of students in different institutions to vary depending on the institution’s
admission policies, target populations and other variables. The critical measure is the change in the skill
sets of students from the time they enter the institution to the time they leave.
It is distressing to see the head of the Higher Education Quality Council reduce the value of education
to a series of business press cliches. Worse, he commits a category mistake of the highest order and
fails completely to see it, confusing the increase in money value of a non-living commodity with the
development of human talent and potentialities. Someone who is supposed to have the best interest of
students at heart blithely reduces them to mere things, objects to which (money) value will be added, as
cars add money value to the steel and rubber from which they are built.
My position is, unsurprisingly, the opposite. Without in anyway being arrogantly dismissive of
students’ practical concerns for their future, or reject completely the existence or value of generic
intellectual skills (obviously, literacy and numeracy etc., are essential across the board) I want to argue
that the life-value of discipline-based knowledge derives from the cultivation of specific “ways of
knowing” which then connect in specific ways to the general demands of understand and improving the
“real world.”
The value for students of discipline-based knowing is the development of specific methods of thinking,
interpretation, and criticism which enable them to understand specific aspects of a complex world
which, when brought together, contribute to a comprehensive understanding of that world and the ways
in which its organization both enables and impedes the realization of human potential.
It is true that this life-value is often hidden because the organization of knowledge along disciplinary
lines can be elitist and self-serving as well as overly specialized. The careerist insularity of some
defenders of institutional status quo open the door to system-serving critics of the traditional
organization of universities. Insularity and specialization is particularly problematic in a discipline like
philosophy, whose life must go beyond jargon and technique to always connect with the abiding and
universal problems of human life (truth, freedom, value, meaning) understood historically but engaged
on the concrete terrain of life as it is lived today. It is true that disciplines can become ways of keeping
out the non-expert, distancing knowledge from everyday life, and treating students as submissive
apprentices rather than active participants in the transmission and elaboration of knowledge. A recent
intervention by two philosophy professors in the New York Times is right to argue that:
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Before its migration to the university, philosophy had never had a central home. Philosophers could be
found anywhere — serving as diplomats, living off pensions, grinding lenses, as well as within a
university. Afterward, if they were “serious” thinkers, the expectation was that philosophers would
inhabit the research university. Against the inclinations of Socrates, philosophers became experts like
other disciplinary specialists. This occurred even as they taught their students the virtues of Socratic
wisdom, which highlights the role of the philosopher as the non-expert, the questioner, the gadfly.

However, we must be careful before we dismiss completely the importance of disciplinary knowledge,
and the university as an institution that provides and protects the time and space necessary for its
cultivation, transmission, and further development. Philosophy can be cut off from life when it is
institutionalized. On the other hand, its institutionalization protects it (especially its critical expressions)
from market forces which it would have to serve completely were there no university institution in
which it can be pursued (more or less) without need to justify itself in money-value terms. Without the
time and space the university provides, philosophers would have to find a market for their ideas, which
means that they would have to be marketed, which would mean that heterodox positions–those for
which few would pay– would be far more threatened than they are now.
It is not only philosophical thought that would be threatened. Non-commercial, basic research as well as
science which exposes the material irrationality of the current model of “economic growth,” (for
example, climate science which has proven the link between capitalist industrialism and life-threatening
climate change), would be far more exposed to political censure and silencing if it found no home in
disciplinary traditions protected by the force of academic freedom (which is not a legal principle but
protected only by University by-laws and faculty association collective agreements).
Disciplines did not arise just because of some desire to “discipline” knowledge in the Foucauldian sense
of the term (to link knowledge with power over subject matter and human subjects). That form of
discipline is real, but knowledge has also become specialized and organized around disciplines because
diversity and complexity in the object of knowledge forced the differentiation. In the Middle Ages,
natural science was a species of philosophy- natural philosophy– and remained such until the worldshattering discoveries of Galileo and Newton. From the seventeenth century on, natural science has
become separated off from philosophy, and particular sciences from one another, because new insights
into the forces and elements of the natural world have forced this specialization. if we want a
comprehensive understanding of how the natural world works, then the distinct scientific disciplines are
essential to building that picture in an open process free (as far as possible) from the exercise of
repressive political and economic power.
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Of course, understanding how nature works is not the only object of human inquiry. Human beings also
have to understand how their own bodies work (hence the need for medicine and nursing as practical
arts and sciences of health). Moreover, human beings are not just organisms, but social-organic
beings. Hence, there is also the need for social scientific work of all sorts (sociology and allied
disciplines, economics, political science, and so forth). We also need to inquire into the symbolic and
aesthetic dimensions of human life (literature and literary criticism, art history, etc., as well as continue
to elaborate them through the arts themselves). Finally, we need a discipline whose province it is to
search for unifying principles of meaning and value that make life as a whole worthwhile and good (at
least potentially) and which, if uncovered, explain the universal purpose of all the other particular forms
of research– not just to produce knowledge for its own sake but to contribute concretely to securing the
natural and social conditions of human (and other sentient life) flourishing. In order to make these
contributions, philosophy and every other discipline must be free to cultivate their specific
methodological procedures and conceptual structures (as well as conduct freely the intra-disciplinary

arguments about the strengths, blind-spots, contradictions, exclusions, etc., of different methodologies
and conceptual structures and build organic, inter-disciplinary links and cross-fertilizations). Out of
those arguments and interactions come more comprehensive and coherent understanding, and out of
more comprehensive and coherent understanding comes the practical contributions to good human lives
all the particular disciplines ultimately aspire to make.
If the new funding formula prioritizes generic skills and pushes specific disciplines in the direction of
cultivating them, to the exclusion of transmitting disciplinary traditions and histories for the sake of
creating more comprehensive and coherent methods specific to each discipline, the result will not be
better service to “the public good,” but better service to labour markets, with no reflection upon whether
the jobs on offer are adequate to students demands not only for a pay cheque, but meaningful, nonalienated, life-valuable labour. Moreover, with no institutional protection of the time and space for
discipline specific work, the particular problems current models of social organization will escape
scrutiny as everyone is pushed into the manufacture of compliant workers rather than critically minded
scientists, philosophers, sociologists; or poets, and artists whose works remind us of the real power and
beauty of human creativity, or doctors and nurses capable of understanding the social causes of
morbidity and understand how to attend to the ill as human beings.
Of course, it is easy to point out (and it should always be pointed out) that disciplinary knowledge can
easily become detached from serving more universal life-values, that departments can be dogmatic and
closed and exclusionary and all manner of other problems I leave it to readers to think through. The
existence of those problems is not an argument to abolish the teaching of discipline-specific traditions of
content and thought, but to criticize these exclusions etc. as barrier to comprehensive and coherent
understanding.
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TEN THESES IN SUPPORT OF TEACHING
AND AGAINST LEARNING OUTCOMES
Originally Posted March 6, 2016
1. Teaching at the university level is not a practice of communicating or transferring information but
awakening in students a desire to think by revealing to them the questionability of things. The desire to
think is awakened in students if the teacher is able to reveal the importance of the discipline as a way of
exposing to question established “solutions” to fundamental problems of human experience, thought,
activity, relationship, and organization. Teaching does not instruct or transmit information, it embodies
and exemplifies the commitment to thinking.
2. True teaching is thus a practice, a performance of cognitive freedom which awakens in students a
sense of their own cognitive freedom. Both are rooted in the most remarkable power of the brain: not to
simulate, not to sense, not to tabulate, not to infer, but to co-constitute the objective world of which it is
an active part. In thinking we do not just passively register the world, we transform it by making it the
object of thought, i.e, an object that can be questioned and changed. To think is thus to cancel the alien
objectivity of the world and to become a subject, an active force helping to shape the order of things.
3. All successful teaching therefore results in students who love to think and never stop thinking for the
rest of their lives. This result is very different from mastering a certain body of knowledge or learning to
apply certain rules to well-defined situations. To love to think is identical to feel and be moved by the
need to question: the given structure of knowledge in the discipline, its application to the problemdomain of human life that the discipline ranges over, the overarching structures of human social life
within which the discipline or subject matter has its place, and the overall problems of life as a mortal,
finite being. To love to think means to remain alive to the questionability of things in all these domains.
4. Thus, the person who loves to think is critically minded. The critically minded person is not an
undisciplined skeptic, but one who can detect contradictions between principle and practice, and
between principles and the values to which they purportedly lead as means. Critical thinking is not the
ability to solve problems within the established parameters of social, economic, political, aesthetic, and
intellectual-scientific life. Change is impossible if all that people can do is apply the given rules
mindlessly. If the problem lies with the established rules (and fundamental problems in any field always
concern the established rules), then confining critical thinking to “problem solving” always serves the
status quo (i.e., repeats the cause of the problem as the solution).
5. Every class in which the love of thinking is cultivated must be a class in which the interaction
between teacher and students lives through the collective effort to open to question a purportedly settled
issue, to see how these solutions came to be, what alternatives they excluded, and what alternatives
might be better (as well as what constitutes a “better” solution). Of course, learning to love to think is
always developed in relation to a specific subject-matter and definite methodologies. However, these
elements of learning are always means to the real end: awakening and cultivating the love of thinking.
Learning outcomes confuse the ends (thinking) with the means (content and skills) and set out to
measure how well the students are mastering the content and the methods.
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6. Learning outcomes are justified as proof of a new concern within the university with the quality of
teaching and student learning. In reality, they are part of a conservative drift in higher education towards
skill-programming and away from cultivation of cognitive freedom and love of thinking. Ironically, the

passive, consumeristic attitude that learning outcomes encourage in students works against students
becoming motivated to learn even the skills and the information that the learning outcomes prioritize.
7. While they are often sold to faculty as means to improve teaching and better serve the interests of
students, what they in fact achieve is a narrowing of the scope and aims of classroom interaction to
skilling and information transfer. (See further, Furedi, Frank. (2012). “The Unhappiness Principle,”
Times Literary Supplement, November 29th, 2012; Stefan Collini, Who Are the Spongers Now? London
Review of Books, Vol. 38, No.2, January 21, 2016). Skills and information acquisition (that which the
learning outcomes try to specify and enforce) are not, however, ends, but only means of opening up the
discipline (and the world) to question. Nothing will kill student engagement faster than drilling them on
information or skills. The really valuable learning happens when the dialectic of question and answer,
problem, provisional solution, and then deeper problem excites students sufficiently that they start to
want to follow the emergent thread of ideas wherever it leads, because they start to feel themselves
actively contributing to that direction.

8. As metrics, they are either redundant (doing nothing but state the obvious, i.e., that a class on Greek
philosophy will cover Greek philosophy, and a class that involves essay writing will enable students to
learn how to write essays), or useless (if what they aim to measure is something like love of thinking,
which is an inner disposition and not subject to quantitative measure). In their belief that only that which
measurable is real, defenders of learning outcomes show themselves to be another example of a societywide cognitive derangement that confuses the value of practices and relationships and activities with
their measurable aspects (the “externalist fallacy,” John McMurtry, “What Is Good, What is Bad, The
Value of All Values Across Time, Places, and Theories,” Philosophy and World Problems, Volume 1,
EOLSS Publishers, 2011, p. 269).
9. That which can be measured is “customer satisfaction.” Even if they are never explicitly justified in
these terms, it is clear that when thought within the context of society-wide changes to public
institutions and attacks on public sector workers (which include professors in Canada), learning
outcomes presuppose and reinforce a consumeristic attitude towards education. They present the
purpose of pursuing a course of study as the purchase of a defined set of skills and circumscribed body
of information which can then be used as a marketing pitch to future employers. Learning outcomes
submerge the love of thinking in bureaucratic objectification of the learner as a customer, a passive
recipient of closed and pre-packaged material.
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10. Hence, there is no clear pedagogical value to learning outcomes. If there is no pedagogical value
how are we to understand the current fad? As part of the attack on the professional autonomy of
professors because it constitutes a barrier to the imposition of market discipline on universities. (See, for
example, Jonker, Linda, and Hicks, Martin. (2014). Teaching Loads and Research Outputs of Ontario
University Faculty Members: Implications for Productivity and Differentiation. Toronto: Higher
Education Quality Council of Ontario; Commission on the Reform of Ontario’s Public Services (2012).
“Post-secondary Education,” Deem, Rosemary, Hilyard, Sam, Reed, Mike. (2007). Knowledge, Higher
Education, and the New Mangerialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Bruneau, William. (2000).
“Shall We Perform or Shall We Be Free? The Corporate Campus: Commercialization and the Dangers
To Canada’s Colleges and Universities. James L. Turk, ed., Toronto: Lorimer; Massy, William F, and
Zemsky, Robert. “Using Information Technology to Enhance Academic Productivity.” If professors are

allowed to define their own terms of work (legitimated by appeal to academic freedom and professional
autonomy) they escape the discipline of market forces to which other workers are subjected. This allows
them to extract rents in the form of higher wages, and it also constitutes a barrier to “higher
productivity” (more graduates produced per unit input of academic labour). Learning outcomes are only
one aspect of this broader political-economic assault on academic labour, but the motivation behind
them—whatever their institutional supporters might say—cannot be understood outside of this context.
TEN THESES: A CODA
Originally Posted March 12, 2016
In the past five days more than 17 000 people have read my Ten Theses. This number of readers is two
orders of magnitude greater than my previously best read posts. If anyone still thinks that the
contemporary university does not take teaching seriously, the scope of interest in the piece and the
seriousness of the debate which followed is evidence that it does. I do not expect my position or the
criticism it aroused to be the final word. I have been making these arguments for a decade (without
much practical success at the institutional level) and, while I am always open to counter-argument and to
developing my own pedagogy in light of others’ good ideas, I remain committed to a more open practice
of teaching which I do not think is well-served by learning outcomes. For those who in good faith
disagree and argue that without clear objectives students’ interests are compromised, I ask you to look at
the debate here. It was not framed by any extrinsic outcomes, was not steered or conducted by any
extrinsic goals, but developed spontaneously through the considered interventions of the participants,
but a coherence evolved that enabled all of us to learn a great deal, just by virtue of our participation and
not because we gave each other assignments to assess. I prefer the higher intensity of face to face
argument to the flatness of electronic communication, but even so, the argument as it evolved here is an
excellent illustration of what I meant in the post where I identified the dialectic of problem-question-reposing of the problem as the life of a well-taught class. I do not mean that I assumed the role of teacher
here, but rather that this spontaneous energy of idea development is analogous to what happens in a class
when it is doing what it should: stimulate in the students the desire to think and contribute and see
where the argument leads. Thanks to everyone for their contributions. The conversation can of course
continue and I will respond as best I can to subsequent comments and criticisms, but other projects call.
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READINGS: CARLO FANELLI: MEGACITY
MALAISE: NEOLIBERALISM, PUBLIC
SERVICES, AND LABOUR IN TORONTO
Originally Posted June 5, 2016
Carlo Fanelli, Megacity Malaise: Neoliberalism, Public Services, and Labour in Toronto, Fernwood
Books, 2016.
Although the basic driver of capitalist society is easy enough to understand, its system-need to turn
money-capital into more money-capital manifests itself as a series of intersecting contradictions:
political, economic, social, and cultural. These contradictions affect different regions of the globe and
different groups of people differently. In Guangzhou, China, the destruction of the industrial working
class of Southern Ontario and the US mid-West is experienced as the birth of an industrial working
class, with all the pain and promise that process entailed in the West one hundred and fifty years ago. In
the world’s ever larger megacities, the loss of manufacturing has been off-set by the explosion of
finance and cultural industries as the main drivers of capital accumulation. Cities too small to act as a
magnet for finance capital and cultural industry monster-spectacle are left desperate and dependent.
The contradictions of twentieth and twenty-first century capitalist urbanization provide the socioeconomic frame for Carlo Fanelli’s political analysis of labour struggles against austerity in
Toronto. While a mid-sized city by global standards, Toronto is by far the dominant city of Canada,
with a metropolitan population bigger than Montreal and Vancouver combined. As the mass culture and
financial centre of Canada, Toronto is a global city which sees itself (and not incorrectly) as a key
competitor with New York and London. In the contemporary world, inter-national capitalist
competition increasingly plays out as competition between major cities. Finance capitalists and the
captains of the culture industries are the winners, peripheral cities and workers across sectors are the
losers. Yet, as Fanelli shows, despite being obviously the victims, workers, and especially unionized
workers, are blamed as the cause of their own demise.
Fanelli is uniquely positioned to both explain the socio-economic context of labour struggles against
austerity and critique the limitations of their existing forms. As a working class child and adolescent
growing up in Rexdale he learned first hand the range and the importance of the public services the city
offered. After having benefited from those services growing up, he later helped to provide them,
working for many years for the City of Toronto in different capacities. During his career he was also an
an activist member of the Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 79– the largest union of
municipal workers in the country. He is also a political economist with a gift– due to his not having
forgotten his working class background– for bringing complex economic problems down to their real
world implications for working people. Although the book focuses on Toronto, the lessons he draws are
of general significance to Canadian public sector workers.
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The book is admirably concise, managing in 100 pages to provide a brief constitutional history of the
status of cities in Canada, the global socio-economic causes of neo-liberalism and the austerity agenda,
the local contours of those causes as they have shaped the political agenda of Ontario and Toronto over
the past twenty years, an ethnography of two pivotal CUPE strikes in Toronto, a critique of the political
limitations of the CUPE Toronto leadership, an affirmation of the public sector as a counter-weight to

capitalist market forces, and general ideas about how that counter-weight can be used as a platform for
the development of renewed union radicalism and anti-capitalist mobilisation. Despite the number of
foci, the book reads as a unified whole. Theoretical claims are empirically substantiated. There is no
extraneous detail, but the reader wanting more fine-grained content is always pointed to the primary
sources. The book needs to be part of any conversation around the political re-birth of the union
movement and the re-invention of the Canadian left. In that regard it could usefully be read alongside of
Alan Sear’s The Next New Left.
Fanelli begins with a cogent explanation of the causes of the austerity agenda in Toronto. These causes
are both general and specific. The general cause is the global reign of neo-liberal orthodoxy, according
to which unions and the public sector have undermined the competitive dynamism of capitalism and
slowed economic growth. Hence the goal of neo-liberal policy has been to weaken unions and privatize
public services. The tactic is the same everywhere: first tax cuts create a revenue crisis, which leads to
service cuts, which are blamed on workers high salaries and secure pensions, which are used to
demonize workers, eroding public support for job security and living wages at the same time as it
increases popular support for state-led attacks on public sector workers. “This is a recurring feature of
neo-liberal administration in which tax cuts are firs used to degrade the quality and breadth of the
service provided, which governments then invoke as justification for “tightening spending.” When this
fails … this manipulative strategy is then used to justify privatization.” (p. 41) Fanelli explains the
logic of manufactured crisis clearly, substantiates his analysis with concrete examples from Toronto, and
avoids repeating at length the historical development of neo-liberalism already well-analysed in works
like Harvey’s Neo-Liberalism: A Brief History.
The specific cause of the austerity agenda is the constitutional status of cities in Canada. Fanelli
weaves his way through the relevant constitutional arcana to explain the core problem: According to the
British North America Act (1867) and the Constitution Act (1982), cities are the creatures of the
provinces with very little room for independent fiscal maneuvering. Overwhelmingly, cities rely on
property taxes to raise the revenue they need to pay for public services. Property taxes, are, however,
regressive: if home value rise property taxes will rise, but there is no guarantee that wages will rise in
lockstep with property taxes. In booming real estate markets working people, whose wages have been
suppressed over the last three decades, can find themselves with a growing tax bill– and moved by the
resentment higher taxes and more or less fixed incomes to set out looking for scapegoats.(p.33) Rightwing politicians are happy to point them in the direction of public sector workers grazing by the side of
the road.
These general and specific causes have combined with a series of disastrous (for cities) provincial
decisions, beginning with that of the hard-right government of Mike Harris (1995-2003) to download
significant new costs to cities (public housing, social assistance …), without any corresponding increase
in their ability to borrow or otherwise raise revenue in new ways. Although a right-wing ideologue of
the most objectionable sort, Harris was simply mimicking what his supposedly progressive federal
Liberal counterpart, Jean Chretien, through the agency of then-finance Minister Paul Martin, was doing
to “solve” the deficit crisis: download costs to the provinces. Martin set in motion a vortex of
downloading at the bottom of which is the political unit least able to fiscally cope– cities. Since most of
the services that people depend upon for the day to day quality of their lives are delivered and paid for at
the municipal level, the overburdening of city budgets by these newly imposed costs was felt in a very
real way, especially by the poorest and most vulnerable: fewer services, higher user fees, and more
encouragement from politicians for them to take their anger out on the workers who deliver the services.
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Toronto city governments from the reign of clown the first Mel “Bad Boy” Lastman to clown the second
Rob “Real Bad Boy” Ford have claimed that Toronto faces a spending crisis. But professional audits
have revealed that the city is and has been very well-managed from a spending perspective.(p.26) The
real problem, as Fanelli demonstrates, is “a revenue crisis rooted in the constitutional constraints of
municipal government and public policies of the neo-liberal era.”(p.3) However, failure to recognize the
truth of the political economic situation has led the public to support, to various degrees of intensity in
different periods, the overall program of “competitive austerity” successive governments have
recommended. Fanelli refers to Greg Albo to explain competitive austerity as a set of policies which
makes “labour markets more flexible, enhances managerial prerogatives, reduces government services
that act as a drain on competition, shedding public assets and weakening labour laws and employment
standards, aiming to turn the state into a series of internally competitive markets.” (p. 28) The program
of competitive austerity can only be realized through the defeat of organized labour, since the entire
point of organized labour is to shield workers from the life-destructive effects that unregulated market
forces generate by pushing down real wages. If competitive pressure increases, then the power of
unions must proportionally decrease. Hence we would expect a period of competitive austerity to be a
period of class struggle in the form of public sector unions trying to preserve past gains against cost
cutting municipal governments. That is exactly what we find in Toronto. Its CUPE locals (79 and 416)
have been involved in work stoppages in 2000, 2002, 2009, and 2012. The results, as Fanelli explains,
have not been catastrophic for CUPE, but they have been defeats.
The most important contribution the book makes is its political analysis of these strikes and the lessons
for the future development of the union movement. Fanelli is fair (and not out of loyalty to his CUPE
brothers and sisters). The bargaining situation for all unions in the context of competitive austerity is
extremely difficult. Anyone who thinks sloganeering or sideline invocations of the need for militancy
can overcome these objective barriers to success simply has not been involved in union politics for the
past thirty years. There are reasons why concessions have been made: the increased mobility of capital
has put workers in competition with each other, internationally, nationally, provincially, and between
cities. While public services are not subject to relocation in the same way a car factory is, private sector
dynamics, as Albo noted, have been replicated in the public sector, weakening unions’ bargaining
strength. At the same time, legislative changes (making the use of scabs easier, declaring more and
more workers “essential” in order to strip them of their right to strike) have coalesced with competitive
pressures to objectively weaken the labour movement. The objective forces have subjective
implications: workers feel beaten down, targeted, worried about job security, and thus
defensive. Mobilizing militant action in this context is extremely difficult.
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Difficult as it is, it is also necessary (if the competitive austerity agenda and, beyond that, capitalism
itself are to be eventually overcome). Fanelli acknowledges the challenges, but he also (hopefully, not
naively) teases out the possibilities for union renewal in the unique role public sector work plays in a
capitalist economy. As Fanelli notes right at the outset, public sector work satisfies real human needs,
and in so doing, improves the lives of those who access those services. These needs run the gamut from
basic physical needs like health care when sick to socio-cultural needs like engaging in organized play
and education. Thus, the first step in recreating a fighting, progressive, and democratic trade union
movement is for public sector workers to connect the life-value of the services to the workers who
provide those services: “The public provision of goods and services, well-managed in a way that fosters
sustainable development and social justice initiatives, and which is accountable to the community,
significantly improves standards of living … It is necessary to ensure that the public at large
understands this through community engagement initiatives led by unions.” (p. 86). “Sustainable
development,” “social justice” and “accountability” all need to be more clearly defined, but the general
point that Fanelli makes is sound: the public sector constitutes a counter-logic to the money to more

money sequence of value that determines the capitalist economy. Its principle is: satisfy human needs
regardless of ability to pay because good human lives demand need-satisfaction.
Of course, this principle exists in tension with the driving force of money-capital accumulation in
capitalism. Fanelli acknowledges this fact: “”Public services address real needs and result from
previous rounds of class struggle, but they also address the need of the capitalist state to reproduce class
society.”(p. 83). Moreover, public sector workers can often also stand in relations of power over and
against the communities they serve, often in racialized and sexist formations (welfare case workers visa-vis their clients, for example). Overcoming the later contradiction requires building alliances and
coalitions with communities, while the former requires defending, extending, and democratising public
services; a reverse process of publicization against the privatizing agenda that has dominated over the
past thirty years. That campaign requires militancy, and militancy requires education and member
mobilization. “Considering the concerted attacks against labour, should unions wish to regain their once
prominent role in the pursuit of social justice and workplace democracy, they will need to take the risks
of organizing working class communities and fighting back … This requires a radicalized perspective
that seeks to develop both alternative policies and an alternative politics rooted in class-oriented
unionism.”(p. 61) It should be added: it will also take a new layer of younger leadership educated in the
history of militant trade unionism while attentive to contemporary realities and open to and capable of
inventing creative responses appropriate to the twenty-first century. One worries (or I do anyway) that
the culture of expressive virtual individualism works against the emergence of such a leadership layer.
Nevertheless, it would be foolish and ahistorical to simply abandon the union movement as a potentially
transformative movement while it still organizes millions of workers (and especially the public sector
union movement, where union density is far higher than in the private sector and where the services the
workers provide must be fixed in local space). As long as there is a union movement, it needs spurs to
reinvention such as Fanelli has written. Still, arguments like Fanelli’s are always subject to the
objection that despite their forward-looking rhetoric they are rear-guard actions whose conditions of
historical possibility have passed. The only sound response to the objection is practical success, for
which the author cannot be held responsible, since success will require contributions from thousands of
people acting politically over open-ended time-frames.
At the level of argument, Fanelli’s set of reform principles: coalition building, community engagement,
internal democratization, and member education steered by the goal of preserving public services and
extending the logic of public provision are sound and what one would expect. There is one blind spot
that is worth mentioning. In Fanelli’s version of cities, what makes them great is the range and depth of
public services available to citizens. I agree without reservation, but would venture to add that the
cultural and intellectual dynamism of great cities needs to be included. Fanelli is largely silent on the
cultural wealth of Toronto: its bands, performances, public talks; its eccentrics, artists, and folk heroes,
its neighbourhoods, galleries, universities, clubs, restaurants, and book stores; its magnificent cultural,
intellectual, and sexual diversity. Unlike David Harvey (whom he cites) Fanelli’s version of the “right
to the city” is largely confined to affordable housing,transit and other (vitally, vitally important, no
doubt) basic human needs.(p.78).
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But human beings are creatures of mind and imagination too. The right to the city must also include the
right to access the extraordinary cultural (and intercultural) dynamism of the world’s great cities. Often
times the barriers here are not financial, but cultural: the snobbery and closed-mindedness of cultural
elites who often (although not always) function as gate-keepers to these institutions and
events. Working people are often made to feel as thought they lack the “symbolic capital” to borrow a
phrase from Bourdieu, to take advantage of cutting-edge art and thought that cities incubate and

nurture. And that is wrong, for art and thought are not the preserve of financial and cultural elites but
should be open to everyone. The left needs to extend its historical commitment to egalitarianism beyond
access to the requisites of life to the requisites of a liberated mind and imagination.
The modern city is certainly a creature of capital, but it is also a creature of human labour and human
imagination. Great cities have long been attractors of genius and eccentricity and spaces where
difference can be protected from bigotry by force of concentrated numbers of the like-minded and
tolerant and experimental. Cities are contradictory spaces just because they concentrate in a relatively
small geographical space the most inventive and forward-looking human beings with the most brutal
indignities that capital can inflict. The struggle for the city must be a struggle to overcome the structural
causes of those dignities, but also a struggle to open the horizons of working people to the creative and
intellectual wealth that already exists. Beyond opening up access to what already exists, a re-vivified
struggle for the right to the city must also be a struggle to widen and deepen that wealth by enabling
people to live as subjects of their own activity and not objects of money-capital. Fanelli has written a
short but important intervention into the debate over the shapes that that struggle should to take.
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READINGS: HENRI LEFEBVRE: THE
CRITIQUE OF EVERYDAY LIFE
Originally Posted on February 12, 2016
A perennial question for he socialist left has been: if capitalism is so bad, why are mass movements
against it so rare (not to mention unsuccessful)? One answer is obvious: the state has a monopoly on the
means of violence and has proven willing to use it to enforce capitalist class rule. However important
that reason is, it does not sufficiently address the deeper issue: workers are not constantly in a state of
near or actual insurrection. Indeed, they are not even in a constant state of overt dissatisfaction, but
most often seem content to seek their pleasures and purposes within capitalism. Beginning with
Gramsci and developing through the Frankfurt School, early and middle twentieth century Marxists and
Critical Theorists looked to the roles that popular culture and the growing purchasing power of workers
played as explanations for ruling class “hegemony” (the ability to build and maintain consent without
resort to violence). While the names of Gramsci and Marcuse are well-known, that of Henri Lefevbre is
less renowned, at least in the English speaking world. And yet, of all the analyses and critiques of
consumer society, none matches the detail or temporal scope of Lefebvre’s The Critique of Everyday
Life. Its three volumes, composed over nearly forty years (1947, 1962, and 1981), trace the changing
structure of consumer society from its re-emergence following World War Two to the dawn of the
information society in 1981. Without denying that these forty years witnessed profound changes to
everyday life: the liberation of women from the home, the sexual revolution of the 1960’s, the growing
role of technology, Lefebvre is able to demonstrate that the one constant of everyday life under
capitalism is that it alienates us in multiple ways from our needs and from each other.
It is easy to forget that behind alienation lies genuine needs and goals– genuine in the sense that if the
needs are not satisfied, harm ensues, and if the goals are not fulfilled, life has in a sense, been wasted in
that dimension of being alive. To focus on everyday life as a structure of alienation is thus at one and the
same time to assert that certain needs and goals are genuine, and to disclose the ways in which capitalist
priorities impede their satisfaction and realization (or permit only partial forms of both). But to focus on
everyday life, as opposed to the workplace, as the zone of alienation, is to argue for a different
conception of socialism (or, perhaps better said, to widen the scope of the idea of socialism), as not just
a structural change in relations at the point of production, but equally a transformation of life-activity
and relationships.
In the first volume this argument is deployed against Stalinist orthodoxy and its failures. He maintained
that socialism had to involve more than releasing the forces of production from their capitalist fetters: it
had to mean transformations of self-understanding that allowed for more satisfying forms of activity and
relationship in all zones of life. “What is socialism, exactly? How does it intervene in everyday life? …
the answer is unclear. The elimination of class antagonisms? The supersession of capitalist property and
production? These are only negative definitions. We find the picture of a bourgeois society without a
bourgeoisie neither reassuring nor satisfying.” (p.69). Lefebvre never fully answers this question, but
his aim was not to provide a blueprint for how free people would live, but to insist that freedom must
encompass everyday and consciousness.
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The main problem with orthodox Marxist politics is that– despite Marx’s own protestation that the
emancipation of workers had to be the act of the workers themselves– it tried to reconstruct workers’
consciousness from the outside, and thus proved continually at odds with the majority of

workers. Already becoming clear in 1947, the conclusion that this politics was a dead end could not be
avoided in 1981: “So the fate of philosophies of pure knowledge as not spared Marxism: Revolution
through positive knowledge, brought to the working class from without, (Lenin)- that revolution has
miscarried.”(p.731) While Lefebvre’s purpose is not to reconstruct the politics of the struggle for
socialism, his arguments have the general political implication that socialism must be a transformation
of everyday life and not just a change in the class identity of the people in charge of major social
institutions. As a transformation of everyday life, the struggle for socialism is a long term on going
struggle and not a cataclysmic overthrow of bourgeois power. The Soviet Union was undone, according
to Lefebvre not because class power was not overthrown, but because the power seized was not used to
emancipate everyday life.
What would it mean to emancipate everyday life? To overcome all manner of alienation: not just
alienation from the product and process of labour or other people as workers, but in all dimensions of
our lives- playing, interacting, loving, building homes, creating. Alienation in everyday life means
looking to things to do for us what we can only do for ourselves: make ourselves feel worthy, valued,
loved, respected as the rela means of producing meaning and joy. Everyday life exists between the
institutionalized spaces and forces of the economic and political system and the uncontrolled sectors of
inner, psychic life. It is “the region where man appropriates not so much external nature, but his own
nature—as a zone of demarcation and friction between the uncontrolled sector and the controlled sector
of life—and a region where goods come into confrontation with needs which have become more or less
desires.”(p.375).” The problem with everyday life under capitalism is that it alienates the desire, i..e, the
conscious striving to satisfy needs into to desire to consume commodities. The critique of everyday life
is thus the critique of the commodification of desire. “Critique,” he argues, “mounts an attack on gaps
and imbalances (between temporalities, between the “basic” and the “superior,” between the historical
and the private, the social and the individual). It points out the gaps, the vacuum, the distance yet to be
crossed. It criticizes the role of society and the roles society imposes … It attacks alienation in all its
forms, in culture, in ideology, beyond the moral sphere. Critique demands the dissolution and
revolutionary metamorphosis of the everyday.”(p.517). The revolutionary metamorphosis of the
everyday, in turn, involves the recovery of the spontaneity of self-creation from the unsatisfactory
pleasures of capitalist consumer society.
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In the controlled sector of society people are tokens of types: workers, bosses, electricians, politicians,
and their lives the execution of more or less programmed routines. Outside of these roles, in everyday
life, people are not mere functions of social positions but persons: “In the everyday, when the “human
being” confronts within itself the social and the individual through the test of problems and
contradictions which have been more or less resolved, it becomes a “person.” What does this mean? In
our view, a cloud of possibilities gradually vapourized by choices—by actions—until it is exhausted and
comes to an end- until death. It is … a drama, the drama of participation in society, the drama of …
individualization.”(p.357). Consumer society alientates us from the spontaneity of personality formation
by promising to routinize happiness: buy this product or appear in that way, and happiness will follow
as a mechanical effect. Even if that effect were achieved (and it clearly is not) the complete loss of
spontaneity it would entail would further entail the loss of our humanity. Our humanity is the capacity
to write the drama as it unfolds, not to merely follow the script but to be its author too, and to never
know exactly how it is going to end. Human freedom is bound up with the responsiveness of the future
to choices that we make in the present: the value of our activity is not determined solely by outcomes,
but also by effort. When Marx says, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 that under
socialism “man will be man and his relationship to the world will be a human one,” he means that
socialism, whatever institutionalized forms it takes, will restore spontaneity and truth to everyday

life. We will be the persons that we make ourselves to be, not the people our money can make us appear
to be, even though we are the opposite.
Lefebvre (like Marx), is not nostalgic, but he does look to rural society (the ghosts of which still walked
the French countryside in 1947) as evidence of the depth sociality of human life that capitalism
alienates. This depth sociality is best expressed in the festival, where the fruits of nature and collective
labour were shared in a communal celebration enjoyed by each individual. “Rural communities
associated nature specifically with human joyfulness … Thus when the community gathered to carry out
this simple action of eating and drinking, the event was attended by a sense of magnificence which
intensified the feelings of joy.” (p.233) Lefebvre does not posit the feudal festival as a model to be
emulated. Indeed, in the third volume he begins to examine urban space as the potential site for modern
forms of creative human expression and interaction. His goal is not, therefore, to romanticize the past
but to look resolutely to the future, to freeing urban space from its current domination by commercial
interests for the sake of opening its cultural dynamism to the contributions of everyone. In this regard
he was a primary inspiration to the contemporary “right to the city” movement. (See further, David
Harvey, Rebel Cities) He does not look backward, but forward, but at the same time, he does not think
of a free society as a creatio ex nihilo, as the result of foundational needs and desires being satisfied in
new ways.
The student and worker rebellions of the late 1960’s appeared to have captured some of the spontaneous
creativity that underlies Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life. Lefebvre was professor of sociology at the
University of Paris-Nanterre during the 1968 rebellion. Its failure did not completely disillusion him,
but it did cause him to shift political focus and reject once for all the Leninist model of revolution. In
the third volume he affirms the unrealized potentials of peaceful democratic struggle and human
rights: “Let me end with the example of human rights. The fact that some dangerous forces, even
imperialism, have sought to make use of them … cannot justify abandoning the, … On the
contrary.”(p.780). This embrace of human rights might be dismissed as conservatism, but this rejection
would be to miss the point (which serves as a political through line connecting all three
volumes): practice must be judged pragmatically and historically. The values of socialism are not
dependent upon some one means of struggle. What matters is realizing the values, not fetishizing “The
Revolution.” If the evidence proves that nineteenth and early twentieth century forms of struggle have
failed, but the values remain unrealized but essential to human well-being, then we honour the history
by changing the tactics, not slavishly repeating them, a move that will only ensure more failure.
The political value of the book follows from its clear understanding that the essence of historical
materialism is the principle that because society changes the methods appropriate to understanding
society have to develop along with it. In the case of The Critique of Everyday Life these changes take
the form not only of defining a new object domain (everyday life) but effecting a new conceptual
synthesis between philosophy and sociology. The synthesis involves bringing the normative core of
philosophy (its concern with realizing the full value of human potentialities) to bear on the empirical
study of the complexities and nuances of the forces that shape everyday life as these forces change
historically and pose new threats (and opportunities) for self-realization. His method treads carefully
between the twin dangers of structuralism on the one hand (which ignores human agency) and
methodological individual and voluntarism on the other (which ignores the ways in which the content
and motivations of individuals are socially structured. It is a paradigm instance of dialectical thinking
which, sadly, was mostly ignored in the English speaking world in the eighties and nineties when it
would have provided an antidote to the one-sided poststructuralist deconstruction of the human subject.
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The difficulties of developing a dialectical understanding of the relationship between structure and
agency are sufficiently challenging that the book still repays reading for its proposed solution to this
problem. It also remains vital today for its anticipations of the problems of technological society. Even
in 1981, before the internet and smartphones, Lefebvre could already see that the promise of
technological society, at least so long as it was bound up with capitalist market forces, would be more
advertising hype than actual emancipation. But more than ideological unmasking, he also saw what
contemporary technotopians still refuse to acknowledge today, when this truth is so much more in
evidence than it was in 1981: the ideal of the technological society is the elimination of the spontaneity
of human self-creative activity in favour of programmed pleasures and predictable
outcomes: “Assimilation, repetition, equivalence (calculable, predictable, and hence open to rational
administration)—such are the characteristics daily life tends towards … Everyday life managed like an
enterprise within an enormous, technocratically administered system—such is the first and last word of
the technocratic ethic: every moment anticipated, quantified in money terms, and programmed
temporally and spatially.”(p. 731). That is not to say that Lefebvre rejects the value of technology
(indeed, in the earlier volumes he often present the problem of the transformation of everyday as the
problem of realizing the social value of technology that had been tapped in industry but not everyday
life). What his argument makes clear is that there is a difference between technology as a means to
social ends, and technology as an end in itself. The latter, fetishized view can only ever be the ally of
economic forces that alienate human capacities.
The Critique of Everyday Life is not a book to read with your feet up and mind half elsewhere. It is a
difficult, sometimes turgid work in which there is a lot of thinking out loud and searching. It is also one
of the great works of twentieth century Marxist philosophy and still well worth the effort that must be
expended to understand it.
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READINGS: CHRIS HEDGES: THE WAGES
OF REBELLION: THE MORAL
IMPERATIVE OF REVOLT
Originally Posted October 27, 2015
The subtitle of this book sums up the problem with the global Left seven years after the start of a crisis
that, from the standpoint of working people, shows no signs of abating. Revolt might be a moral
imperative, but revolution is a matter of political organization. Revolt is immediate, passionate, a
response to a specific provocation or an exasperated flailing against structures of oppression that the
oppressed can no longer bear. Revolts can become revolutions, but not without democratic political
organization. Democratic political organizations alone can transform a righteous fight into a coherent,
long term strategy of institutional change. Hedges should not be faulted for not providing what no one
else has yet provided: a defensible alternative to the vanguardist Leninist parties that won power
through the revolutions of the twentieth century but could not ultimately sustain the democratic energy
from which they were born. But he can be faulted for ignoring the question altogether.
In part, the criticisms I am reluctantly forced to make stem from the expectations that I brought to the
book. Books should be allowed to speak for themselves, and when the reader does not let them, because
he or she has already formed a preconception of what ‘should” be in the book, disappointment is
inevitable. I came the The Wages of Rebellion expecting: a) a clear analysis of the structural crisis of
capitalist civilization, in America and globally, b) an argument that demonstrated that the crisis is the
cause of growing political mobilizations around the world, c) a systematic explanation of the form of
organization needed to transform these mobilizations from spontaneous episodes of resistance and revolt
into a cumulative and self-ramifying revolutionary transformation of global capitalist society, and d) a
clear explanation of the values, institutions, and social dynamics that characterize the alternative
society. The book did not fully satisfy any of those expectations. On the one hand, it did not because its
real purpose was to tell stories of individual rebels rather than provide a systematic analysis of the
causes of global crisis.(p.18) On the other hand, when it does attempt analysis, it is not systematic,
never clearly grounded in any definite political tradition, and, at the crucial moment, substitutes treacle
platitudes for a more prosaic, but much more necessary, explanation of institutional alternatives and the
concrete political steps needed to mobilize the numbers of people necessary to bring them into being.
The introduction foreshadows the problems from which the whole book suffers. Instead of a clear
statement of a) what the real nature of the problem we are facing is, and b) a correspondingly clear
statement of what we ought to do about it, we are instead given a tour through a picture gallery of
famous revolutionaries. The portraits are engaging but the underlying message is inconsistent. Hedges
defines the revolutionary ideal as “the vision of a better world, the belief that resistance is a moral act to
protect the weak and the poor.”(p.6) Note the way in which he defines revolution as a moral act “in
defense of the weak and poor” rather than as a movement of the weak and poor. The political view of
the entire book is coloured by this substitutionist-heroic understanding of revolution. Instead of being
understood as the democratic movements they historically have been, Hedges repeatedly reduces
revolution to the moral psychology of revolutionaries, which he alternately extols, when they chose the
path of non-violent resistance, or dismisses, when they chose the road of armed struggle.
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My argument here is not that Leninist vanguard parties or peasant armies should be the preferred means
of struggle at this point in the twenty-first century. I agree with Hedges on this point, that anyone who
still believes in that politics has not understood the political lessons of the failure of twentieth century
revolutions. Hedges is thus correct when he argues that “revolutions take time. They are often begun by
one generation and completed by the next.”(p.18) Rather, my objection is that, with the notable
exception of his discussion of the Zapatista strategy of building the world you want to live in with the
available means at your disposal, there is no discussion whatsoever of political mobilization.(pp.7076). The Marxist tradition is invoked periodically for certain insights about the process of revolution,
but politically dismissed, with no alternative tradition of mass political mobilization ever being invoked
as a superior alternative. This history of feminism, of anti-colonial struggle (with the exception of a few
vignettes about Nelson Mandela), and even the civil rights movement are left unexamined as sources of
information about how massive numbers of people can be effectively organized to win major social
victories.
Thus, the main problem with Hedges’ book, for all its exceptionally clear focus on the profoundly
undemocratic and violent and dangerous state of the world, is that it is too much like every other
political book published by major publishing houses: it is about personalities, not political and social
processes. The body of the book is not a defense of the claim that revolt is a moral imperative, it is a
gallery of people who have stood up to power and paid for it: Martin Luther King, Mumia Abu-Jamal,
Chelsea Manning, Julian Assange, Edward Snowden, Cecily MacMillan, Thomas Paine. The portraits
are lovingly drawn, the political lessons of their individual struggles well-taken, the heroism of their
personal examples obvious, their courage superogatory. Yet, despite Hedges’ unquestionable
commitment to justice and democracy, the majority of people never appear as agents of their own
liberation in this book. The most important argument Marx ever made about revolution (one that is too
often forgotten) is that the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class
itself. One can say the same for women, for racialized mainitorites, for demonized ethnicities, and any
other group facing structural oppression: their freedom must be achieved through their own struggles,
and not as the reflex of the heroic acts of a saviour.
Amazingly, that point is never made. Instead, the majority of the people on the planet appear either as
passive victims awaiting salvation or as dangerous mob ready to explode. Despite the fact that the book
asserts that there is a moral imperative to revolt, Hedges often appears to be as fearful of mass political
uprisings as the ruling class he rails against. His is an individualistic view of rebellion: “The person
with moral courage defies the crowd, stands up as a solitary individual, shuns the intoxicating embrace
of comradeship, and is disobedient to authority, even at the risk of his or her life, for a higher
principle.”(p. 59). This view of rebellion is typical of a liberal, great person theory of history.
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Indeed, I found myself worrying that Hedges’ preferred audience for this book is not the mass of people,
but the very “liberal class” whose death he lamented in the book that first brought him to public
prominence. Like Thomas Piketty two years ago, Hedges seems less interested in working out a theory
of mass democratic political mobilization than warning the ruling class to begin to address structural
inequality, sham democracy, and totalitarian surveillance, or face a violent and incohate uprising that
will destroy everything in its blind fury. He alternates between charges that the public is compromised
by an “inability to grasp the pathology of our oligarchic corporate elite” (p. 61) which makes effective
resistance difficult and apocalyptic worries that without effective resistance the planet might be
doomed.(p.28) At one point, he simply asserts that socialism must replace capitalism, (p.155) without
defining what he means by socialism. Yet, throughout the book, he laments the decline of unions and is
skeptical about the power of the working class. If socialism is not going to be achieved via the political
agency of the working class, how is it going to be achieved? By following, it would seem. At the end,

Hedges asserts that the majority of people must follow those rebels moved by a “sublime madness” to
some indeterminate future of emancipated life: “I do not know if we can build a better society. I do not
even know if we will survive as a species. But I do know that corporate forces have us by the throat. …
I do not fight fascists because I will win. I fight fascists because they are fascists. And this is a fight
that in the face of the overwhelming forces against us requires that we follow those possessed by
sublime madness.”(p. 226). Calling the current regime “fascist” sounds like bold iconoclasm, but when
thought through in the context of the comment that follows, Hedges actually plays it safe.
That suspicion is bolstered by the complete lack of any discussion of what an alternative will look like,
what its economy will be, and what values it will serve. He inveighs against “corporate capitalism,” and
details in chilling detail the Kafkesque machinations of surveillance state power, but does not discuss
alternative models of democracy, what a democratic socialist and life-valuable economy might look like
and how it might run, and what sorts of political parties need to be created in order to advance the
agenda. He does not discuss the struggle for twenty-first century socialism in Bolivia and Venezuela, he
says nothing about Syriza or the attempt to re-energize parliamentary democracy through the creation of
parties to the left of moribund social democracy.
To really challenge the forces of what Hedges calls fascism does not require sublime madness but
working through– critically, to be sure– the concrete lessons of past and present efforts at systematic
change . To blindly follow the lone rebel is to turn oneself into cannon fodder for a failed revolt. The
successful revolutions and mass rebellions of history were not spontaneous uprisings of people led by a
charismatic leader, they were meticulously planned and organized. That is not to say that leadership is
not important or that almost mystical visions of future harmony and beauty cannot be important
motivating ideas. It is to say that the protection and freedom of life that would define a society that
manages to solve the problems of capitalism cannot be a virtuoso creation, but a project of long, patient,
democratic struggle. If the situation is as bad environmentally, economically, politically, and culturally
as Hedges portrays it as being, then we need much better from public intellectuals like Hedges than
“rebellion … requires honoring the sacred. It requires an understanding that, as with the heros of
ancient Greece, one cannot finally overcome fate … but that we must resist regardless.”(p.225). If, as
this claim implies, resistance is doomed to failure, people will be forgiven if they do not even
try. Ultimately that message is a message more likely to lead to resignation than resistance, and it is
therefore a message the ruling class will not be unhappy to have disseminated.
In the purple glow of “sublime madness” a union meeting or a pro-choice rally or a demonstration
against police violence looks grey and uninspiring, particularly if it is small. There seems no way to get
from the shabby union office or the wind-swept street to the conquest of the structures that oppress
us. Nevertheless, it is in shabby offices, kitchens, and on wind-swept streets that revolutions are made,
and made not by those summoning followers to follow their inspired vision, but by leaders mobilizing
ordinary people to become agents and leaders themselves. I believe that Hedges would agree with this
properly democratic conception of leadership and struggle, but if he does, it does not come through
clearly in this powerful, but ultimately politically unsatisfactory, book.
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READINGS: FREDERIC GROS: A
PHILOSOPHY OF WALKING
Originally Posted on July 23, 2015
If there is a book in the history of philosophy that I wish I would have written, it is this book, Frederic
Gros’ A Philosophy of Walking. It is humble– “a” philosophy of walking, not the philosophy of
walking. It does not claim to lay bear the universal principle of Being as the great but now mostly
ignored systems of classical and modern philosophy claimed to have accomplished. It does not expose
the depth contradictions of our social order, the primary task (I would argue) left to philosophy now that
its universe-comprehending efforts have been taken over by natural science. What it does do is draw
attention to the beauty of the mundane- a minor function of philosophy (and the major function of
poetry?) in such a way that unexpected depths are revealed in the very simplicity of the act of
walking. Walking is not treated as metaphor, metonym, or symbol for something grander, but is allowed
to reveal the multiple ways in which it is, in its very banality and corporeality, one element of what can
make the life of finite embodied beings wonderful.
There is a mystery to the world of ideas. When one’s mind is intensely focussed on a problem it
draws towards itself the work of previously unknown other minds who give perfect expression to some
aspect of the problem one initially thought no one else had ever explored. Rather than professional
jealousy (the response of the careerist, not the philosopher) the discovery that someone is thinking as
you think produces a sense of intellectual communion: an anticipatory knowledge constantly confirmed
of what the book is going to say next. Just as an objection formed in my head– but what about urban
walking? is this a philosophy of walking of a philosophy of hiking? my concerns were allayed, and
Gros came around to the proper pleasures of walking in cities. The almost exact doubling of one’s
ideas still leaves room– and this is crucial–for work to deepen one’s own thinking and push it in new
directions. Ultimately, this space means that there is never any repetition in the field of philosophical
ideas, but growth.
A Philosophy of Walking is an elegant book. Its insights are not extolled over sentences as long as
paragraphs and paragraphs as long as chapters, but in deceptively simple observations that the readers’
mind cannot leave hold of once they have been read: “Walking is a part of active melancholia” (p.151,
in commentary upon Gerard de Nerval); “Boredom is immobility of body confronted with emptiness of
mind” (in explanation of why walking, though monotonous, cannot be boring); “When you hurry, time
is filled to bursting, like a badly arranged drawer in which you have stuffed different things without any
attempt at order,” (p. 37, in praise of the slowness of walking). The text alternates between commentary
on famous literary and philosophical walkers and the author’s reflections on what his own walks have
taught him. The commentaries– on Nietzsche, Rimbaud, Rousseau, Thoreau, the Cynics, Gerard de
Nerval, Kant, and Ghandi (with shorter discussions of Baudelaire, Benjamin, and Wordsworth) expose
the different ways in which walking is essential to philosophical and poetic creation. Gros’s reflection
on his own peregrinations testify to the simple goodness of being a sentient body in the world.
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Considered from the perspective of its philosophical content, three truths are asserted rather than
reached through argument. I call them truths in honour of the richness and depth of experience from
which they have been drawn by careful reflection. Some truths are learned not by following arguments
but by paying attention to the world, (which is a material system not a logical principle). The
justification for these truths is not logical but experiential– to confirm them, one must undertake the

experience from which it they have been drawn. If one undertakes the experience but does not derive
the same truth, its universality is not thereby refuted. The absence of acceptance only proves that one is
closed off to what the experience teaches (the truth is in the object waiting to be drawn out). Before the
truth is definitively rejected, one must work harder to open oneself to the object whose truth one
resists. In this struggle to open oneself to that to which one is initially closed consists human learning.
The first truth that Gros’s reflections disclose is that the slow pace of walking allows us to savour being
alive amidst the things of the world. “Slowness means cleaving perfectly to time, so closely that the
seconds fall, one by one, drop by drop like the steady dripping of a tap on stone. This stretching of time
deepens space. It is one of the secrets of walking: a slow approach to landscapes that gradually renders
them familiar. Like the regular encounters that deepen friendship.” (p.37). Like friendship, the
encounter with the world in walking is an end in itself– we do not walk to learn about the world that
which the scientist demands (abstractions, general forces, universal laws), but to allow it to reveal itself
to us in its endless variety and specificity. Walking thus returns us, Gros claims, to the “realism” of
childhood- the acceptance of material things as they show themselves to be in their concreteness: “It is
children who are the true realists: they never proceed from generalities. The adult recognises the general
form in a particular example, a representative of the species, dismisses everything else … The child
perceives individuals, personalities. He sees the unique form … It isn’t a triumph of the imagination,
but an unprejudiced, total realism. And Nature becomes instantly poetic.” (p.162). In becoming poetic,
the Nature we encounter in walking is beautiful, sufficient in its mere presence, and ourselves, in
response, joyful just to be for those few moments. “When we renounce everything,” Gros,
quoting Swami Ramdas notes, “everything is given to us, in abundance. Everything: meaning the
intensity of presence itself.”(p. 9). At root, what is the good of life other than this being here amongst
the things of the world (everything, there is nothing outside of the whole world) and knowing that
you are being here? Everything else is instrumental to some purpose, but beneath the particular
purposes there must be goodness in being as such– otherwise, what justification for the struggles to
achieve the purposes?
The second truth that Gros reveals is that walking, as the most basic coordinated movement of the body,
connects us to our finite materiality and the earth– it teaches us what we really are at base–
bodies. Bodies that think, yes, but bodies: “What dominates in walking, away from ostentation and
showing off, is the simple joy of feeling your body in the most primitively natural activity … When you
walk, the basso continuo of joy comes from feeling the extent to which your body is made for this
movement, the way it finds in each pace the resource for the next.” (p. 143) This joy of simple
movement simultaneously frees the mind from its mundane concerns, the demands that work and life
pile upon it, so that thoughts can come. The real thought, the idea that contains some insight, something
previously unthought, in contrast to the explication and the proof, does not come hunched over at one’s
desk, but when one is not expecting it, when one is not searching deliberately for it. Walking untenses
the body and opens the mind: when the mind is open, ideas flood in, uncalled for: “The body’s
monotonous duty liberates thought. While walking, one is not obliged to think, to think this or that or
like this or like that. During that continuous but automatic effort of the body, the mind is placed at one’s
disposal. It is then that thoughts can arise, surface, or take shape.” (p.157). As with the good of sheer
being, the letting arise or take shape of ideas is the presupposition and validation of the hard work of
putting them to work in arguments. The impoverished content of much of the philosophy of our age is
perhaps a consequence of the fact that philosophers are mostly paid academics– too much time indoors,
at desks and conferences, arguing about the same old ideas and not enough moving in space letting ideas
for which there are as yet no supporting arguments arise.
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The third truth can be understood as a synthesis of the first two. Walking allows us to encounter the
reality of the things of the world and free our own thoughts from the social forces that weigh them
down. It thus constitutes a form of resistance– (Gros calls it “subversion”) of the competitive,
technological, money-driven form of social life coming to dominate the planet. (p. 178). The simplicity
of walking, the fact that the body is ready-made to walk without any need for technological
supplementation (not even shoes, if you choose not to wear any), the fact that everyone teaches him or
herself to walk without any need for expensive lessons, that it can only be enjoyed at a measured pace
(speed walking is a contradiction in terms), and that it is best done alone, makes it paradigmatically
free: it costs nothing and we can undertake a walk anytime we choose. Reflecting on Ghandi’s use of
walking in his campaigns, Gros observes that a determined political march requires dignity, discipline,
and courage. “Walking is the right speed to understand, to feel close. Apart from that, you depend on
yourself alone to advance. Given that you are up to it, your will alone is in charge, and you await only
your own injunction… Gandhi promoted through the marching movement a dimension of firmness and
endurance: to keep going. That is essential, because walking calls for gentle but continuous
effort.” (p.201) Contrast this steadiness of purpose with the panicked fleeing of a riot in retreat from a
police charge: the rioters succumb to the superior violence of the state; the calm walkers refuse to
engage on the level of state violence, and simply keep going, determinedly, towards their objective.
Techno-capitalism is trying to colonise every second of lifetime and every square centimeter of life
space. In the space time it controls, ever-accelerating activity is demanded. Hence the pace of walking
(and the refusal to respond to society’s demands which is sleep, as Jonathan Crary argues in his short
masterpiece, 24/7) is a revolt of the human body and a demand to reclaim life:
“These discoveries and joys can only be given to those who stroll with an open mind … they will come
spontaneously to one who, summoned by spring sunshine, joyously abandons his work just to get a little
time to himself … Only thus- with no expectation of a specific profit from the outing, and with all cares
and worries firmly left behind in desk drawers– will a stroll become the gratuitous aesthetic moment,
that rediscovery of the lightness of being, the sweetness of a soul reconciled to itself and the
world.”(p.166).

120

